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Abstract 
This thesis argues that American exceptionalism is a necessary, but insufficient, 
way of reading U.S. foreign policy. Exceptionalism is employed by different 
ideologists in different ways and in differing contexts. This thesis employs the 
contextualist methodology of Quentin Skinner to challenge proleptic, static 
understandings of American exceptionalism and, in doing so, uncovers American 
grand strategy as a keenly contested ideological battleground. In each constituent 
case study, the thesis identifies the ideological innovators of American strategic 
policy and the key moments of ideological innovation, and examines why 
ideological innovations became conventional, or not. 
The analysis proceeds with an introduction to the composition of grand strategy, 
continues with an examination of Quentin Skinner’s version of Cambridge School 
contextual analysis, and then places Skinnerian contextualism within the broader 
framework of International Relations theory. This analysis illustrates the 
methodological advantage of Skinnerian contextualism, which allows the 
reconstruction of the context in which past generations of ideological innovators 
operated and conceived of the world and the place of the United States within it. 
This specific type of analysis demonstrates ideological innovation in practice at 
four pivotal moments in American foreign policy: first, the emergence of 
containment as the cornerstone of the Truman Doctrine at the outset of the Cold 
War; second, détente and the supposed injection of realism into American foreign 
policy; third, President Clinton’s strategy of enlargement and the place of 
American exceptionalism in the aftermath of the Cold War; and, fourth, the Bush 
Doctrine and the interaction between American exceptionalism and 
neoconservatism. 
The thesis concludes by stressing the particularities of historical context, having 
demonstrated that, although exceptionalism has rarely been the only causal 
dynamic of American grand strategy, it has consistently provided the context with 
which innovating ideologists have been required to engage in order to create their 
own version of grand strategy.  
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Chapter 1. The Cambridge School and the Discourse of 
Exceptionalism in U.S. Grand Strategy 
Rationale and hypothesis 
The central argument made in this thesis is that American exceptionalism is a 
necessary yet insufficient way of understanding American grand strategy. It is 
insufficient because it has always been a source of ideological contestation, 
employed in different ways, by different people, and in different contexts, to 
support and enable different grand strategic projects. This thesis applies the 
contextualism of Quentin Skinner to recreate and examine the contested discourse 
of American exceptionalism at four critical junctures and will illustrate the way in 
which these ideological struggles shaped grand strategy by enabling ideological 
innovation whilst at the same time also limiting the degree of possible 
transformation. In doing so, this thesis will show how this debate about the nature 
of America and its place in the world, which has imbued American political life at 
least since the Declaration of Independence, has had a far more flexible meaning 
than previous scholarship suggests, but it will also show that the political actors 
who created grand strategy were to a significant extent bound by the ideological 
conventions of their predecessors. 
This chapter serves three primary functions. First, it will set out the rationale and 
hypothesis for the thesis. Second, it will explicate the notion of grand strategy as 
an ideologically contested space in the United States. Third, it will introduce the 
methodological approach of Cambridge School contextualism. 
Three faulty assumptions are made in the academic analysis of the role of 
exceptionalism in American foreign policy: (1) that American grand strategy is 
only sometimes ideological (this thesis will argue that it is always underpinned by 
ideology); (2) that exceptionalism has meant the same thing over time; and (3) 
that exceptionalism is used as a rationale for the same kinds of political project or 
for the same political ends. 
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Richard Hofstadter claims that Americans do not embrace ideologies because 
America is an ideology.1 Here, Hofstadter argues that a set of beliefs that 
epitomise American values and the American way of life frame every American 
policy decision and, Hofstadter argues implicitly, that these beliefs exist at a very 
fundamental, yet tacit, level that transcends most party political debate. He 
suggests that, whilst Americans are not necessarily able to consciously articulate 
an ideology or acknowledge that they embrace an ideology, they are imbued with 
the ideology of America: that is to say that, by virtue of being American, they 
derive part of their own personal identify, and thereby their tacit beliefs, from this 
overarching societal dynamic. These tacit beliefs are clustered around the ill-
defined idea that the United States is an extraordinary nation with a special role to 
play in human history and is in some sense distinct both in characteristics and 
behaviour from other states. The nature of America’s difference from other states 
and how this should be expressed in terms of international conduct has 
nonetheless legitimised a wide range of different strategic approaches from 
unilateralism to periods of national disillusionment, self-condemnation, and 
isolationism. 
In its most benign form, ideology2 simply refers to a body of thought, “a language 
of politics defined by its conventions and employed by a number of writers.”3 In 
this thesis, American exceptionalism is treated as just this: a language of politics 
about America’s place in the world. This thesis treats American exceptionalism as 
‘para-ideological’, the crystallisation of a loose language of politics that explains 
the world and the American role therein. Whilst exceptionalism might not be 
shown to have the coherence of a formal ideology it can be shown to underpin 
political discourse in the United States. In recreating that contested discourse of 
exceptionalism the thesis challenges the notion that American exceptionalism has 
                                                
1 Hofstadter in Michael Kazin, “The Right’s Unsung Prophets,” The Nation, 248 (February 20, 
1989): 242. 
2 The use of the term “ideology” is the subject of considerable contestation and is frequently used 
in very different, ill-defined ways and often inconsistently by the same authors. See John Gerring, 
“Ideology: A Definitional Analysis,” Political Research Quarterly, 50, no. 4 (1997): 957–94 for a 
useful survey and analysis of the use of the term. See also Michael Freeden, Ideologies and 
Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
3 James Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” in Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and His 
Critics, ed. James Tully (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), 9. 
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trans-historical homogeneity of meaning or that it has been codified as a means 
towards one single definable strategic end. 
On the sole occasion where he explicitly defines ideological argument, Quentin 
Skinner describes it as argument “intertwined with claims to social power.”4 This 
is a less benign use of the term, suggesting a rhetorical strategy aimed at 
achieving some sort of distortion. What distinguishes Skinner’s account of 
ideology from other critical accounts is that, unlike Marxist or feminist accounts, 
which do share Skinner’s understanding that an ideology is intertwined with 
social power, Skinner’s conception has no a priori sense of ascribing who might 
be trying to exercise that power or why.5 
In an area of scholarship that has been dominated by diplomatic historians on one 
disciplinary wing and realists on the other,6 the examination of exceptionalism 
and American foreign policy has neglected to treat American grand strategy as 
intellectual history. Where American exceptionalism has been treated as a discrete 
ideology its treatment has tended to either be temporally limited or it has been 
considered a largely static concept, not subject to political contestation.7 Unable to 
find easy lines of causation between ideology and policy, diplomatic historians 
who have focused on the period after 1945 have been wary of sustained 
examinations of American exceptionalism. When scholars have attempted to 
tackle American ideology they have rarely dealt directly with exceptionalism, 
instead creating new ideological tropes or focusing on other avenues, as in the 
                                                
4 Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, 3 vols (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), I, 7. 
5 Melvin Richter, “Pocock, Skinner and Begriffsgeschichte,” in The History of Political and Social 
Concepts: A Critical Introduction, ed. Melvin Richter (New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), 131. 
6 See Chapter 2 for a thorough examination of existing International Relations scholarship. 
7 Arnon Gutfeld, American Exceptionalism: The Effects of Plenty on the American Experience 
(Brighton; Portland, Ore.: Sussex Academic Press, 2002); Karl J. Holsti, “Exceptionalism in 
American Foreign Policy: Is It Exceptional?” European Journal of International Relations, 17, no. 
3 (2011): 381–404; Seymour Martin Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword 
(New York; London: Norton, 1996); Deborah L. Madsen, American Exceptionalism (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1998); Trevor B. McCrisken, American Exceptionalism and the 
Legacy of Vietnam: U.S. Foreign Policy since 1974 (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003); Siobhán McEvoy-Levy, American Exceptionalism and U.S. Foreign Policy: 
Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War (Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave, 2001), Edward 
McNall Burns, The American Idea of Mission: Concepts of National Purpose and Destiny (New 
Brunswick, N.J.,: Rutgers University Press, 1957); Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: 
American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World (New York: Knopf, 2001); Anders 
Stephanson, Manifest Destiny: American Expansionism and the Empire of Right (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 1995). 
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case of early studies drawing on the Marxist link between ideology and political 
economy.8 The profusion of analytic categories, stemming from debate over what 
exactly America’s ‘core values’9 were, has occluded the study of American grand 
strategy as an expression of how the Washington elite viewed America as an 
exceptional nation, how this shaped their sense of American purpose in the world, 
and how this changed over time. 
The two most in-depth attempts to grapple explicitly with exceptionalism and the 
foreign policy of the U.S. – by Michael Hunt and historian Anders Stephanson10 – 
exhibit another type of methodological mistake: a teleological approach. This 
approach has merits: for example, it acknowledges commonalities in thought and 
calls attention to humanity’s preoccupation with certain seemingly eternal 
thoughts. However, the approach relies on the assumption that an idea remains 
constant despite dissimilarities in its context. This approach encourages a kind of 
Platonic view of thoughts, as if they somehow predated their contexts and merely 
manifested, regardless of social forces or situational context. In the case of the 
Cold War, the debate has largely focused on the orthodox,11 revisionist,12 and 
post-revisionist debate,13 in which the scholar’s historiographic bias has deployed 
the material to suit a given argument. 
                                                
8 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, Ohio: World 
Publishing Co., 1959). 
9 Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and 
the Cold War (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992); Emily S. Rosenberg, 
“Commentary: The Cold War and the Discourse of National Security,” Diplomatic History, 17, no. 
2 (1993): 277–284; Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the 
National Security State, 1945–1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); William O. 
Walker III, National Security and Core Values in American History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009). 
10 Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1987); Stephanson, Manifest Destiny. 
11 Principle examples include Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and 
The Peace They Sought (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Herbert Feis, From 
Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War (New York: Norton, 1970); Arthur Schlesinger Jr., 
“Origins of the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, 46 (October 1967): 22–52. 
12 The key text which inspired the Cold War revisionist school was William Appleman Williams, 
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (Cleveland, Ohio; New York: World Publishing Co., 1959) 
and, although this is an astonishing work, his sense of an American Weltanschauung which was 
based on exceptionalist and expansionist principles did not account for ideological change or 
contestation over time, rooted as it was in a critique of American capitalism. For other revisionists 
see Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945–1971 (New York: Wiley, 1972); 
Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power. The World and United States Foreign 
Policy, 1945–1954 (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
13 The first of the post-revisionist texts was John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins 
of the Cold War, 1941–1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); Ernest May, “The 
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Similar ‘raiding’ of history has occurred within the field of International 
Relations.14 “Realist theorists know in advance what ‘threats’ look like, liberals 
know what ‘joint gains’ look like, and constructivists know what an ‘ideational 
consensus’ looks like.”15 They then apply these abstract concepts to the historical 
material up to the early post-Second World War period in order to see whether 
their preferred decision-making input is present.16 The problem is that the early 
postwar period, like virtually any other historical period, offers sufficient 
evidence to support all of these claims and others. As a point of logic this could be 
valid, except that these claims, derived often from the same evidence, are often 
contradictory. “Thus, each approach concentrates on the evidence that supports its 
own position, downplaying the extent to which ‘threats’, ‘gains’, ‘consensus’, and 
individuals’ perceptions of these factors were still forming.”17 By effectively 
starting with the political meanings from the end of the period under investigation, 
in which the Cold War is over, scholars have subconsciously read stability into 
the earlier historical period, whereas political scientists purposefully impose 
theoretical constructs. Even the term early Cold War proleptically18 implies future 
bipolarity. This fact leads to an underestimation of the diversity of options that 
existed at the time, the variety of proposals and plans that were advanced, and the 
historical contingency of the term Cold War, whose meaning changed over time. 
Grand strategy in the United States 
Realists have historically raised the prescription of a realignment of policy along 
realist lines at key foreign-policy junctures, most notably during the Vietnam War 
and the more recent Operation Iraqi Freedom.19 The underlying suggestion of 
                                                                                                                                 
Cold War,” in The Making of America’s Soviet Policy, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (New Haven, Conn.; 
London: Yale University Press, 1984), 209–234; John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking 
Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). 
14 This thesis distinguishes between ‘International Relations’ the academic discipline (sometimes 
abbreviated ‘IR’) and ‘international relations’, political relations at the international level. 
15 Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Defending the West: Occidentalism and the Formation of NATO”, 
The Journal of Political Philosophy, 11, no. 3 (2003): 230. 
16 Ernest R. May, Richard N. Rosecrance, and Zara S. Steiner, History and Neorealism 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
17 Ibid., 231. 
18 A term of central importance to Quentin Skinner’s contextualist methodology. For further 
discussion of this term see the discussion of Skinner’s knowledge claims for his methodology in 
Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
19 Hans J. Morgenthau, Vietnam and the United States (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 
1965); Hans J. Morgenthau, A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: F. A. 
Praeger, 1969); Anatole Lieven and John Hulsman, Ethical Realism: A Vision for America’s Role 
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their claims is that the pursuit of ‘the national interest’ is unique to realism and 
that realist ‘national interest’ stands in contrast to other, more ideological, foreign-
policy goals. From a realist vantage point the United States is simply one nation 
amongst many in an anarchic international system based upon power. Perhaps 
most prominently, neorealism casts the international distribution of capabilities as 
the key constraint on foreign policy.20 They argue that states define their interests 
“in terms of power,”21 pursuing “aims that [have] some materially identifiable 
benefit . . . for society as a whole.”22 In this light, major wars appear as sudden 
manifestations of underlying shifts in the distribution of power. This thesis 
suggests that such materialist analyses are insufficient on two grounds. First, since 
material incentives are indeterminate and the distribution of power often 
ambiguous, agents can interpret identical material changes in any number of 
ways. Second, the same intersubjective understandings which guide 
interpretations of material shifts can also constitute varying state interests.23 
In fact, realism’s competitors are equally concerned with the pursuit of the 
‘national interest’ but disagree about the nature and extent of the objectives which 
compromise ‘the national interest’. “The main debates surrounding U.S. foreign 
policy are best understood as disputes within the conceptual space of ‘the national 
interest’ rather than between it and alternative strategic philosophies.”24 The point 
of such observations is not to attempt to critique the efficacy of any one approach 
to grand strategy but to move the discourse away from an exclusive bond between 
realism and the ‘national interest’. As Aletta Norval contends, “Ideology has 
always been conceived of in contrast to some order of truth or knowledge from 
                                                                                                                                 
in the World (New York: Vintage Books, 2006); Barry R. Posen, “The Case For Restraint”, The 
American Interest, 3, no. 1 (2007), http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=331 
[accessed 15/03/09]; John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “An Unnecessary War”, Foreign 
Policy (January 1, 2003), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2003/01/01/an_unnecessary_war 
[accessed 16/03/09]. 
20 Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass; London: Addison-
Wesley, 1979). 
21 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: 
Knopf, 1948), 5. 
22 Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and U.S. 
Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), 15. 
23 For a more detailed analysis of realist and constructivist approaches to American grand strategy 
see Chapter 2. 
24 Adam Quinn, 2008, “The ‘National Interest’ as Conceptual Battleground” (paper presented at 
the International Studies Association Convention March 26–29 2008, San Francisco). 
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which it would be possible to discern its misleading and false character.”25 This 
thesis contends that all notions of ‘national interest’ are inherently ideological and 
require treatment as such and, furthermore, that existing approaches to the 
ideology of American exceptionalism have failed to incorporate the 
methodological advances within the study of the history of ideas and have 
underestimated ideological contestation as a result. 
One major contribution of critical international relations has been to problematise 
the modern state as the starting point for analysis.26 Recent scholarship has built 
on this approach to illustrate how the construction of the modern state and the 
construction of modern modes of knowledge have operated in tandem to recast 
the nature of security.27 The effect has been to demonstrate that concerns about 
identity have never been absent from theories of international relations, 
particularly security issues. Michael Williams remarks that “[t]he apparent 
absence of a concern with identity in conceptions of security needs to be 
understood in fact as an historical legacy of a conscious attempt to exclude 
identity concerns from the political realm.”28 The roots of realism’s conception of 
an objective national interest lie in the “liberal sensibility, in an attempt to 
construct a material and objective foundation for political practice,”29 even though 
that process is predicated on liberal faith in the power of science to subdue 
political conflict.30 
Some security scholars have noted the absence of identity from previous debate. 
Because they have seen identity as compatible with neorealism they have 
attempted to add identity as an intervening variable in order to strengthen 
                                                
25 A. J. Norval, “The Things We Do with Words – Contemporary Approaches to the Analysis of 
Ideology,” British Journal of Political Science, 30 (2000): 313–46. 
26 Jens Bartelson, A Genealogy of Sovereignty, vol. 39 of Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye 
(eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1971); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition (New York: Little Brown, 1977). 
27 Michael C. Williams, “Identity and the Politics of Security”, European Journal of International 
Relations, 4, no. 2 (1998): 204–25. 
28 Ibid., 205. 
29 Ibid., 206. 
30 Nicolas Guilhot, “The Realist Gambit: Postwar American Political Science and the Birth of IR 
Theory,” International Political Sociology, 2, no. 4 (2008): 282. 
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neorealist arguments.31 However, security scholars with a more critical 
perspective suggest that identity’s absence from early debate cannot be glossed 
over too easily.32 Lapid exhorts that we must examine “the historical context and 
scholarly practices that have rendered [identity concerns] incompatible in the first 
place.”33 
The absence of identity in theories of security can be conceptualised as a result of 
the realisation that “theories about the world, and about security were integral 
elements in the political practices constituting that world.”34 Thus, both U.S. 
grand strategy and a contextualist, historical approach (the method of inquiry) are 
fundamentally intertwined as part of a broader critical approach to security 
studies. 
It is important to understand what the terms strategy and its wide-ranging 
derivative grand strategy have meant at various historical points. The term 
strategy has been subject to considerable misuse; it is imprecise in common 
parlance, and its meaning has changed over time. Carl von Clausewitz, who still 
serves as the central referent for strategic studies, defined tactics as “the theory of 
the use of military forces in combat” and strategy as “the theory of the use of 
combats for the object of the War.”35 Although Clausewitz provided useful 
definitions, his vision was unsurprisingly narrowly confined by the type of 
military campaigns of his time. Clausewitz’s definition could not adequately 
describe the wars of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, which were altered 
by the conception and execution of ‘total war’, or the mobilisation of the fully 
available resources and population of the state. 
                                                
31 Barry Posen, “Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power,” International Security, 18 
(1993): 80–124. 
32 Yosef Lapid and Friedrich V. Kratochwil, “Revisiting the National: Toward an Identity Agenda 
in Neorealism,” in The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich 
V. Kratochwil (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996), 106; Jeffrey W. Legro and 
Andrew Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” International Security, 24, no. 2 (1999): 5–55; 
Ken Booth, Theory of World Security, vol. 105 of Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
33 Yosef Lapid, “Culture’s Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory,” in The 
Return of Culture and Identity, ed. Yosef Lapid and F. Kratochwil (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1996), 19. 
34 Williams, “Identity and the Politics of Security,” 217–18. 
35 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Elliot Howard and Peter Paret (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2007), 74. 
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It was Basil Liddell Hart who provided the conceptual and genealogical leap in 
the analysis of strategic thought. He observed that “the role of grand strategy – 
higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the resources of a nation, or band 
of nations, towards the attainment of the political object of war – the goal defined 
by fundamental policy.”36 We can usefully take Hart’s notion of grand strategy as 
the highest level of national strategy. But Hart went farther in his suggestion that 
“the object in war is to obtain a better peace – even if only from your own point of 
view. . . . [I]t is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you 
desire.”37 His most important conclusion following from this suggestion that the 
key task facing national decision-makers was defining the shape of a “better 
peace” was that grand strategy was concerned with much more than just 
supervision of battles: 
Fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which 
should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, of 
diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical 
pressure . . . . It should not only combine the various instruments, but 
so regulate their use to avoid damage to the future state of peace.38 
Writing in the mid-1960s, Alastair Buchan refined Hart’s concept of grand 
strategy for the Cold War by making the political concerns of strategy far more 
explicit. “The real content of strategy is concerned not merely with war and 
battles but with the application of the maintenance of force so that it contributes 
most effectively to the achievement of political objectives.”39 This emphasises the 
extension of grand strategy to peace as well as wartime.40 In so doing this 
definition allowed for the notion that nations might pursue fundamental interests 
that do not require the actual use of military force for their realisation. 
Both Hart and Buchan recognised that military victory alone was not the key 
concern of grand strategy. If it left the nation weaker and vulnerable, success in 
war alone could not meet the requirements of effective strategy. Hart noted: 
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It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you 
desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz’s definition of war as a 
‘continuation of policy by other means’ – the prolongation of that 
policy through the war into the subsequent peace must always be 
borne in mind.41 
Hart seemed to suggest that grand strategy is fundamentally about the creation of 
an idealised vision of the world.42 Paul Kennedy went further, linking the notion 
of an idealised strategic goal to the effective marshalling of the totality of the 
nation’s resources: 
The crux of grand strategy lies . . . in the capacity of the nation’s 
leaders to bring together all the elements [of national power], both 
military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the 
nation’s long-term (that is, wartime and peacetime) best interests.43 
By 1914 the U.S. Department of War was already distinguishing between national 
strategy, which was analogous to grand strategy, and more basic military strategy. 
National strategy was defined as “the art and science of developing and using the 
political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed 
forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives,”44 whereas military 
strategy was defined quite separately as “the art and science of employing the 
armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the 
application of force, or the threat of force.”45 Subsequently, however, the 2004 
edition of the dictionary defined strategy more parsimoniously as “a prudent idea 
or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized 
and integrated fashion to achieve theatre, national, and/or multinational 
objectives.”46 The distinction between peacetime and wartime is absent from the 
2004 edition, as is the notion of distinct military coercive power; and, most 
importantly, the objectives of the strategy seem almost to have been relegated to 
an afterthought. 
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Notwithstanding this, it would be misleading to suggest that grand strategy has 
ever been a precise science. According to Clausewitz, the nature of its complexity 
rendered it an art that operates at political, strategic, operational, and tactical 
levels, which interact to advance the primary aim.47 Paul Kennedy shared 
Clausewitz’s sense of complexity: 
Given all the independent variables that come into play, grand strategy 
can never be exact or foreordained. It relies, rather, upon the constant 
and intelligent reassessment of the polity’s ends and means; it relies 
upon wisdom and judgement, those two intangibles which Clausewitz 
and Hart . . . esteemed the most.48 
None of this suggests that strategy must be explicitly named as such in order to be 
achieved. The temptation to look for strategic declarations solely in formal 
declamatory documents is strong; however, political groups or individuals often 
have a strategy even when they do not acknowledge having one. Equally, 
strategies need not be the creation of a single mind. Perhaps the best example of 
such ad hoc strategy, explored in depth later in this thesis, was Bill Clinton’s 
strategy of enlargement.49 Strobe Talbott recalled a conversation with Clinton in 
1994 in which Clinton expressed his conviction that “Roosevelt and Truman had 
gotten along fine without grand strategies. They’d just made it up as they went 
along, and he didn’t see why he couldn’t do the same.”50 
This thesis argues that grand strategy is the cumulative expression of ideology, a 
shared language of politics, including policy ideas that political actors use and 
reshape. Even if Clinton thought he was improvising his grand strategy on a 
pragmatic basis, his administration did articulate a central idea, ‘democratic 
enlargement’, around which a national security strategy was created. As this thesis 
will examine in Chapter 6, this ideological imprimatur was strongly asserted 
across apparently disconnected policies. In other words, a grand strategy may well 
follow a quasi-logic with assumptions so strong, so familiar, and so tacit that it is 
mistaken for common sense. 
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Clausewitz’s definition conveys better than any other what Americans meant by 
strategy from the inception of the republic until the First World War.51 Indeed, on 
the battlefield the U.S. notion of strategy was tightly focused on the favourable 
disposition of troops. Such a narrow definition of strategy, limited to military 
affairs, meant that military strategists gave little consideration to their actions’ 
non-military consequences. Some strategic theorists suggest that America has 
never really moved beyond this limited and technocratic type of strategy. For 
example, Edward Luttwak stated in his analysis of American strategic thought of 
the 1960s and 1970s that the American intellectual tradition entails a ‘national 
style’ that includes characteristics antithetical to the very idea of strategic thought: 
As a nation, Americans are pragmatic problem-solvers rather than 
systematic or long-range thinkers. Our whole experience tells us that it 
is best to narrow down complicated matters so as to isolate the 
practical problem at hand, and then to get on with finding a solution. 
Strategy by contrast is the one practical pursuit that requires a contrary 
method: to connect the diverse issues into a systematic pattern of 
things; then to craft plans – often long range – for dealing with the 
whole.52 
Luttwak echoed the earlier critique of Hans Morgenthau, who railed against the 
American Weltanschauung, a liberal refusal to recognise the political realm. In 
Morgenthau’s view, the result was not only unfounded confidence in human 
abilities but a trivialisation of life, “trivial optimism for which life dissolves into a 
series of little hurdles which, one after the other, increasing skill cannot fail to 
overcome.”53 Morgenthau was not alone in this critique of America; some current 
scholars have also suggested that this problem-solving approach is irreconcilable 
with truly strategic thinking and as a result most of what passes for strategic 
debate in the United States does not meet the most basic definition of linking 
military power to political purpose.54 Luttwak picked up on Morgenthau’s line of 
reasoning and suggested the result was that so-called U.S. strategic debates such 
as those in the 1970s and 1980s over the Strategic Defence Initiative or SALT II 
actually had very little to do with strategy. American defence debates tended to 
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“narrow down complicated matters so as to isolate the practical problem at 
hand.”55 Colin Gray took the analysis further, suggesting that “each activity is 
assessed on its own terms as if it had meaning in and of itself.”56 The point is that 
“each problem has tended to be treated sui generis – or on its own merits.”57 
Russell Weigley suggested that the effect of limited American thinking about 
strategy and inconsistent involvement in international affairs meant that an 
American grand strategy for the employment of force or the threat of force to 
attain political ends, beyond the confines of wartime military strategy calculated 
to lead to military victory, did not emerge until after the Second World War.58 
This thesis argues that once a discrete American grand strategy did emerge in the 
wake of the Second World War, it expanded well beyond the confines of 
Clausewitz and toward Hart’s more fully developed definition: 
A true grand strategy was now to do with peace as much as (perhaps 
even more than) war. It was about the integration of policies that 
should operate for decades, or even for centuries. It did not cease at 
war’s end, nor commence at its beginning.59 
Luttwak offered an important corrective. He suggested that few nations have ever 
possessed a “thought-out grand strategy” that anchored their foreign policies.60 
Nevertheless, grand strategy does have interpretive value because it represents 
more than just the identification of long-term national goals and the selection of 
means to obtain those ends. Such a blueprint is not deterministic of specific 
policies. Instead, it provides a touchstone by which policymakers chart their 
action in response to events: 
Both the operational environment (the world as it really is) and the 
psychological environment (the world as seen by conditioned and 
fallible human beings) – do not require that certain policies be adopted 
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but open and foreclose upon ranges of policy possibilities – which 
societies and their governments may pursue or not as circumstance 
and mood take them.61 
Paul Kennedy describes this sense of grand strategy as intrinsically ideological: 
It is because of the essentially political nature of grand strategy – 
What are this nation’s larger aims in the world, and how best can they 
be secured? – that there has to be such a heavy focus upon the issue of 
reconciling ends and means. . . . The real task for the polity in 
question is to ensure that, in wartime, the non-military aspects are not 
totally neglected . . . and that, in peacetime, the military aspects are 
not totally neglected. . . . [I]f the wartime task of balancing ends and 
means also exists in the peacetime execution of a nation’s grand 
strategy, there is the additional problem that politically it may be 
harder to achieve, year after year, since the conditions of peace 
conduce to turning the polity’s attention to other priorities and 
activities.62 
The maintenance of this kind of grand strategy, requiring both wartime and 
peacetime marshalling of the state’s military and civilian activities – entailing the 
necessary management of both complexity of activity and political apathy – 
requires a strong ideological basis. Hunt posits an ideological basis for grand 
strategy “that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily 
comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that 
reality.”63 
With this distinction in mind, this thesis suggests that exceptionalism in the 
United States is shared by individuals from differing, sometimes opposing, 
political perspectives. Anders Stephanson has put such a model into practice, 
suggesting how the concept of manifest destiny, which became a poeticised 
rallying call, mobilised American exceptionalism as an ideological guiding 
principle: 
Manifest destiny did not “cause” President Polk to go to war against 
Mexico. No particular policy followed from this discourse as such: 
though certainly conducive to expansionism, it was not a strategic 
doctrine. . . . [M]anifest destiny is of signal importance in the way the 
United States came to understand itself in the world and still does: . . . 
[T]his understanding has determinate effects. [Manifest destiny] 
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worked in practical ways and was always institutionally embedded. 
. . . Not a mere rationalization, it appeared in the guise of common 
sense.64 
This thesis agrees with Stephanson’s assessment that exceptionalism was not a 
strategic doctrine in its own right but disagrees with the implication that the 
‘common sense’ of American exceptionalism has had a temporally consistent 
meaning. This section has suggested that grand strategy is a twentieth-century 
phenomena, stemming from unprecedented ‘total wars’. Rather than just being 
concerned with the fighting of battles, grand strategy concerns itself with the 
achievement of an idealised ‘peace time’ world. 
Methodology: Cambridge School contextualism 
This thesis will employ Quentin Skinner’s Cambridge School contextualism to 
overcome the proleptic misreading of history that is shared by political scientists 
and those who have attempted historical surveys of exceptionalism. The standard 
focus on ‘manifest destiny’ and the seeming inevitability of American 
expansionist impulses that have spilled from much of the work examining the role 
of exceptionalism in American grand strategy can be problematised, thereby 
yielding a more nuanced recreation of the debate about America’s role in the 
world and the American strategic posture. 
Skinner’s main concern and theoretical contribution65 is the recreation of authorial 
intention relating to the creation of texts. Skinner suggests that his approach to 
texts “enables us to characterise what their authors were doing in writing them.”66 
Works of political theory cannot be treated as timeless contributions to a universal 
philosophical debate, nor can their meanings simply be read off as determined by 
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the economic and social context in which they were written. He argues that in 
order to grasp an utterance’s meaning one must first situate it within the linguistic 
and intellectual context in which it arose and upon which the authors sought to 
have some effect. As a result, for contextualists it is dangerous to strip texts from 
their idea environments; doing so can result in a distortion or loss of a text’s 
meaning.67 By concentrating on conceptual change and language’s constitutive 
role in shaping a society’s normative architecture, we can reach a more 
sophisticated understanding of language with respect to the reproduction of social 
norms and conventions and consequently in the process of historical change. 
Skinner has interrogated language’s role in moulding and determining action and 
the part that political principles play in the process. He approaches the 
problematic relationship between speech and praxis by switching the direction of 
causation. Whatever an agent’s motive for adopting a certain course of action, that 
agent must be able to justify it through reference to existing linguistic conventions 
or political vocabularies.68 A society’s normative parameters are established and 
reproduced through the intersubjective meanings attached to such terms. 
However, these concepts are somewhat unstable; their sense and reference are 
open to challenge, manipulation, and, ultimately, transformation. The essence of 
conceptual change thus lies in the malleable relationship between sense and 
reference over time. How this change occurs is necessarily political because it 
involves conflict over meaning and action. From this argument it follows that, 
once a set of principles has been employed, it establishes the parameters for 
action, opening up some channels and closing others. Therefore, the choice of 
legitimation vocabulary entails a form of path dependency.69 
This thesis will demonstrate this point by examining the role of linguistic 
intelligibility and communication in the legitimation of political and social action. 
It can be shown that the constitutive role of language in shaping the normative 
architecture of society is open to challenge, that the parameters are far from fixed, 
but at the same time it can also be shown that there are intrinsic limits to what can 
be achieved practically. 
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The Cambridge School in practice: the methodology of contextualism 
Skinner’s work builds on the approach from Wittgenstein70 that language is an 
intersubjectively shared multiplicity of tools for various purposes but one in 
which only some elements are open to subjective criticism and change. According 
to this theory, language is so deeply woven into human action that it provides the 
grounds on which criticism and change take place.71 
A Skinnerian methodology revolves around three processes: (1) interpretation of 
historical texts; (2) survey of ideology formation and change; and (3) analysis of 
the relation between ideology and the political action it represents.72 Skinner’s 
procedure comprises five steps that answer five questions: 
(1) In writing a text, what was an author doing in relation to other 
available texts that make up the ideological context? (2) In writing a 
text, what was an author doing in relation to available and problematic 
political action that makes up the practical context? (3) How are 
ideologies to be identified and their formation, criticism, and change 
to be surveyed and explained? (4) What is the relation between 
political ideology and political action which best explains the 
diffusion of certain ideologies and what effect does this have on 
political behaviour? (5) What forms of political thought and action are 
involved in disseminating and conventionalizing ideological 
change?73 
Step one. Drawing on the speech-act theory of John L. Austin,74 John Searle,75 
and Herbert P. Grice,76 Skinner argued that if speaking and writing are viewed 
pragmatically as linguistic activities, they can be seen to comprise two kinds of 
action: locutionary (propositional) and, more importantly, illocutionary 
(linguistic). To fully understand a text’s historical meaning, one must understand 
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not only its illocutionary meaning but also the author’s point (argument). To 
determine locutionary meaning, one must situate the text within its linguistic or 
ideological context. The context refers to the collection of texts that were written 
or used during the same period, that addressed the same or similar issues, and that 
shared a number of conventions.77 Skinner used the term convention heuristically 
to refer to relevant linguistic commonplaces uniting a number of texts: shared 
vocabulary, principles, and assumptions; and criteria for testing knowledge 
claims, problems, and conceptual distinctions. This technique allows the 
researcher to understand the extent to which authors accepted, endorsed, 
questioned, repudiated, and ignored the prevailing assumptions and conventions 
of political debate. Skinner called this the manipulation of the conventions of 
available ideology.78 
According to Skinner, this form of explanation is an element of a text’s historical 
meaning, equivalent to the author’s intentions in writing the text. In addition, this 
form of explanation is noncausal because it recharacterises the linguistic action in 
terms of its ideological point, not in terms of an independently specifiable 
condition.79 In short, the explanation is an intention inherent in performing the 
linguistic action, not an intention that precedes performing the action. Step one 
also enables the researcher to ascertain the novelty (nonconventionality) of the 
text under study. This kind of understanding of a text is unavailable to those who 
employ a solely textualist approach or to contextualists who ignore the linguistic 
context.80 
Step two. The second step is concerned with examining what the author was doing 
in manipulating the ideological conventions. Where the first question asks about 
the character of a text as an ideological manoeuvre, the second question is 
concerned with the character of the ideological manoeuvre as a political 
stratagem.81 In order to do this the text is placed within its practical context – that 
is, the political activity to which the text is a response and which the author is 
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trying to change. As Skinner puts it, the political theorist is responding to the 
political problems of the age. “I take it that political life itself sets the main 
problems for the political theorist, causing a certain range of issues to appear 
problematic and a corresponding range of questions to become the leading 
subjects of debate.”82 
In step two the analyst compares how the ideology’s conventions render the 
relevant political action and how the manipulation of these conventions in the 
given text redescribes the political action. This new characterisation will be the 
key to the text’s political point. As with step one, the fact that a text makes a 
political point within a practical context does not necessarily mean that the author 
wrote the text in order to make that point.83 
Step three. The next stage is the study of ideologies themselves. In step three, less 
canonical texts of the period are surveyed to identify the constitutive and 
regulative conventions of the reigning ideologies and their interrelations before 
they are employed as benchmarks to judge the conventional and unconventional 
aspects (and so, the ideological moves) of the major texts. Where those following 
Hegel interpret the classic texts as expressing an age’s consciousness or 
assumptions, Skinner’s project demonstrates that great texts are usually a poor 
guide to conventional wisdom; instead, they are expressions of ideological 
contestation.84 
Step four. Where step two is meant to illuminate the relation between political 
thought and action in the case of an individual text, step four replicates this in the 
case of an ideology. Any political vocabulary will contain a number of terms that 
are intersubjectively normative: in other words, they simultaneously describe and 
evaluate. The terms are intersubjective in that not only the criteria for their 
application (sense) and their reference but also their evaluative dimension is a 
property of the words as commonly used, not something the conventional 
                                                
82 Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, 1: xiii. 
83 Tully, “The Pen is a Mighty Sword,” 11–12. 
84 Ibid. 
 27 
individual user bestows on them. The evaluative dimension is known as the 
speech-act potential.85 
Within any society’s vocabulary the class of such descriptive/evaluative terms is 
extremely large, as can be seen in the uses of terms such as democracy, 
dictatorship, inefficient, irrational, objective, rational, and tolerant.86 It follows 
that political vocabulary in standard use describes and evaluates political action. 
Skinner suggests that by manipulating this set of terms a society establishes and 
alters its moral identity.87 Using these terms in the conventional way legitimates 
customary practice. Manipulating the conventions of a prevailing ideology 
involves changing the conventions governing the sense, reference, or speech-act 
potential of some of these normative terms. Altering the sense, reference, or 
evaluative force of an ideology’s terms recharacterises or re-evaluates the political 
situation they represent, legitimising a new range of activity or beliefs and 
delegitimising the status quo. As a result political theories can be seen as 
contemporaneous legitimation crises caused by shifting political relations, not as a 
result of any choice or intention of the theorists but because the language in which 
they are written characterises political relations.88 
The second aspect of this step is the examination of an ideology’s constrictive and 
productive effects on the conduct that the ideology legitimates. The use of 
conventions dictating the prevailing normative vocabulary cannot be manipulated 
indefinitely and so cannot be employed to legitimate wildly divergent practice.89 
Skinner states: 
Thus the problem facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is 
doing at the same time as gaining what he wants cannot simply be the 
instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in order to 
fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects 
in order to fit the available normative language.90 
The constraint is both political and ideological. An attempt to stretch ideological 
conventions requires a justification and this takes the form of grounding the 
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change in terms of what is already accepted as ‘common sense’. In other words, 
an ideologist changes one part of an ideology by retaining and bolstering another 
part of it.91 Even if an ideological innovator does not believe in the beliefs they 
are expressing, they are to some extent required to conform with the established 
ideological context they wish to challenge. As Skinner puts it, “[e]very 
revolutionary is to this extent obliged to march backwards into battle.”92 
Step five. The last step is to explain how ideological change becomes a 
conventional part of the social fabric, or not. This is partly a function of how well 
the innovation fits with other available schools of thought. Equally, the ability of 
ideologues to control the medium of ideological propagations, such as academia, 
religious institutions, and the media are key, although this does not automatically 
lead to a corresponding change in practice.93 
The Cambridge School and American grand strategy 
At first glance, the policy documents that constituted American grand strategy do 
not seem to be substantial candidates for intellectual history. However, this thesis 
examines the complex, tension-ridden interface between political thought and 
public policy.94 The various Cold War and post-Cold War grand strategy 
documents and the world they envisioned were not the products of political 
philosophers but nonetheless shared a language of politics. This language of 
politics was contested and at critical junctures underwent a process of ideological 
innovation. 
What Skinner’s process of contextualism is able to reveal is that innovating 
ideologists are less concerned with logical coherence or philosophical rigour than 
they are with conceptual and practical political change. These ideological 
innovators can be revealed to draw upon and shift existing discourse and present 
their policies as the only viable solution to a set of self-defined political problems. 
In other words, these ideologies were far from steadfast and instead were forced to 
evolve to suit a specific set of situational and relational political problems; 
moreover, these ideological innovators purposefully played with the conventions 
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of ideology to legitimate and enact political change. However, as the later case 
studies illustrate, their efforts to put such ambitious political visions into practice 
usually faced difficult hurdles in conforming to the conventional parameters of 
ideological discourse. Thus, this thesis is an exercise in the reconstruction of the 
languages through which past generations conceived of the world and their 
relationship to it. 
 30 
Chapter 2. Quentin Skinner’s Contextualism and International 
Relations 
This chapter maps Quentin Skinner’s form of contextualism onto the broader 
framework of International Relations scholarship. Having traced the 
methodological steps necessary for Skinnerian contextualism in the previous 
chapter, this chapter proceeds to examine how realist and liberal schools of 
thought in International Relations theory have approached the study of ideology 
and grand strategy. The chapter lays out how both of these schools engage with 
American foreign policy and suggests that they occlude certain approaches to the 
study of the history of ideas and ideology. The chapter then further examines the 
contributions made possible by Skinnerian contextualism by examining it in 
contrast with Gramscian approaches and via a close discussion of the knowledge 
claims which Skinner makes for his methodology. In conclusion, this chapter 
suggests Skinnerian contextualism is able to achieve a type of analysis that other 
approaches either cannot or which they attempt in problematic ways. It refines 
this claim by placing Skinnerian contextualism within the broader framework of 
constructivist approaches to International Relations. 
Realism 
Classical realist writers of the early postwar period, such as Walter Lippmann and 
George Kennan,95 understood that ideological factors had a profound impact on 
the grand strategies of nations. There is little in Kennan’s writing that offers a 
systematic explanation of his approach to international politics or of his political 
philosophy in general;96 however, textual analysis of what he did write goes some 
way in revealing his underlying conservative suspicion of ideology.97 Kennan was 
far from alone in pointing to the impact of liberal and idealistic political culture 
precisely to condemn its impact on American foreign policy. Hans Morgenthau 
and Reinhold Niebuhr took similarly disapproving stances to that of Kennan the 
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alienated American intellectual.98 However, whilst historically rich in its analysis 
and concerned with keeping the debate of ‘ideas’ as part of the political sphere,99 
classical realism’s forms of analysis were skewed by its approach as an “’error 
theory’ of U.S. foreign policy.”100 In other words, the normative, prescriptive 
element of classical realism compromised elements of its analytic ability. 
The over-emphasis on one form of anarchy (international) by realist scholars 
obscured the observation that the American republic’s founding fathers were 
equally as concerned with domestic anarchy between the states and specifically 
sought to avoid the interstate anarchy of Europe in creating the union.101 On such 
a view, any variant of realism “is insightful but radically incomplete.”102 
The methodological rigour and systemic focus injected into realism by, most 
prominently, Kenneth Waltz and Robert Gilpin,103 gave neorealism a very 
different, positivist character to that of the classical texts of E. H. Carr, Kennan 
and Morgenthau. This thesis is not trying to artificially impose uniformity 
between classical realist thought, which did concern itself with both ideology and 
the study of history, and Neorealism. Neorealism emphasises international 
pressures by pointing to the international distribution of power, and suggests that 
strategic change is shaped by material or structural pressures at the international 
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level.104 The neorealist point of view is that the anarchic international system, in 
which war is always a possibility, means that states are forced to rely upon their 
own material capabilities in a game of survival. As a result, international 
pressures are the primary cause of the strategic behaviour of individual states.105 
Neorealists do not deny that states have their own historical and ideological 
legacies but they do suggest that these domestic differences tend to be obliterated 
by the pressure of international competition, and that states tend to eventually act 
in the same manner, paying close attention to their relative position in the 
international system and trying to promote their own power and security, as a 
result becoming undifferentiated.106 
Waltz himself has argued that a truly international theory cannot pretend to 
explain foreign policy or grand strategy; it can only explain international 
outcomes.107 It remains unclear, even to some realists, how one can have a theory 
of international outcomes without making certain assumptions about the 
behaviour of individual states.108 However, when Waltz argues that states balance 
each other this is not simply a prediction about outcomes: it is also a prediction 
about foreign-policy behaviour, whether intentional or otherwise. It is possible, 
then, to sketch a realist explanation of changes in grand strategic ideas as rational 
adjustments by states to changing international conditions. However, for a 
neorealist the causal arrow would run from international conditions to strategic 
behaviour, with ideas having little or no effect.109 Here, contemporary neorealists 
split between ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ varieties. For offensive realists the 
competitive nature of the international system induces states to expand their 
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relative power wherever possible.110 The ‘tragedy’ of the security dilemma, to 
which Mearsheimer refers,111 is the uncertainty of intention of other states, which 
leads individual states to assume the worst and maximise the greatest possible 
margin of safety over others. Thus powerful states act as though they seek 
dominion, even if they only seek survival. Following from this, the only crucial 
difference between states and the best guide to their grand strategy is their relative 
power. 
Offensive realists argue that rising states adopt more expansive grand strategies 
because they posses the power to do so, or, as Robert Gilpin puts it, “the 
redistribution of wealth and power toward a particular state in the international 
system tends to stimulate the state to demand a larger bundle of welfare and 
security objectives.”112 
The alternative strain, defensive realism, emphasises threats to national security, 
rather than the international distribution of power, as the primary motivating force 
in grand strategic behaviour. What both offensive and defensive realists share is 
the starting point of international conditions. Unlike their offensive cousins, 
however, defensive realist do not believe that capabilities specify intentions and 
instead they argue that there is a plurality of interests and intentions compatible 
with any given set of capabilities.113 For defensive realists the danger and 
uncertainty of the international system does not lead states to adopt worst-case 
scenarios but encourages judgements based upon the reasonable probability of 
threats.114 
The difference between the two strands matters within the bounds of this thesis 
because for defensive realists the specific interests and intentions of particular 
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states cannot be left out of the analysis. In other words, defensive realism leaves a 
great deal of explanatory power to domestic level factors.115 
Picking up on this, Alexander Wendt has argued that realism’s weakness is its 
“growing reliance on social factors to do their explanatory work [tacitly].”116 
Causally, as Wendt suggests, “to get from anarchy and material forces to power 
politics and war neo-realists have been forced to make additional, ad hoc 
assumptions about the social structure of the international system” and its 
actors.117 As a result these ad hoc assumptions may be partly successful in 
producing explanatory power, but only because “the crucial causal work is done 
by social, not material, factors.” This, in turn, undercuts the systemic 
underpinning of neorealism.118 
In recent years there has been a sustained trend for realists to insert cultural, 
domestic-level, intervening variables when explaining foreign policy. Randall 
Schweller has suggested that this new neoclassical realism represents the “only 
game in town for [the] next and current generation of realists.”119 His claim is 
disputable, as there have been attempts to reinvigorate classical realism;120 
nonetheless, a wide array of next-generation realists belong to the neoclassical 
realist school.121 
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These scholars take their moniker from Gideon Rose’s polemic which described 
their attempt to synthesise the wide-ranging insights of classical realism with the 
structural imperatives of neorealism in a theory which: 
explicitly incorporates both external and internal variables, updating 
and systematizing certain insights drawn from classical realist 
thought. Its adherents argue that the scope and ambition of a country’s 
foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the 
international system and specifically by its relative material power 
capabilities. This is why they are realist. They argue further, however, 
that the impact of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect 
and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through 
intervening variables at the unit level.122 
In other words, neoclassical realists still privilege material structural factors but 
try to take into account historical and ideological domestic factors.123 As one 
recent defender of neoclassical realism admitted: 
For structural realists to make use of domestic politics and ideas, they 
have to serve the purposes of validating the central premises of 
structural realism: anarchy is a real force, not totally constraining, but 
one that cannot be ignored without severe consequences. This is in 
fact what neoclassical realism does. If it did anything less, we could 
not distinguish it from liberalism and, in many instances, 
constructivism.124 
Neoclassical realism manages to sneak into structural analysis – hitherto only 
concerned with the anarchical nature of the system and the distribution of relative 
capabilities – a number of additional variables, chiefly the domestic politics of the 
state or the perceptions of the decision-making elite, or both.125 Neoclassical 
realists thus claim to achieve a synthesis between the rich insights of classical 
realists and the theoretical parsimony of their neorealist forebears. 
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Contra Waltz, neoclassical realists are putting forward a theory of foreign 
policy.126 Against Waltz’s systemic view, a unit-based theory of foreign policy 
seeks to account not for similarity but for differences between states in their 
behaviour and “explains why different states or the same state at different 
historical moments, have different intentions, goals and preferences towards the 
outside world.”127 This thesis would support this goal but expresses concern with 
the ability of neoclassical realism to achieve it in the face of its inherent 
contradictions. Furthermore, neoclassical realism shares the same approach to 
history as neorealism, which this thesis is trying to move beyond. 
Neoclassical realism suffers from the same theoretical indeterminacy as defensive 
realism.128 Quite apart from the fact that neoclassical realism is so all-
encompassing that it is hard to falsify, some have claimed that it has borrowed 
from so many International Relations theories that it is hard to say what is 
uniquely realist about it.129 This thesis suggests that the ultimate privilege 
accorded to systemic factors over the long term makes neoclassical realism 
essentially a variant of neorealism: 
For neoclassical realism to be confirmed, it is not enough to point to 
the influence of intervening variables such as domestic politics or 
misperception, or both, in order to account for behaviour that is 
anomalous from a systemic point of view. One must also show the 
system reasserting itself and emerging victorious in the end.130 
Thus neoclassical realism is unable to escape from the straightjacket of its own 
logic and deliver a theory of foreign policy, since it “cannot explain convincingly 
why states act differently starting from the premise that all states will have to act 
in the same way in the end.”131 
This thesis is not arguing that neo and neoclassical realism are ahistorical, as that 
is not the case;132 however, it is concerned with rectifying the type of historical 
analysis which systemic theories of international relations use. Neorealism does 
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utilise history and can explain systemic change over time,133 but the type of 
history which both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism share is that which 
provides a grand narrative that can establish universalist propositions,134 and, as 
Lawson and Hobson suggest, this is “history without historicism.”135 This type of 
history produces what it is required to produce: lessons and rules that can inform 
policy-makers and support research hypotheses.136 
This type of historical inquiry is shared by but has not been confined to the ‘neo-
neo’ schools of International Relations scholarship. It has also permeated the 
work of some prominent members of the post-revisionist school of diplomatic 
history and its study of American grand strategy, despite their associated claim to 
a more dispassionate assessment of the sources.137 When viewed from a 
perspective which privileges ideology, neorealism and some post-revisionist 
diplomatic historians have effectively served to remove the study of ideology 
from the history of policymaking by making ‘national security’ or the ‘national 
interest’ into a seemingly neutral explanatory device. 
Despite John Lewis Gaddis having repudiated neorealism in the 1990s, 
neorealism’s logic is still evident in his138 more recent work, where he states that 
“[w]hen a power vacuum separates great powers . . . they are unlikely to fill it 
without bumping up against and bruising each other’s interests.”139 There is also a 
problem with the way Gaddis deploys his variant of realist logic on occasions 
where the U.S. committed actions that violated its proclaimed principles: in other 
words, Gaddis uses systemic pressure as an explanatory ‘escape clause’. As a 
result, the combination of neorealism and moralism he deploys is incoherent.140 
Melvyn Leffler shares Gaddis’s indeterminacy; for Leffler, American foreign 
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policy is a product of the interaction of external threats and internal core values.141 
The problem with both Gaddis’s and Leffler’s essentially neoclassical realist 
framework is that, while they recognise the significance of the domestic sphere to 
explaining American foreign policy in principle, they neglect to develop that 
insight in a systematic fashion. Leffler does talk about the ‘core values’ which 
U.S. policy makers sought to defend – democracy, the free market, the American 
way of life – but there is little discussion of the meaning of these values or how 
they came to dominate the view of the U.S. government. They are accepted in a 
unproblematic way and are treated as static and unchanging; a retrospective 
ideological coherence is applied.142 Further, these ideas are transmitted into grand 
strategy as the desire to simply protect these values by the maintenance of a 
balance of power favourable to the U.S. So, whilst ostensibly including the 
internal processes in the explanatory framework, Leffler actually reduces them to 
considerations of policy-makers about how to respond to external ‘threats’ in 
order to create a favourable balance of power. 
What this reflects is that, for the two leading post-revisionist diplomatic 
historians, the core values that the U.S. sought to defend were both self-evident 
and universal – a hostility to authoritarianism and a benevolent Wilsonian desire 
to spread democracy and capitalism which are traduced to a consensual 
banality.143 This approach ostensibly gives more credence to ideological factors; 
however, it stumbles when actually doing so. ‘Core values’ becomes an umbrella 
term for all ideas or interests of policy-makers without providing guidance as to 
how they are to be identified. The implicit logic is that systemic causes are 
primary but occasionally domestic factors interfere, and that is usually where 
systemic explanations fail to provide satisfactory answers.144 
Liberalism 
Liberalism starts with a different sense of the “state of nature” metaphor to 
realists, which seems to owe more to Locke than to Hobbes, where far more 
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cooperation is possible in the anarchic international system.145 Starting in the 
1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye re-engaged with liberalism as a response 
to realism.146 What this work and those it inspired147 shared was a recognition 
that, over the course of several hundred years, state behaviour no longer 
resembled its Westphalian ‘ideal type’.148 
Neorealist and neoliberal international relations theorists, though pursuing 
different arguments, are underpinned by a similar, though not identical, set of 
assumptions. Neoliberals distanced themselves from the classical liberalist 
framework, adopted some of neorealism’s theoretical rigour in the late 1970s, and 
took hold of some neorealist assumptions in order to restore integrity to liberal 
ideals.149 The core similarities between the two schools stem from the three basic 
tenants that were taken from neorealism. First, states are ‘rational egoists’; 
second, it is the prospect of conflict that dictates relations between states; and, 
third, the states are the primary actors in international relations.150 It was from this 
common basis that Robert Keohane sought to challenge neorealism, albeit from a 
common ontological, epistemological, and methodological basis.151 
In the neoliberal conception states still pursue survival as an objective and are 
rational actors; however, their survival is more broadly defined than simply the 
maximisation of power. This shifts some of the causal weight for state behaviour 
away from structural conditions towards domestic political institutions. In 
addition, the liberal conception of actor rationality suggests that states might be 
willing to forego competition in favour of greater gain if they can reduce the fear 
that other states might forego international agreements through international 
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institutions.152 Corollaries to this are the ideas of republican liberalism, a 
resurrection of Kantian153 observations that democracies tend not to fight each 
other. It was Michael Doyle who expanded these claims to suggest that the nature 
of the domestic political system had an impact upon the international behaviour of 
states.154 Republican liberalism goes further and stresses that democracies hold 
common moral values which lead to what Kant suggested was a “pacific union”155 
– not a formal peace treaty, but rather a zone of peace based on the communality 
of the moral system shared by democracies. 
The neoliberal analysis of U.S. grand strategy after the Cold War, in both an 
analytic and a prescriptive sense, has been concerned with the promotion of an 
‘Americanised’ international order characterised by the spread of democracy and 
‘free market’ capitalism but based upon strong multilateral organisations.156 
However, the most historically orientated example of this viewpoint is found in 
the work of G. John Ikenberry.157 In a title which plays on Keohane’s After 
Hegemony,158 Ikenberry suggested that after the Second World War America, as 
victor, sought to transform the international system through the establishment of 
international organisations.159 The shared grounding with realists in the notion of 
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power is key. America was able to pursue this project based upon material 
hegemonic capability. However, what distinguishes Ikenberry’s position from that 
of neorealism was the emphasis he placed upon the character of American 
democracy: 
It was the exercise of strategic restraint – made good by an open 
polity and binding institutions – more than the direct and instrumental 
exercise of hegemonic domination that ensured a cooperative and 
stable postwar order.160 
There are striking similarities between Ikenberry’s account of American postwar 
grand strategy and the narrative of American history from some ‘orthodox’ 
diplomatic historians161 who dominated the historiography of the Cold War until 
the 1960s.162 In such accounts, the United States entered the war in order to build 
a peace based on democracy and prosperity for all under the Atlantic Charter. The 
Charter represented a combination of American ideals and the principles of 
Wilsonian internationalism.163 Once victory had been achieved, postwar 
arrangements were to be institutionalised through new collective security 
organisations designed to maintain the peace.164 The orthodox accounts are 
imbued with a normative commitment to the virtuous nature of American policies 
and there is a marked absence of overt methodological commitments or reflection. 
This thesis does not rigidly impose a taxonomic link between the schools of 
International Relations theory and particular waves of diplomatic history; the two 
do not map onto each other neatly enough to do so. Nonetheless, there is heuristic 
purpose in the partial overlay pursued in this chapter. Both neoliberalism and 
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neorealism share a particular approach to history that seeks to construct a grand 
narrative for the purposes of theory building or testing.165 
Such an approach to history occludes the study of ideology as social practice. As a 
result it precludes studies that seek to understand how American policy-makers 
viewed their place in the world and how such views were contested or reproduced 
over time. Neorealism may yield insight into the “endogenous logic of relations of 
force,” but it is too reductionist to yield insight into “social epistemology.”166 This 
thesis contends that texts do not yield meaning in a straightforward fashion and 
the idea of fundamentally timeless concepts such as ‘international anarchy’ or ‘the 
balance of power’ based upon stable vocabularies is useful for little other than 
theory creation and testing. In its place this thesis adopts “a willingness to 
emphasise the local and the contingent, a desire to underline the extent to which 
our own concepts and attitude have been shaped by particular historical 
circumstances.”167 As a result this theory avoids the transplanting of concepts and 
viewpoints across time and between different historical actors and in so doing 
avoids the imposition of a retrospective “mythology of coherence”168 into 
understandings of American exceptionalism at different points in time. 
Neo-Gramscian169 International Relations 
Robert Cox is credited with having introduced International Relations scholars to 
the work of the Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci.170 Not only did Cox offer an 
alternative to the ‘neo-neo’ dominance within International Relations but he 
suggested a new conception of hegemony at the international level. This thesis 
explores Gramscian thought because it provides an alternative way of theorising 
about ideology at both the domestic and international level and, like Skinnerian 
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contextualism, it is focused on conceptual change and conflict (albeit with some 
important differences). In short, it seeks “to explain the way in which dominant 
ideas about world order help to sustain particular patterns of relations among 
material forces, ideas and institutions at a global level.”171 The appeal of Gramsci 
to International Relations scholars is that: 
[H]is work provides an ontological and epistemological foundation 
upon which to construct a non-deterministic yet structurally grounded 
explanation of change . . . By insisting on the transformative capacity 
of human beings, Gramsci’s radical embrace of human subjectivity 
provides IR scholars with one way of avoiding a deterministic and 
ahistorical structuralism.172 
However, the utility of exploring Gramsci for this thesis is that his reconfiguration 
of the concept of base and superstructure and avoidance of a teleological, 
deterministic reading of Marx did not engage in economic reductionism. Instead 
his theories were concerned with culture, identity, and hegemony.173 Via Gramsci, 
Cox brought this idea of ‘hegemony’ into International Relations theory, 
specifically problematising the conception of power. As a result, hegemony at a 
global level cannot simply be equated with military force or economic might. Cox 
reasserted Gramsci’s insight that the power of a ruling glass was exercised not 
simply by coercion but also through the capacity to gain the consent of the people, 
to make the questioning of certain key ideas beyond consideration and instead 
accepted as ‘common sense’.174 Although Cox meant to deploy Gramsci at an 
international level to describe hegemonic world order, this thesis is more 
interested in Cox’s critique of International Relations theory and more concerned 
with Gramsci’s own work, rather than Cox’s international reformulation of it.175 
Gramsci’s ‘war of position’ has some conceptual similarity to Skinner’s model of 
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ideological innovation in that it required intellectuals176 (similar to Skinner’s 
‘innovating ideologists’) to start the war of position by basing their arguments in 
the ‘common sense’ of hegemony.177 
Cox picked up on these features to develop a historical approach capable of 
recognising historical change and contestation. In so doing he made the point that 
critical theories challenge the problem-solving theories such as neorealism and 
neoliberalism by calling into question the fixed order that such theories take as 
their starting point.178 While class struggle or other factors can be placed within 
such an approach, they become simply “one analytical lens, not a privileged 
one”179 and it “does not take institutions and social and power relations for 
granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and 
whether they might be in the process of changing.”180 
Neo-Gramscian thought is often associated with studies of International Political 
Economy and has examined the assertion of American (economic) hegemony 
through international institutions.181 Such an approach differs from this thesis’s 
concentration on the domestic level and focus on grand strategy. However, a 
number of scholars of American foreign policy have been inspired by Gramscian 
approaches.182 These studies are largely polarised, with the majority focusing on 
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the earlier periods of what became known as the Cold War and the rest on the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003. In other words, they focus almost exclusively 
on moments of American assertion of hegemony. Most of these Gramscian 
studies examine the interaction between state and civil society183 in functionally 
creating hegemonies and counter hegemonies184 and, as a result, there is an 
underlying materialist bias to these studies, rather than a sustained focus on the 
content of the ideologies.185 
This thesis has more in common with the ideologically orientated studies which 
have taken the Gramscian notion of ‘common sense’ amongst the civil–military 
American elite as a starting point and have then sought to disentangle what 
‘common sense’ meant at that particular moment.186 It shares a commitment to the 
Gramscian discovery of norms and practices, which can be seen as consistent with 
Skinnerian ideology and practical context. Equally, in adopting Skinnerian 
contextualism this thesis shares with Gramscians the notion of historically 
specific conceptions of the world as responses to specific problems.187 Where this 
thesis overlaps empirically with the Gramscian scholarship, particularly in its 
analysis of the Bush Doctrine, there is considerable congruence. However, this 
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thesis focuses primarily on ideological contestation and change, which is similar 
to (but not synonymous with) the ‘war of position’ in Gramscian terms. The 
difference is that this thesis is concerned with an intra-elite form of ideological 
contestation, not the seeds of proletarian revolution of which the ‘war of position’ 
was an integral part. 
This difference is not surprising. Where Gramsci was motivated by activism, 
Skinner is concerned with perfecting historical method,188 and pursues a different 
project as a result. This is an important difference between the Gramscian 
approach and Skinnerian contextualism. Gramscian analysis engages with history 
to ‘shed light on’ the present condition; it is based on a “philosophy of praxis.”189 
In Cox’s famous phrase, “[t]heory is always for someone and for some 
purpose.”190 Cox’s statement does not just reveal what he perceived as 
deficiencies within then-dominant approaches in International Relations theory; it 
also reveals the core of the Gramscian project. As Gramsci elucidated his own 
commitment to the ‘philosophy of praxis’:191 
The real philosopher is, and cannot be other than, the politician, the 
active man who modifies the environment, understanding by 
environment the ensemble of relations which each of us enters to take 
part in. If one’s own individuality means to acquire consciousness of 
these relations and to modify one’s own personality means to modify 
the ensemble of these relations.192 
As a result, Gramscian analysis of hegemony and ‘common sense’ is concerned 
with disrupting the translation and transmission of political and philosophical 
ideas for mass consumption. This translates into the Gramscian scholarship of 
American strategic thought. For instance, Dodge is concerned with “the influence 
that Neo-Liberalism and its cousin Neo-Conservatism had on the Common Sense 
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decision-making of American government functionaries on the ground in 
Baghdad.”193 
Margaret Leslie’s and Joseph Femia’s critiques of Skinner reveal much of the 
difference between his project and Gramsci’s.194 In attacking contextualism they 
suggest that ‘anachronistic’ readings and strained analogies may, in the hands of 
gifted thinkers such as Gramsci, prove to be politically persuasive. In his study of 
Machiavelli, Gramsci suggested that the Communist Party was a modern 
Principe, making use of what he interpreted to be Machiavelli’s notion of an all-
powerful Principe.195 By substituting ‘party’ for Principe, Gramsci was able to 
adapt his reading of Machiavelli’s argument to his own (very different) context. 
Gramsci’s use of Machiavelli would, by Skinner’s judgement, be anachronistic, 
but for Gramsci as a political actor it served a very specific purpose. Skinner 
grants no such licence to scholars of political thought and his riposte to Gramsci, 
Leslie, and Femia would probably be that Gramsci’s notion of ‘political party’ 
was simply not available to Machiavelli. In Skinner’s terminology, Gramsci 
would be categorised as an ‘innovating ideologist’. 
This thesis is not advocating a ‘philosophy of praxis’; instead, it is concerned with 
archaeological196 reconstruction of how human collectivities organise and 
constitute themselves and how they construct and impose an understanding of that 
process. As one reviewer woefully commented of Skinner, “if theoretical 
manoeuvres are political in that they are directed at an ‘audience to be moved,’ in 
what direction is Skinner’s audience encouraged to move?”197 Skinner provides 
no such answer. In contrast, for Gramsci scholarship and activism remain 
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indivisible and the very idea of political neutrality is impossible.198 Gramscian 
thought would deny Skinner the epistemic privilege of even attempting to reduce 
the impact of contemporary subjectivity,199 regardless of his method. 
Quentin Skinner’s project and the linguistic turn 
The inability to establish direct causation between ‘culture’ and ‘behaviour’ – 
‘once so easily lined up on either side of the great Cartesian divide’200 – has 
directed more critical scholars dealing with culture and ideology to the concept of 
discourse. As stated by R. B. J. Walker, terms such as discourse are “used to 
suggest a more complex and mutually constitutive interplay of phenomena” 
(consciousness and matter). They: 
stress the way seemingly abstract ideas and seemingly concrete 
processes converge in texts and institutions. . . . Those now working 
with culture are now likely to refer to “cultural practices” . . . that are 
embodied in all forms of social activity.201 
Walker points to language’s role in the construction of social life, the ‘linguistic 
turn’ long ignored by the positivist mainstream of academic international 
relations. 
Post-structuralists, some feminists, and many constructivists have seized on the 
possibilities that such an approach offers.202 The rise of Critical Theory203 and 
post-positivist orientations204 in the field of international relations has manifested 
                                                
198 Femia, “An Historicist Critique,” 169–70. 
199 Stephen Gill, “Epistemology, Ontology and the ‘Italian School” in Historical Materialism and 
International Relations, Ed. Stephen Gill (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 24–5. 
200 R. B. J. Walker, “The Concept of Culture in the Theory of International Relations,” in Culture 
and International Relations, ed. Jongsuk Chay (New York: Praeger, 1990), 5. 
201 Ibid. 
202 See Emanuel Adler, “Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics,” European 
Journal of International Relations, 3, no. 3 (1997): 319–63; Daniel M. Green, Constructivism and 
Comparative Politics (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2002); Ted Hopf, “The Promise of 
Constructivism in International Relations Theory,” International Security, 23, no. 1 (1998): 171–
200; Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International 
Relations (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2007). 
203 Meant in this instance in the sense of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School and its heirs. 
For an overview see David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas 
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1980), and for Critical Theory in International 
Relations see Richard Wyn Jones, Critical Theory and World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 2001). 
204 See Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York; 
London: Columbia University Press, 1992) for an overview of the projects of Critical Theory and 
post-positivism and their relationship to International Relations theory; see also Richard Price and 
 49 
in various ways, but many scholars have taken an interest in the language of 
international politics as the discipline of international relations takes its own 
linguistic turn.205 Reflecting varying epistemological commitments, these theories 
have been inspired by different traditions, such as the universal pragmatics of 
Habermas,206 the ordinary language analysis of Wittgenstein and Austin,207 and 
the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer.208 
Nonetheless, it often seems that scholars of international relations have remained 
oblivious to the methodological revolution that has taken place since the 1960s 
within the study of the history of political thought. This revolution has been 
spearheaded by Quentin Skinner, John Dunn, and J. G. A. Pocock, the so-called 
Cambridge School.209 Although the Cambridge School remains controversial and 
its members are not as unified in their approach as their soubriquet suggests,210 
they do share the notion that consideration of a text’s linguistic context211 is 
necessary and perhaps sufficient for understanding that text. The methodological 
battle that their work has triggered has resulted in improved approaches to 
recovering the meaning of texts.212 
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Given the ‘fifty years’ rift’213 between International Relations and the discipline 
of history, it is not surprising that the field of International Relations has 
overlooked the Cambridge School, divided as they are by a common language. As 
the history of diplomatic archives moved from the margins, the field of 
international relations became more theoretical and positivistic. The two 
disciplines’ methods and aspirations increasingly diverged. This had not always 
been the case. From Thucydides to Ranke, the main concern of historical writing 
had been topics that would become the locus of study for international relations: 
war and peace, diplomacy and law, sovereignty and the state. As David Armitage 
notes, the separation of the disciplines has occurred within the last fifty years or 
so.214 The result within international relations has been the emergence of two 
forms of ahistoricism, “history as scripture and as butterfly.”215 Positivists have 
tended to pursue the scripture approach, in which history becomes “a 
predetermined site for the empirical verification of abstract claims.”216 In pursuing 
the butterfly approach, post-positivists have reduced historical inquiry to the 
identification of “contingent hiccups,” the identification of which is instrumental 
in uncovering “power–knowledge nexuses.”217 Barry Buzan and Richard Little 
went further in identifying in International Relations “the prevalence of a-
historical, even anti historical, attitudes in formulating the concept of an 
international system” to explain why “International Relations has failed as an 
intellectual project” and can be rescued only by a return to history.218 
It is strange, then, that as a discipline International Relations has not been more 
responsive to the critique of intellectual history which the disparate members of 
the Cambridge School started in the 1960s. They were responding to the same 
types of concern that Buzan and Little would identify as undermining the field of 
International Relations forty years later. The Cambridge School thinkers did not 
conceptualise intellectual history as distinct from political theory, which would 
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have allowed political theorists to continue in their anachronism. In particular, 
Skinner’s work is not just of methodological interest. His brand of contextualism 
comes close to reconstituting historical inquiry as social theory and thus requires 
detailed examination. 
For Skinner, the central problem remains that we cannot interpret historical 
authors as discussing issues of contemporary relevance but must attempt to 
understand their work as a response to their own, historically specific, concerns. 
Of central importance is what Skinner identified as the ‘mythologies’ often 
present in the study of political thought.219 The first mythology of doctrines 
consists of interpreting authors as if their writings were an attempt to expound a 
complete doctrine on a subject, a doctrine that subsequent generations would 
easily recognise. For Skinner the effects were twofold: an overestimation of the 
significance of what might be “scattered or incidental remarks” and a risk of 
attributing doctrines to authors without considering whether they would have or 
could have expressed an opinion on the relevant subjects.220 Skinner’s position is 
based on the presupposition that to understand an author’s position is to 
understand it as a response to a particular debate. The mythology of doctrines is 
based on the false assumption that such debates are perennial. Skinner’s project 
thus turns on the historical specificity of the concerns of the authors under 
examination. 
The second mythology is that of prolepsis, which elides historical specificity. 
Prolepsis in the Skinnerian sense is the description of past texts in terms of their 
subsequent influence. In Skinnerian terminology this is the texts’ significance, 
which Skinner contrasts with the meaning or author’s intention. The effect of such 
an approach is that “no place is left for the analysis of what its author may have 
intended or meant.”221 Thus, authorial intention is historically specific, and actual 
intention depends on the particular possible intentions available to the author. 
Apart from being philosophically untenable, the neglect of historical specificity 
leads to two types of parochialism: the assumption that past authors were 
responding to what we now regard as canonical authors; and “conceptualiz[ing] 
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an argument in such a way that its alien elements dissolve into a misleading 
familiarity.”222 
Skinner seems caught in a ‘catch-22’: his theory implies that any attempt to bring 
a past text into the context of the present will dissolve its specificity, rendering its 
meaning unrecoverable. Aware of these contradictions, Skinner states that “we 
must learn to do our thinking for ourselves”223 and that the “philosophical, even 
moral, value” of past texts lies in their distance from the present, the very way in 
which they demonstrate the contingency of present ways of framing political 
questions.224 The scholar’s concern thus becomes to uncover past political thought 
in its unfamiliarity. That is, the scholar can retrieve a specific conception that can 
be contrasted with other temporally specific conceptions. Thus, the process of 
retrieval is not just of historical significance but also “of immediate philosophical 
relevance.”225 
By extending Austin’s speech-act theory to account for the difference between a 
speech act and a text production, Skinner created a method that allows one to 
recover past political thought without reducing it to familiarity. Skinner’s famous 
dictum that political texts are attempts to “do things with words” focuses his 
interest in Austin on the distinction between locution and illocution.226 Skinner’s 
key insight is that locution and illocution are conceptually separable but 
independent: “[t]here can be no doubt that the meaning of utterances helps to limit 
the range of illocutionary forces they can bear.”227 Skinner sees authorial intention 
and conventions as intimately connected. For Skinner, the central issue is “the 
relationship between the linguistic dimension of illocutionary force and the 
capacity of speakers to exploit that dimension.”228 
Here Skinner usefully deviates from Austin. Derrida’s critique of Austin 
elucidates the nature of the difference. Like Skinner, Derrida praises Austin’s 
speech-act theory for seemingly avoiding construing language in terms of the 
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communication of transparently accessible meaning.229 Derrida rejects the idea 
that the meaning in which readers are interested is transparently accessible in the 
text. He finds fault with Austin’s examination of failed performances. According 
to Derrida, Austin is aware that the failure of a speech act is a permanent 
possibility, that “all conventional acts are exposed to failure.”230 Derrida’s key 
criticism is that Austin fails to acknowledge that this permanent possibility is in 
fact necessary; something that prevents language’s proper operation is not 
something outside of language but is inherent in the way language functions.231 
This condition of both success and failure lies in what Derrida calls ‘iterability’. 
As Austin emphasises, to carry illocutionary force a speech act must occur 
according to certain conventions; it must repeat certain ritualistic forms (e.g., ‘I 
promise,’ ‘I name this ship’). However, the iterability of utterances that allows 
their conventional functioning is a general property that also allows them to be 
repeated in circumstances in which they do not perform the associated 
illocutionary act, notably when they are performed theatrically or ironically or just 
in a different context. Austin excludes such language uses, but they depend on 
precisely the same iterability as successful ‘serious’ use of language.232 
Derrida emphasises that for Austin it is the speaker’s intention that ultimately 
ensures an utterance’s ‘seriousness’. However, if this intention is to overcome the 
aporias of conventionality, it must be separate from convention. Thus, Austin fails 
to account for meaning that does not depend on some foundational, transparently 
accessible meaning. If intentions are to exclude the failure that is a necessary 
possibility of language use, they must be fully present in either the speaker or the 
text.233 
Thus, for Skinner’s theory of language to accomplish what he wants, he cannot 
depend on this form of intentionality. For those interested in historical texts, the 
author is never present, and to assume the presence of meaning in a text absent its 
context condemns us to Skinner’s vision of parochialism. Leaving aside 
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objections one might hold with respect to the philosophical basis of intentionality, 
such an approach is unavailable to Skinner because he is interested in interpreting 
texts when the author is not present and therefore the author’s mental state at the 
time of writing is unrecoverable. Thus, Skinner emphasises intention in writing 
(which exists to the extent that it is manifested by the produced text) rather than 
the motive for writing (which may be separate from the text and inaccessible).234 
Skinner’s alternative to causal explanation is explanation by redescription. Rather 
than explaining an action by saying why it was done, redescription attempts to 
convey an action’s meaning or, as Skinner puts it, “[w]hat an illocutionary 
redescription will characteristically explain about a social action will be its 
point.”235 Redescribing an utterance identifies what it is. On that basis, Skinner 
positions redescriptive explanation before causal explanation: we need to know an 
act’s type before we can explain why the act was performed. Redescription does 
not point to anything separate from the utterance, whereas a causal explanation 
must identify something separate that caused the utterance. If describing an 
utterance is a form of redescriptive explanation, then the identified intention will 
not be some property of an author separate from a text but a property manifested 
by the text. The sort of meaning at issue here is social meaning, a property of a 
text within its social context.236 The redescriptions with which we can acceptably 
explain an utterance are limited by the meanings available to the utterance’s 
author. These meanings are a matter of the language employed by the speaker and 
their audience. 
Skinner refers to a pervasive ideological context and discusses a cultural 
lexicon.237 This lexicon consists of the words available to us, their 
interrelationships, the circumstances in which we legitimately apply them, and the 
evaluative forces they can be made to bear.238 By way of example, he considers 
Marcel Duchamp’s ‘ready-mades’ and whether they can be considered works of 
art. Skinner suggests that the debate centres on the meaning of the term art, 
whether ready-mades fall within the category of art (are objects not deliberately 
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created as art, still art?), the relation of art to other concepts (can an object be both 
useful and a work of art?), and art’s value.239 In this sense a context is a complex 
structure of words and possible practices. 
Although Skinner has suggested that his methodology is fundamentally about 
understanding authorial intentionality, this is necessarily linked to understanding 
atemporally specific cultural lexicon. The lexicon can be conceptually 
distinguished from particular discursive acts that employ it, but can be accessed 
only through such discursive acts. Therefore, understanding authorial intentions in 
the Skinnerian sense becomes a matter of extracting from the text conceptual 
structures that evince the existence of the intentions. 
In his response to Saul Kripke, Thomas Kuhn goes some way in addressing how 
we might achieve this goal via his consideration of the concept of ‘paradigm’.240 
Kripke argued that a term’s referent is determined by the term’s history, the causal 
chain connecting users of the term to the object to which it refers.241 Kuhn adds 
that the causal chain cannot be given for individual terms without reference to 
other terms.242 Terms are introduced into a pre-existing vocabulary by reference to 
terms already in that vocabulary. Kuhn gives examples of terms that are 
introduced as part of a group of interrelated terms, such as acceleration, force, and 
mass.243 Such groupings are relevant to terms common to political thought, such 
as democracy, rights, or liberty, which do not generally deal with objects that can 
be given an ostensive definition. 
Kuhn’s point is that this holism produces quasi-analytic statements which must be 
accepted as a precondition of using the terms involved with other members of the 
linguistic community.244 Studying the history of these terms allows us to identify 
these quasi-analytic statements and thus recover the structure of the vocabularies 
they constitute, their causal relation with the world, and the internal relations 
between concepts. Studying the arguments presented and accepted by past authors 
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with a view to the presuppositions that underlie these arguments allows us to 
delineate the context within which they worked. This would enable the Skinnerian 
project of recovering past theories and the structure that makes them unfamiliar 
because such theories bear associations and presuppositions alien to our way of 
thinking. 
Thus, understanding past political thought depends on understanding what is 
unfamiliar in the vocabulary of past political writing. The focus on a historically 
specific context allows Skinner to isolate and retrieve political thought from a 
particular period. The virtue is that it disrupts a teleological sense of political 
thought. As expressed by Skinner, an awareness of the contingency of political 
values: 
can help liberate us from the grip of any one hegemonic account of 
those values and how they should be interpreted and understood. 
Equipped with a broader sense of possibility, we can stand back from 
the intellectual commitments we have inherited and ask ourselves in a 
new spirit of enquiry what we should think of them.245 
In some sense, Skinner’s project continues E. H. Carr’s view of history as a social 
process.246 In that view, historians immerse themselves in ‘“knowledge cultures’, 
modes of thinking and reasoning practices which emerged in specific contexts and 
which help to translate historical materials into social facts.”247 
One of Skinner’s central concerns is investigating language’s role in shaping 
political actions, in particular political principles (in this thesis, American 
exceptionalism). Political realists and scholars with other perspectives have 
argued that professed political principles play little role in shaping political action, 
that expedient justification obscures real motives, so principles remain 
epiphenomenal. For them the object of study must be material power and interests 
(military or economic, depending on their persuasion). At the other extreme lies 
the assumption that political agents act in accordance with sincere beliefs. The 
direction of causality is thus clear, and the analyst is tasked with grasping the 
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professed principles and matching them with the behaviour of the actor being 
investigated. Neither extreme is satisfactory. 
Skinner’s theory appeals largely because it reverses the direction of causation 
between speech and action.248 Whatever a political agent’s motive for adopting a 
particular action, the agent must justify it through reference to existing language 
conventions. In turn, this will affect what the agent is able to articulate and act on. 
Deviating too far from these lexical parameters would jeopardise political 
legitimacy because it would involve the relinquishing of intelligibility. This is of 
particular relevance in assessing what Skinner terms ‘untoward’ behaviour, which 
violates the conventions of the time. According to Skinner, the task of the 
‘innovative ideologist’ is to legitimate untoward social actions by manipulating 
the meaning and application of concepts in order to modify political behaviour.249 
By examining the intersubjective meanings of ‘evaluative-descriptive’ terms such 
as freedom, patriotism, and security, which describe and normatively evaluate an 
action, we can glimpse the establishment and reproduction of a society’s 
normative parameters. However, these concepts are unstable and open to 
challenge, manipulation, and transformation. As stated by Duncan Bell: 
The essence of conceptual change thus lies in the malleable 
relationship between sense and reference through time and across 
space. How this change occurs is necessarily political since it involves 
conflict over meaning and action.250 
Skinnerian contextualism and constructivism 
The point of utilising Skinnerian contextualism is not to become mired in the 
history-versus-theory debate or to artificially claim that emphasising the role of 
language is alien to the field of international relations. Instead, this approach 
allows a focus on the role of history and conceptual change and illuminates “how 
political legitimacy is embedded in the set of political vocabularies available at a 
given time.”251 As Lawson puts it, “moments in time take on relatively stable, 
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meaningful shapes drawn from the interaction between particular events and the 
repertoires of meaning brought to bear on the historical meaning.”252 
This thesis builds upon the research agenda of constructivist international 
relations253 and suggests that Skinnerian contextualism is a good methodological 
fit with constructivist theories. Constructivism is “best understood as a meta-
theoretical commitment”254 and in International Relations that commitment is 
“about human consciousness and its role in international life.”255 Specifically, a 
constructivist approach asserts that: 
(a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not 
simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are 
widely shared or “intersubjective” beliefs, which are not reducible to 
individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and 
identities of purposive actors.256 
Thus it makes the epistemological claim that meaning and hence knowledge is 
socially constructed, because concepts are the conditions for the possibility of 
knowledge. Furthermore, this knowledge is socially constructed. Concepts are 
part of language and language cannot be reduced to something subjective or 
objective:257 
It is not subjective, since it exists independently of us to the extent 
that language is always more than its individual usages and prior to 
them. It is not objective, since it does not exist independently of our 
minds and our usage (language exists and changes through our use). It 
is intersubjective.258 
These features make constructivism different from realism and liberalism; 
equally, constructivist analyses use an ideational ontology, so it is not a theory of 
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politics but rather a social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life 
and about social change. As a result it does not, on its own, produce specific 
predictions about political outcomes that could be tested in social scientific 
research.259 
The constructivist umbrella covers a wide variety of commitments and 
approaches. Alexander Wendt’s ‘systemic’ constructivism has focused on the 
interaction between states in the international system.260 Martha Finnemore has 
focused on the norms of international society and their effect on state identities 
and interests.261 In the sub-genre defining book edited by Peter Katzenstein, a 
variety of arguments suggest that culture, norms, and identity matter in 
constructing national security.262 
Ted Hopf suggests that there is actually a split within constructivism between 
‘conventional’ and ‘critical’ versions.263 Whilst they share a rejection of 
‘mainstream’ IR, critical constructivists owe much to post-modern and post-
structural approaches, primarily the assumption that actor and observer cannot be 
separated.264 The key issues for conventional constructivists are norms and 
identity; for critical constructivists, power and discourse. The suggestion is that 
conventional constructivists operate between the ‘mainstream’ of International 
Relations and critical theory.265 Conventional constructivists differ from 
rationalists in their ontology because they emphasise a social ontology: “they 
emphasize how ideational or normative structures constitute agents and their 
interests.”266 In this configuration, conventional constructivism complements 
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rationalism with sociological perspectives but does not diverge substantially on 
issues of epistemology or methodology. Thus, whilst the commitment of 
conventional constructivists to social ontology differs significantly from the 
mainstream of International Relations scholarship, they use positivist 
epistemology. 
In contrast, others have elaborated on critical epistemological positions available 
to constructivists, stating that “the new generation of critical theorists (in the 
1990s) has been labelled ‘constructivists’ because of their characteristic concern 
with the social construction of world politics.”267 As Price and Reus-Smit suggest, 
the most important difference between conventional (or ‘modernist’ in their 
terminology) and critical (‘postmodernist’ in their terms) constructivism is 
analytical, “the former concentrating on the sociolinguistic construction of 
subjects and objects in world politics and the latter focusing on the relationship 
between power and knowledge.”268 
What emerges is that, although constructivism has become mainstream in 
International Relations over the past decade, an ordered and consistent 
methodological framework or object of study is rare.269 As a result, the treatment 
of American grand strategy by constructivist scholars has been strongly 
contested.270 So, whilst they may have agreed on the importance of collective 
understandings of foreign policy, Jackson and Nexon made an important critical 
refutation of Legro’s conventional constructivist account of ideational change in 
American grand strategy. They suggested that he implicitly relied on 
“functionalist reasoning”271 and, furthermore, they contended that he could not 
adequately explain the ideational shift from unilateralism to internationalism in 
U.S. grand strategy: “[I]t is not simply the ‘availability’ of a better heterodoxy 
that explains American internationalism, but the concrete ways in which the 
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diffusion of specific ideas altered extant political and ideological networks to 
make them ripe for transformation.”272 
This thesis is sympathetic to Jackson273 and Nexon’s point. Legro repeated his 
own problematic failure to adequately explain ideational change274 and the 
question of where new ideas came from is one he admits that his theoretical 
position cannot explain.275 This thesis deploys Skinnerian contextualism because 
whilst it rectifies Legro’s position by providing an account of ideological change 
it does so without Jackson’s attempt to imbue concepts themselves with agency, 
“as alternate logics of identity are simply swept away.”276 
In important respects this thesis also departs from structural versions of 
constructivist research in international relations and the traditional history of 
political thought. First, unlike many constructivist studies,277 it seeks to engage 
with interests and ideas at a domestic, rather than international, level. This is an 
attempt to “bring society back into social constructivism . . . the society within 
states rather than the society between them.”278 As Deniz Kandiyoti observes: 
“[t]he question of what and who constitutes the West, or any Other, often has less 
to do with the outside world than with the class, religious or ethnic cleavages 
within the nation itself.”279 
Second, this thesis will treat exceptionalism as a form of ideology. The texts dealt 
with are not on the whole explicit political theory, although some are. Historians 
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of political thought have usually treated the history of the state’s ideas as the 
history of the polis, ‘the self-contained, firmly bounded, sovereign and integrated 
community.’280 However, a series of authors have applied Cambridge School 
contextualism to international political theory, various strands of ideology, and 
more contemporary periods, thereby expanding the temporal scope and focus of 
such study.281 On the whole, the texts examined in this thesis do not deal with 
self-conscious political theory – at least, not in the traditional sense. However, 
grand strategy is necessarily an expression of a worldview and, in the case of the 
objects of this thesis, how the United States engages with the world and to what 
end. 
Although it is difficult to neatly place Quentin Skinner within the taxonomy of 
International Relations theory, this thesis argues that his approach is consistent 
with constructivist thought. As Chris Brown has suggested, “many and various are 
the positions which hold that there is something fundamentally suspect about the 
thought of modernity.”282 Skinner perhaps sits in an isolated corner of the range of 
post-positivist thought. It is unlikely that he would consider himself a post-
modernist or post-structuralist, but, nonetheless, he does raise the type of doubts 
about the “‘Iron cage’ of reason”283 which are characteristic of post-positivist 
approaches. Crucially, Skinner makes considerably stronger epistemological 
claims than many post-structuralists.284 So, as the last section concluded, whilst 
Skinner might agree with Derrida that contexts in their entirety cannot be 
retrieved, for him there is a relevant context outside the text which can be 
plausibly described.285 
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Although Skinner himself claimed that his notion of context seemed to leave “the 
traditional figure of the author in extremely poor health . . . mere precipitates of 
their context,”286 such a conclusion is excessive. Context of the Skinnerian kind is 
precisely what provides the possibility for authors to act. Skinner is making the 
claim that authors are acting when delivering their utterances into an existing 
context and thus that the illocutionary force of an utterance will reveal “what the 
author was doing in issuing it.”287 For both Skinner and constructivists, “the fact 
that history is ‘interpretation dependent’ does not mean it is unknowable, only that 
the test of historical knowledge must be plausibility not infallibility.”288 
This thesis suggests that such knowledge claims are consistent with constructivist 
thought. Perhaps the only way to study what Anthony Gidden termed 
“structuration”289 is diachronically. As expressed by Christian Reus-Smit, “[y]ou 
have to cut into a social order at a particular time, identify the agents and social 
structures, and then trace how they condition one another over time.”290 Although 
Skinner’s own corpus of work seems to deny the utility of studying concepts over 
long periods, Melvin Richter has suggested using the Cambridge School 
contextualism to examine the different meanings and usages of political concepts 
over time,291 his aim being to trace breaks in the use of particular concepts in 
order to determine how particular canons or tropes are reproduced and reworked 
over time.292 
Reus-Smit makes the point that the constructivist philosophy of history is 
essentially Skinnerian, even if it departs from Skinner’s approach with regard to 
comparative case studies and macro-history. Crucially for both Skinner and 
constructivists, history is “a knowable realm of human experience, about the role 
of ideas in constituting that experience and about the appropriate methods for 
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interpreting the constitutive role of ideas.”293 Contra Ranke, such an approach is 
apparent as far back as Carr’s assertion that the “belief in [a] hard core of 
historical facts existing objectively and independently of the interpretation of the 
historian is a preposterous fallacy.”294 According to Carr, a fact “is like a sack – it 
won’t stand up until you’ve put something in it.”295 
With social history, “the presence of ambiguity and the virtuosity of the 
interpretative act are at a premium.”296 Reus-Smit indicates that the constructivist 
position with regard to history’s ‘knowability’ is both ontological and 
epistemological: history comprises an infinite array of facts that can be put 
together in a variety of ways and that depend on interpretation.297 Skinner applies 
similar logic in asserting that if, like Derrida, an interpretation has to be certain 
rather than merely plausible,298 then the intention with which a text was written 
and what the author meant can never be retrieved.299 Skinner’s point is that such a 
position “is insisting on too stringent an account of what it means to have reasons 
for our beliefs.”300 
Skinner emphasises hermeneutic interpretation over causal explanation. His 
preoccupation with the relationship between text and context does not imply a 
causal or determinative role for context. The social context is relevant only insofar 
as it conditions the interpreter’s understanding of what constitutes the range of 
conventionally recognisable meanings within a particular society. 
Skinner’s approach is relevant to this thesis largely because this study 
presupposes the necessity of discussing the social and political context within 
which change takes place when studying change in a political concept such as 
American exceptionalism. For Skinner, such study should include the agent’s 
intention, the meaning of statements, their force, and their effects on listeners and 
readers. 
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This thesis recognises that it does not fully meet Skinner’s methodological 
demands; it is arguable how many Skinnerian inspired studies actually do, and 
Quentin Skinner’s own research, whilst extensive, is not exhaustive.301 The 
intentions of authors, the force of their statements, and their statements’ effects on 
others are requirements far too strict for a comparative study of four different time 
periods covering over half a century. Within its limited strictures no thesis could 
provide a comprehensive study of contextual factors. However, this thesis also 
contends that a less than comprehensive contextual survey is still intellectually 
illuminating and contextualism need not be exhaustive. Unlike the work of 
Skinner himself, this thesis also attempts to recreate the context at four 
historically separate junctures. 
It is important to note that the use of Skinnerian contextualism leads to a 
fundamentally different understanding of American exceptionalism to the existing 
scholarship.302 This difference manifests empirically but also theoretically, in the 
explication of how exceptionalism is inculcated into American grand strategy. 
Although conventional treatments of exceptionalism have differed in their 
conclusions, they have repeated the same methodological mistake. This mistake is 
evident in Hunt’s suggestion that: 
Because of a remarkable cultural stability, Americans have felt no 
urgent need to take their foreign-policy ideology out for major 
overhaul or replacement but have instead enjoyed the luxury of being 
able able by and large to take it for granted…Americans could afford 
to leave their ideology implicit and informal.303 
This thesis fundamentally challenges the suggestion that American 
exceptionalism has meant the same thing in different epochs.304 Instead the 
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research seeks to recreate the different meanings of exceptionalism at different 
points in time. So whilst the thesis agrees with existing scholarship that American 
exceptionalism is fundamentally a debate concerned with the perception of the 
Republic as a different type of state, it does not seek to impose a temporally 
consistent understanding of this debate for the sake of analytic parsimony. Instead 
it brings to life a bitterly contested debate over America’s fundamental nature and 
purpose, even over the half century under study here. The research employs a 
deliberately ecumenical understanding of exceptionalism, which strays beyond 
overt invocation of American purpose. As the texts reveal, many actors have not 
been conspicuous in their appeals to exceptionalism, indeed the belief in 
American exceptionalism has often been implicit within specific debates about 
foreign policy issues and interventions. 
Americans are not unique in regarding their nation as exemplary. Many nations 
lay some claim to superiority.305 In the twentieth century only the Soviet Union 
rivalled the United States in its claim to prophetic messianism and historical 
transcendence. Originating in the Puritan vision of the New World “city on a 
hill,”306 the idea of American exceptionalism was contested in tandem with 
notions of continental expansion and, in the twentieth century, global power. The 
pervasiveness of the idea makes American exceptionalism the para-ideological 
umbrella for such related concepts as manifest destiny, the American dream, and a 
new world order. Other recurring ideas of the same root include the protection and 
extension of the ideal and practice of democracy and the moral responsibility such 
a project entailed. American exceptionalism is para-ideological because it is a set 
of related language that explains the world and the role of the United States 
therein but it lacks the coherence of a formal ideology and has not been codified 
as a means toward a single, definable political end.307 
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This study explores how American political elites viewed their country’s place in 
the world and the meaning of this para-ideology at key points in American 
strategic policy. The aim is not to provide a new theory of American 
exceptionalism or expose beliefs in American exceptionalism as true or false. 
Instead, it is to show how various conceptions of American exceptionalism arose 
amid the competitive context of political argument and, in turn, manifested in a 
conceptual ordering of the world that became ingrained in grand strategy at four 
critical junctures in American history. 
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Chapter 3. Exceptionalism, The Republic, and The Evolution of 
American Foreign Policy and International Thought, 1738–1945 
This chapter examines how political leaders of the United States have understood 
the world of international relations. It explores thought about the place of the 
United States in the world through the lens of American political experience from 
the founding of the republic until the cessation of hostilities in 1945,308 and 
examines how American domestic and foreign policy developed in tandem over 
time. It goes on to suggest that the foundation of the republic was a process that 
was inherently informed by international politics and, equally, as American 
foreign policy developed it was informed by these founding principles. 
The first statements of National Security Council Report 68 (hereafter NSC-68),309 
the codifying document of America’s Cold War experience, indicate the 
importance of such an exploration. Underscoring the primacy of America’s 
founding principles, NSC-68 includes a section near the start titled “The 
Fundamental Purpose of the United States.”310 According to NSC-68, the 
Constitution’s preamble states this purpose: “to form a more perfect Union, 
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity.” This aspect of NSC-68 makes explicit an often-overlooked fact 
about an element of continuity in American political thought and in thought about 
the international system: America’s purpose was defined in terms of perfection of 
the Union. 
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This chapter starts at the point when the former British colonists had to codify 
their states’ relationships with one another and with the rest of the world. 
Questions regarding states’ relationships would ultimately be resolved with the 
creation of the Union, a project that was justified in part by arguments pointing to 
international relations. The nascent United States faced a series of immediate 
challenges in its relationship with the international system – most notably, how to 
manage relations with its former colonial master, how to react to revolutionary 
fervour in France, and how to pursue American neutrality amid a global war 
centred on Franco-British enmity. 
From the outset, the Founding Fathers were concerned with a number of central 
questions which were initially focused on the nature of relations between the 
constituent states. The primary issues were concerned with the nature of interstate 
relations, the conditions under which war occurred, and the concept of 
interference in the affairs of other states.311 
Although most of these questions explicitly related to the young country’s 
domestic character, the answers they generated also informed the American view 
of the international system. The questions would be continually debated and 
challenged. Although not always consciously orientated toward America’s 
international relations, many of the domestic questions would spill into American 
foreign policy.312 
In the respect that it was absorbed with these issues, the United States was 
unusual as, from the outset, it was absorbed at the domestic level with answering 
these questions as part of the process of establishing federal union. However, this 
thesis is not making an argument suggesting that America was or was not 
exceptional. It is concerned, rather, with how political actors in America 
interpreted, contested, and ultimately redefined for successive generations what 
their shared belief in American exceptionalism meant. 
The debates over the Constitution in 1787 and 1788 raised a number of questions 
which were as pertinent to relations between nations as they were to those 
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between the American states. However, the travails of the Union and its states 
have received little recognition in either diplomatic history or the literature on 
international relations. Scholars often overlook that the authors of the Constitution 
of the United States were motivated to perfect the Union largely by the 
inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation in matters of defence and foreign 
policy.313 
Equally, the United States was in part conceived as a product of international 
relations. The nation did not exist as a legal entity until the European powers 
recognised its independence in the treaties that comprised the Peace of Paris. 
Therefore, 3 September 1783 rather than 4 July 1776 is this chapter’s starting 
point. U.S. activity on the world stage evinced that the United States had achieved 
nationhood. John Jay wrote in The Federalist: 
As a nation we have made peace and war. As a nation we have 
vanquished our common enemies; as a nation we have formed 
alliances, and made treaties, and entered into various compacts and 
conventions with foreign states.314 
The first twenty-nine of the eighty-five Federalist papers comprise an extended 
argument for ratifying the Constitution on foreignpolicy grounds.315 Between 
1776 and 1787 there was concern that the states would be incapable of forming or 
maintaining a union and that they could expect the wars and other conflicts that 
were the common experience of neighbouring peoples. The fear was that a state 
system might develop in North America. The dynamic of U.S. politics from 1789 
to 1861 involved the occurrence, approximately every ten years, of a monumental 
sectional crisis averted only through an unexpected turn of events or inspired 
statesmanship. Because disunion was understood as a virtual synonym for war, 
the threat of force remained a constant. In other words: 
‘Union’ was not the belated outcome of the Revolution, but rather its 
central and defining problem from the very outset. American 
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constitutionalism was shaped by the Revolutionaries’ experience in 
successive world systems.316 
Thus, this chapter eschews the oft-repeated claim that the “Anguishing dilemmas 
of security that tormented European Nations did not touch America for nearly 150 
years.”317 From the American Revolution to the Civil War and beyond, the same 
security problems that preoccupied European statesmen were a concern for 
Americans. American domestic politics was filled with internationalist language. 
American doctrines emerged on the balance of power,318 the equality of states, 
and defence against aggression.319 The problem of anarchy within the states was 
central to the architecture of the early Union.320 The Civil War’s continental scale 
illustrates that this was a well-founded concern and that conflicts within the Union 
were equal to those of continental Europe. 
Against the backdrop of Gordon Wood’s influential view that constitutional 
innovation was only tangentially concerned with problems of interstate relations 
and the international context,321 this chapter argues that, whilst the domestic 
model of a perfectible Union is crucial to understanding the intellectual lineage of 
U.S. foreign policy, the “Philadelphian System” which emerged was equally 
concerned with the other three threats to security.322 The point is that, by placing 
the formation of the Union within an international context, it is possible to 
understand American federalism as a contribution to international constitutional 
thought:323 “Federalism was not just a domestic order but a potential world system 
. . . set free from the mercantilism and monarchy of empires past.”324 
A Union of states emerged; then, after considerable debate, a bipartisan policy of 
detachment from European rivalries and, ultimately, a spheres-of-influence 
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demarcation of global authority which would eventually take the form of the 
Monroe Doctrine. At the core of the intellectual debate was “the Unionist 
Paradigm,”325 which was primarily concerned with the predicaments of free states 
in union, a state of affairs that should be familiar to scholars of international 
relations. Central to the unionist paradigm was the belief that Americans had to 
create and perpetuate a form of political association by which republican 
governments that were committed to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness”326 
could join together in a workable federal system in order to escape the anarchy of 
states on the one hand and the despotism of centralised empire on the other. 
Americans nevertheless sought to safeguard two positive values with which 
anarchy and despotism were closely identified: respectively, the liberty of states 
and the preservation of peace across a territory of imperial dimensions. 
Within this context the founders can be seen as having sought institutions that 
would enable the Union to prevail over the forces that threatened it while limiting 
the Union’s power. Achieving this balance was America’s central problem. 
When the old Union died in 1861, a more entrenched sense of U.S. nationalism 
emerged. Before then “the two words ‘United States’ were generally used as a 
plural noun: ‘the United States’ are a republic.’ After 1865 the United States 
became a singular noun. The loose union of states became a nation.”327 
The Constitution, the Union, and the balance of power 
The founders of the United States regarded the wars that had afflicted North 
America before independence as a consequence of British rule. Ties to the 
imperial centre, they argued, had dragged them into European power rivalries. 
Independence from Britain partly represented the potential for freedom from these 
rivalries,328 but achieving this freedom would require keeping disparate states 
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together.329 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and fellow federalists warned 
that rejecting the proposed Union in favour of separate confederacies would result 
in conflict and replicate or create a more unstable situation than that in Europe. 
Hamilton observed, “to look for a continuation of harmony between a number of 
independent unconnected sovereignties, situated in the same neighbourhood[,] 
would be to disregard the uniform course of human events.”330 
Throughout The Federalist the arguments reveal concerns with intra-state 
anarchy. However, Hamilton and Madison, The Federalist’s primary authors, 
were also sceptical about the possibility of peaceful cooperation between nations 
in the absence of higher authority. They knew that the remedy for this required the 
possibility of more concentrated power, creating a terrible trade-off for free 
government. Hamilton noted: 
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national 
conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to 
its dictates. To be more safe they at length become willing to run the 
risk of being less free.331 
It was the observation of the European experience that informed the views of the 
founding fathers. Hamilton argued that relying on reason to guarantee peace was 
dangerous.332 He stated that there was “nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea 
of a league or alliance between independent nations,” despite the complexity of 
the European alliance system that had been formed with “a view to establishing 
the equilibrium of power and peace of that part of the world.”333 Hamilton wrote: 
they were scarcely formed before they were broken, giving an 
instructive lesson to mankind about how little dependence is to be 
placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the obligations of 
good faith and which oppose general considerations of peace and 
justice to the impulse of any immediate interest and passion.334 
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In an important sense “the Philadelphian System” was a conscious ‘other’ to the 
European state system, an acknowledgement of but, nonetheless, a rejection of 
European models of balance of power. The founding fathers were animated by the 
complex logic of republican thought on security, which can best be encapsulated 
by the paradox that “individual security requires the bounding (i.e. control) of 
power but power itself is bounding (i.e. involves ever more extensive 
capabilities).”335 This central insight into the core argument linking the domestic 
creation of the Union and the thought of the founding fathers on international 
relations has not been fully appreciated by either realist or liberal analysis. 
This system had important differences with the idealised conception of the 
Westphalian system.336 First, there was a different distribution of sovereignty. The 
Westphalian hierarchical state limited union to fleeting alliances, as Hamilton 
noted in the preceding quote. Second, both orders had different forms of 
separation of power. In Europe it was material and geographic, while in the 
Philadelphian system it was a formalised constitutional arrangement between the 
three arms of government, which shared power rather than creating autonomous 
institutions, requiring concurrent approval between them. In other words, the 
strength of the union reinforced the division of power in America. Third, the 
balance of power in Europe and America had different roles. In Europe, within 
states, balance of power was quashed by absolute monarchy and between states 
anarchy reigned. In America the ‘balancer’, the armed people, remained dormant. 
Finally, the American political identity remained both capitalist and republican, 
contrasting with the entrenched hybrid of feudalism and capitalism in Europe and 
an aristocratic warlike tradition which asserted itself in international politics.337 
For Hamilton, the other key ‘European factor’ in the shaping of the republic was 
her strategic position. Hamilton argued that disunion would ruin American 
interests, whereas secure union would offer the United States unique 
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opportunities, especially given the country’s geographical advantages.338 He 
wrote: 
If we are wise enough to preserve the Union, . . . we may for ages 
enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation. Europe is 
at great distance from us. Her colonies in our vicinity are too much 
disproportioned in strength, to be able to give us dangerous 
annoyance. Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, 
be necessary to our security.339 
The Jeffersonian vision for the future of the nation was based on the idea of 
fashioning a union of perfect republics. The nature of the world within which the 
American republics existed made such a union a necessity. Whilst trade and 
relations with the rest of the world were necessary, they also threatened to corrupt 
the republics. Both the balance of power between them and the future of their 
conjoined shape and, in turn, how they would conduct themselves on the 
international stage depended on the structure of the union. Jefferson and his 
contemporaries did not appear to make the same distinction between domestic and 
international that contemporary scholars use. 
Whilst the union between the American republic states eliminated anarchy 
between them, it was not able to eliminate the threat from foreign powers, 
particularly those who were not inclined to recognise the Union. There was a 
persistent fear of the attempted reassertion of European imperial dominion,340 not 
to mention bitter division between the political elites on how America should 
position herself with regard to her former colonial master, how to respond to the 
French Revolution, and what position to take in ongoing Franco-British conflict. 
It is important to note that this conscious formation of American identity in 
opposition to Europe’s balance-of-power system is key to the discourse of 
American exceptionalism.341 As early as the 1660s, Puritan ideas of divine 
providence and exceptionalism had started to dissipate. The exceptionalist 
impulse had taken a different tack with the Declaration of Independence, centred 
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on denouncing tyrannical rule and asserting the natural right of free individuals to 
form a civil society.342 
Rather than sharply dividing political relations into foreign and domestic realms, 
American republicans saw nested sets of relationships. Diplomatic relations with 
foreign powers were at the outer extremity, while relations between the American 
states took up their own sphere, differing in shape and degree but not in kind from 
other political relations. The challenge was to determine the degree to which the 
law of nations offered an appropriate framework for organising a union of 
republics.343 Vattel had described relations between European states,344 and he did 
recognise the advantages of federal alliances; however, he did not provide a clear 
articulation of how the sovereign diplomatic powers of that federation could be 
exercised. 
The law of nations was not the only conceptual model available. Before 1776, the 
American states had simply been provinces within the British Empire. This had 
been seen as an extended polity organised under an informal constitution or 
customary framework. Therefore, under the dominion of a distant metropolis they 
were able to exercise a degree of sovereignty.345 For Jefferson, a stronger union 
between the states became a strategy for overcoming their weakness within the 
Atlantic states system. In the period directly preceding the Philadelphia 
Convention, Madison concluded that only a strong federal union could preserve 
republicanism in the separate states and pre-empt interstate conflict. Without such 
a powerful force, the American states system would mirror the European states 
system.346 
The domestic concern of governing a vast country is at the heart of The 
Federalist. Territorial size was directly linked to the problems of republic and 
empire. Was vast territory compatible with a virtuous republic? Ancient Rome 
served as the central reference point. Since the Renaissance, Rome had been the 
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favourite source of ‘lessons’ regarding the fate of states. On the strength of the 
Roman example, Montesquieu demonstrated in the mid-eighteenth century that 
republics could extend themselves by conquest, but in so doing they should not 
expect to reproduce their constitutional system, their true essence.347 The warning 
seemed to be that expansion would lead to a destruction of virtue. The implication 
that the U.S. republic might internally degenerate into an imperial tyranny, 
complete with militarism and depravity, was not pleasant for Americans to 
ponder.348 
Madison attempted to solve the problem by inventing a wholly indigenous 
American model based on the rejection of Europe and the creation of a republic of 
popular sovereignty. In such a republic vastness was not a problem but a boon, 
insurance against corruption and decline. If politically embodied at the centre in a 
series of institutional checks and balances, vastness would prevent any one 
interest group, faction, or region from dominating and thereby destroying the 
whole.349 Madison’s federal solution laid the foundation for future expansion. 
After the 1820s, Jacksonians would take the logic one step further and espouse the 
view that popular republics needed to expand to stay healthy.350 
Like their European contemporaries, the founders highlighted the idea of 
translatio imperii: the notion that, at any given time, a single dominant power or 
people advances civilisation and that historical succession is a matter of westward 
movement.351 Americans found this notion attractive because it sanctioned 
America’s becoming the next great embodiment of civilisation. The global circle 
had been completed; there was no territory farther west to be discovered, just a 
huge and empty territory to be transformed. 
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At the political level, this huge federation of states with the potential for both 
growth and disintegration had to confront the question of identity, what the 
‘national self’ might mean, and how it would be projected. Thomas Jefferson’s 
vision of the exceptional Union would be emblematic of the nineteenth century. 
The European state that he abhorred was essentially an apparatus for war and the 
calculation of attendant dangers and benefits.352 Europeans considered it rational 
and legitimate to wage war for any reason short of obliterating the enemy state. 
The system was brutish but based on the idea that enemies were essentially equal. 
There was no room for any universal ideology of moral right. In contrast, 
Jeffersonians invested the American project with a quality of universal right. They 
saw the United States as embodying the interests of all humans, whose material 
conditions varied so widely. Their own nation hardly warranted the term nation 
because it exhibited none of the entrenched military establishment and consequent 
tax apparatus of most European nations. The external precondition for this was the 
continent’s relative security. For Jefferson, Americans were historically the first 
to be truly free, able to create a completely new society. Because the United States 
was the first place where humans could be free, western expansion was by 
definition a step toward universal liberation. Such expansion advanced what 
Jefferson called the ‘empire for liberty’.353 Defining expansion in this way 
suggested that any potential enemy obstructed the course of natural freedom. 
Jefferson’s first address as president represented a remarkable act of ideological 
innovation. Making use of Washington’s farewell address and reversing his own 
previous political position, he successfully created consensus regarding America’s 
separateness from Europe, and thus justification for a policy of non-alignment. 
Jefferson’s presidency was “key to embedding the principle of ‘detachment’ from 
Europe in U.S. foreign policy thought.”354 Whilst commercial links with Europe 
were unavoidable, they were to be pursued with minimal political 
entanglement.355 
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Dividing the world and the Monroe Doctrine 
Although Jefferson’s shrewd crafting of consensus on foreign policy did not end 
turmoil in foreign affairs, the Philadelphian system of strong domestic union and 
neutrality towards Europe (minimising foreign influence on the United States) 
nevertheless remained central to U.S. grand strategy. 
By the second decade of the nineteenth century that system was threatened by the 
possibility of ‘Old World’ involvement to suppress Latin American revolution. 
Equally, as secretary of state, John Quincy Adams’s twin aims had been to 
exclude British claims in North America whilst extending as far as possible 
American claims. This mix of Adams’s ideas would find expression in Monroe’s 
message of 1823, later known as the Monroe Doctrine: 
That the American continents by the free and independent condition 
which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be 
considered as subjects for future colonization by any European 
power.356 
Adams had already established a moratorium on further colonisation; now he was 
extending this to any conquest of the New World or intervention in its political 
affairs. In effect he was moving from non-colonisation to non-intervention.357 
Furthermore, this was raised to the status of vital interest.358 
It was in Adams’s conception of “two separate systems, two spheres” that 
American exceptionalism became apparent.359 The Doctrine formulated strategy 
so as to: 
‘remove’ the United States from the broader international system and 
the European balance of power. The US portrayed itself as different 
from the European nations, who fought for their interests in an 
inescapable and competitive system of rival states.360 
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The Doctrine extended this formulation to imply that, in the Americas, a new 
system of states was coming into existence and that this system’s members had 
interests that were separate from, but not in conflict with, those of European 
nations.361 As Adams expressed it, 
the political system of the United States is also extra-European . . . 
[F]or the repose of Europe, as well as of America, the European and 
American political systems should be kept as separate and distinct 
from each other as possible.362 
It is not clear from Monroe’s address what the logical justification was for closing 
the Americas to European colonisation. The phrase which seems to answer that 
question is “by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and 
maintain.”363 
Whilst it seemed fairly straightforward that the U.S. should assert their “free and 
independent condition,” it is less clear how that assertion could be transferred to 
continents already widely colonised by Europe or to a future part of the U.S. that 
was neither a state or territory in 1823. The answer is to be found near the end of 
the message in a separate homily, coming after a lengthy description of domestic 
affairs. In this longer section, Monroe addressed the relationship between the 
United States, Europe, and South America, declaring solidarity with the recently 
independent South American republics. Monroe’s struggle consists of two 
binaries, democracy and the monarchical “Holly Alliance,” but also a spatial 
difference. Monroe made clear that the United States would not interfere with the 
struggle for democracy wherever it arose. He contrasted “events in that quarter of 
the globe . . . with which we have so much intercourse and from which we derive 
our origin, we have always been anxious and interested spectators,”364 with 
“movements in this hemisphere we are of necessity more immediately connected, 
and by causes which must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial 
observers.”365 
Old World tyranny versus New World democracy presented interesting 
contradictions and hypocrisies, on the one hand advancing an ideology of equality 
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and on the other practising domestic policies of inequality, including the 
resettlement of native Indians, the slave trade, and the doubt often expressed in 
the U.S. that South Americans were racially incapable of self-rule. Monroe’s 
hemispheric solidarity contained a measure of imperialism. By referring to South 
American republics as “our southern brethren,”366 Monroe put in place the 
“America/Américas” myth,367 a strategy of “control through sameness.”368 Thus 
this statement of protection became through interpretation and reinterpretation a 
strategy of control.369 
The Monroe Doctrine’s effect was striking in the construction of a Western 
Hemisphere and its relative locations of Europe and North and South America, all 
crucial to the formation of the ideology of exceptionalism. It was an ideology 
which was able to simultaneously claim radical separation from European 
colonialism whilst also enabling cultural, military, and economic hegemony. 
The move to world power and the duty of civilisation 
By 1900, the United States led the world in the extraction of raw materials, 
produced more manufactured goods and steel than any other nation, led in the 
production and consumption of consumer goods, and was also a leading exporter 
to the rest of the world.370 But the rise of American power on the international 
stage does not necessarily tell us about her foreign policy. In retrospect, the rise to 
imperial power by the United States at the end of the nineteenth century seems to 
have been almost accidental. President McKinley noted that America had 
proceeded without any intention to acquire the Philippines. What is apparent is 
that the process was not started by security concerns.371 America was redefining 
herself for a new industrialised age in which she was materially stronger. 
Although this chapter has shown the earlier rejection of European models of 
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imperialism, it seems hard to imagine America’s ‘imperial moment’ having 
existed without an explicit European model. 
Although the enthusiasm for imperialism at the end of the century did not last 
long, it did leave the United States as a world power, one of a small group 
“directly interested in all parts of the world and whose voices must be listened to 
everywhere.”372 But in the process of increasing American international 
involvement, America was not simply becoming another great power. Rather, 
some progressives believed that, in a period of profound change, the world was 
coming to resemble America.373 World power did not automatically mean 
following the European model of competitive expansion; in its place could be 
peace, prosperity, and liberal democratic growth, although by 1900 a new world 
view had yet to be convincingly argued. As Ninkovich conceives it, Roosevelt’s 
view was that “the great statesman must be a man of imagination,”374 by which he 
meant that the old ‘common sense’ of foreign policy would have to be 
reinvented.375 
Roosevelt was still constrained by the non-entanglement consensus that had held 
sway the previous century. Thus he was confined in justifying what became 
known as the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ in traditional terms. Nonetheless, the 
corollary expanded the Monroe Doctrine into its modern form. It used the 
supposedly ‘flexible’ Monroe Doctrine to justify intervention in Latin Americas 
even when European powers were not attempting to gain territory. Roosevelt did 
so in a reworking of Monroe’s original “southern brethren” formulation, claiming 
that “our interests and those of our southern neighbours are in reality identical.”376 
Thus the corollary not only kept Europe out but also made the United States the 
ultimate authority in the region. For Walter LaFeber, Roosevelt’s invocation of 
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the Monroe Doctrine was a key turning point, when its protective intentions were 
inverted into a statement of control.377 As Quinn suggests: 
it was a fundamental assumption of this model for order that the 
prerogative of identifying and acting on the ‘common interest’ lay 
with the United States alone. This unarticulated but central principle 
of unaccountable-yet-legitimate leadership is key to understanding the 
ideology of American interventionism that would follow.378 
Of key interest was Roosevelt’s concept of ‘civilisation’, which was paramount in 
constructing the Corollary’s ‘legitimacy’. The Corollary was not made from the 
position of hemispheric detachment but from a universal frame of reference in 
which ‘civilisation’ had conferred upon the United States a police-like power. 
Though this was an inherently imperialist doctrine, it was prompted by hostility to 
the diplomacy of imperialism. Roosevelt’s thinking about international relations 
was dominated by a belief in a global process of civilisation that advanced great 
power cooperation and imperialism, in parallel with his suspicion of imperialism 
in the western hemisphere.379 
Roosevelt shared with other progressives his belief that a nation was truly free 
only if its democracy followed the American model. Theoretically free societies 
could vary, but in reality liberty was not viewed as allowing for different paths of 
development. Instead, it was taken to entail a narrow range of outcomes, all of 
them congruent with the economic and political model of the United States and a 
particular world order. In other words, “liberty for a state ought to produce 
something resembling liberalism within that state, for such was the meaning of 
‘progress’.”380 
Woodrow Wilson, the abandonment of hemispheric detachment and a “peace 
of justice” 
Not long before his inauguration Woodrow Wilson is alleged to have told a friend 
“It would be an irony of fate if my administration had to deal chiefly with foreign 
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affairs.”381 That irony was fully realised. The First World War was a watershed 
event in the history of U.S. foreign policy. In contrast to the limited imperial 
events of 1898 it marked the start of America as a world power and the end of the 
longstanding American pursuit of hemispheric separation. In demanding that 
America take a more involved interest in European affairs, it also presented an 
unprecedented opportunity to pursue radical reform of the ideological basis of the 
European and world order. 
However, Wilson’s immediate response was to take shelter in tradition. In 
proclaiming American neutrality in the War, he declared that: 
The United States must be neutral in fact as well as name during these 
days that are to try men’s souls. We must be impartial in thought as 
well as in action, must put a curb upon our sentiments as well as upon 
every transaction that might be construed as a preference of one party 
to the struggle before another.382 
Neutrality was meant as an assertion that the interests of the United States were 
fundamentally different from those of the belligerents. In legal terms, neutral 
rights meant a right to trade with the belligerents or anyone else; this meant that 
only legally defined ‘contraband’ could be seized. In other words, commerce was 
expected to remain neutral despite the war.383 
Privately Wilson was sympathetic with Britain and believed that if she, Russia, or 
France dictated the postwar settlement it would not be at odds with his conception 
of America’s interest.384 Although legally correct, Wilson’s vision of neutrality 
was at cross-purposes with his vision of civilisation. Traditional neutrality was 
rooted in a narrow conception of national interest. Wilson was concerned with 
reconciling this selfish doctrine with America’s role in promoting civilisation. As 
he conceived of it, neutrality should posses a noble and universal validity. As he 
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put it “I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to 
do than fight.”385 
Whilst neutral rights became the casus belli for America, Wilson had a more 
ideological sense of neutrality grounded in civilisational terms and the ability to 
mediate between the belligerents, rather than just to guarantee trade.386 The 
chance for mediation was never very good, as the belligerents shared neither a 
vision of postwar peace (which might have compelled them to put down arms) nor 
Wilson’s view of America as peacemaker. Whatever chance there was for 
America to make peace vanished entirely in 1917. 
The experience formed Wilson’s strategic view and by the time America entered 
the War he had decided that the balance of power in Europe had been so critically 
damaged that even if it survived it could never re-establish great power security. 
As a liberal optimist, Wilson hoped and assumed that the balance of power would 
not last. He was not a misguided idealist, as he is sometimes cast. Both as an 
academic and politician he was thoroughly grounded in the concept of the balance 
of power but he did not view it as an unchanging natural law which nations 
ignored to their detriment. Since the balance of power was a human creation it, 
too, was subject to change. His view was perhaps not surprising, as there was no 
American tradition of raison d’état. It was a European construct which (as this 
chapter has already demonstrated) American foreign and domestic policy had 
strenuously avoided.387 
The other important point to tease out of Wilson’s thought was that the failure of 
American neutrality and the emergence of a World war meant that great power 
politics and, more specifically, conflict beyond trade and the maintenance of 
empires were now global. As a result, the geographic isolation America had 
enjoyed was threatened by the potential for the war to end with a single power 
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dominating Europe.388 Wilson’s rhetoric after America entered the war introduced 
the concept of a global threat into American foreign-policy lexicon. 
An unanticipated shift in American grand strategy reflected this new conception 
of the world. During the years of neutrality, American war planning had been 
based on the traditional idea of the threat of invasion of the Western Hemisphere. 
The logic of pursuing simply neutral rights “ought logically to have been a naval 
war”;389 instead, America sent a military force to Europe, which was met with 
shock by the political elites. 
Wilson’s solution for postwar peace was collective security based on no less than 
‘world opinion’. But this was less idealistic than it sounded; Wilson’s view of 
world opinion was circumscribed, ideologically conservative, and less than global 
in reach. “Collective security based on world public opinion . . . [was] far more 
limited – a new language of power that relied, as had the old, upon the sanction of 
force.”390 
For Wilson, America was the linchpin of world opinion. The assumption of U.S. 
primacy helped Wilson sustain his belief that the institutions and norms of the 
new world order would not clash with U.S. interests or wishes. As with his 
concept of the Monroe Doctrine, he conflated U.S. interests with those of other 
nations, this reconception of the Monroe Doctrine later serving as the basis of 
Wilson’s global new world order. “True freedom and independence meant the 
maintenance [of] a liberal, democratic capitalist order.”391 He assumed that U.S. 
wishes and the collective will of the free world would perennially coincide. “His 
approach to foreign policy was at once unilateral and universal.”392 
Wilson did not consider that the United States might find itself in conflict with the 
new order of international institutions and law that he had planned because he 
conceived of that order as a universalisation of U.S. standards. The purpose of the 
new system was to bring other nations into line with the United States, not vice 
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versa. In making his case for the assumption of global leadership, Wilson 
projected a familiar sense of national destiny: 
The isolation of the United States is at an end, not because we chose 
to go into the politics of the world, but because, by the sheer genius of 
this people and the growth of our power, we have become a 
determining factor in the history of mankind. And after you have 
become a determining factor you cannot remain isolated, whether you 
want to or not. Isolation ended by the processes of history, not by the 
processes of our independent choice, and the processes of history 
merely fulfilled the prediction of the men who founded our 
republic.393 
Wilson’s presidency marked a turning point in U.S. foreign policy, even if it was 
imbued with familiar strands of thought. A more engaged global foreign policy 
had been likely as the country increased in economic power and military potential. 
The Roosevelt years had already made apparent the huge growth in U.S. power 
potential, but Roosevelt had remained constrained by pre-existing norms of U.S. 
ideology regarding separation of spheres of influence. Under Wilson, The First 
World War ruptured the international order and the way America conceptualised 
its role within it. 
Following the path established by Roosevelt, the United States believed that it 
could increase the freedom of foreign peoples by interfering in their national 
affairs so as to generate the conditions needed for liberty. This belief was rooted 
in the now-familiar view that only certain forms of political order were 
compatible with progress and that the United States had a responsibility to guide 
other nations in their exercise of freedom. Under Wilsonian ideology, it was 
therefore legitimate to seek to build a cooperative system of states under 
American hegemony. 
From World War to Cold War 
After Wilson’s political decline the United States eschewed the level of 
engagement he had sought. Although the United States was firmly involved in 
European economic affairs, it avoided military and political alliances. 
Ideologically the country returned to the detached relations of Jeffersonian 
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consensus. Despite the passage of a series of neutrality acts aimed at avoiding the 
1917 casus belli that had dragged the United States into the First World War, the 
country ultimately did not stay out of the Second World War.394 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt (FDR) combined, not always logically, a deeply 
rooted Wilsonian disposition with Theodore Roosevelt’s geopolitical nuance. 
Thus, FDR’s new version of Wilson’s League of Nations included Theodore’s 
idea of a concert of great powers exerting peaceful influence and vigilantly 
supervising their respective regions, or ‘four policemen’. The massive antifascist 
alliance of the Second World War would be transformed, when the criminal 
aggressors had been vanquished, into a stable order of cooperation and mutual 
interest, headed by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and 
perhaps also a reconstituted China.395 
FDR’s vision did not come to pass. Only the United States and the Soviet Union 
emerged stronger from the war. The resultant change to the international system 
was unprecedented. Before the war it had been based on a number of great 
powers; by 1945 only the United States and Soviet Union really rivalled each 
other in material or ideological terms. Domestically the war had changed the 
views of U.S. leaders. The decision to reject Wilson’s legacy in favour of 
defensive isolation now looked like a colossal error. “It had allowed a war that 
might have been contained in size by early American commitment to engulf half 
the world before dragging the United States in anyway.”396 
The noninterventionists had been wrong in deeming U.S. intervention 
unnecessary, but they had anticipated the complications that would ensue once the 
United States permanently committed to a world order. Their predictions of U.S. 
totalitarianism proved unfounded, but they were correct in believing that the old 
republic would vanish with the war and a new United States would take its place. 
The nascent Truman administration struggled with America’s limited experience 
in Great Power politics. Within a few years, the United States moved from robust 
wartime cooperation with the Soviets to NSC-68’s comprehensive diagnosis of the 
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nature of the Soviet threat and a programme of response. The nature of the 
diagnosis showed just how far U.S. international thought had travelled, as the 
threat from the Soviet Union was suddenly believed to endanger freedom at a 
global level. 
Conclusion 
Unlike the words imperialism, nationalism, and internationalism, which did not 
come into widespread use until the nineteenth century, the terms, empire, nation, 
and Union have signified important categories of American political discourse 
since 1776.397 In the words of Meining, these political terms are “an essential 
generalised shorthand for elusive formations that are continuously under 
construction and alteration.”398 The tension among imperialism, nationalism, and 
internationalism has been a significant feature of American political discourse. 
The debate continues regarding who Americans are and how that question should 
inform domestic and international policy. 
Some traditional accounts of U.S. diplomatic history have stressed the adherence 
to “Continental Americanism” by American statesmen until the 1890s, keeping 
America out of great power international politics.399 It is an account which still 
maintains some influence and in that narrative the United States moved from 
isolationism to internationalism only in the twentieth century.400 Such an account 
is wrong to dismiss the significance of internationalist currents between the 
republic’s founding and 1914. As this chapter has demonstrated, the international 
environment was a concern so fundamental that it conditioned the formation of 
the Union and the image of the Union remained linked to the perturbations of 
internationalist thought in the United States. 
The sense that the breakdown of European and world order in the aftermath of the 
First World War had returned the U.S. to its original predicament was part of the 
U.S. internationalist sensibility. In 1918 Horace Kallen, a member of Wilson’s 
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‘Inquiry’, stated that America’s independent states in 1776 “were in precisely the 
same position and confronted precisely the same problems, in principle, as the 
present states and governments of the world.”401 That is not to say that many 
voices wanted a world society amongst ‘the civilised powers’. U.S. 
internationalism would have to clear a new path between the need for a union 
among peace-loving nations and the totalising of a world state. In response to the 
exigencies of America’s new world role in the twentieth century, the unionist 
paradigm was neither abandoned nor uncritically accepted but was modified and 
restated to fit the new circumstances. 
This chapter outlined the development of the theory and practice of U.S. 
international political thought from the founding of the republic to the end of the 
Second World War. It showed that questions of international politics and the U.S. 
experience of Union were interdependent and examined how this experience 
influenced America’s international stance. In short, there is an intimate 
relationship between how Americans have viewed the republic and how they have 
attempted to fashion foreign policy. 
The last section of the chapter has examined how themes of twentieth-century 
internationalism had far deeper roots in U.S. political thought than is sometimes 
suggested. The distinctive American Union always had an internationalist 
dimension because it was constructed on a federative principle according to which 
a genuine federation was neither an empire nor simply a civic society but an 
assemblage of societies large enough to provide security for all while preserving 
the individuality and independence of each. It occupied a moderate place between 
anarchy and tyranny. 
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Chapter 4. Exceptionalism and Containment, 1946–1950 
Starting in early 1947, American grand strategy underwent a reorientation on a 
global scale. The twenty-minute delivery of the Truman Doctrine made public 
what Washington political insiders had known for at least a year: a new grand 
strategy of containment had replaced Rooseveltian internationalism. This change 
heralded the onset of the Cold War and marked the first move in an ideological 
reordering of American grand strategy around the policy of containment, which 
would find final expression in NSC-68.402 
President Truman was nevertheless critical of the emergent popular notion403 that 
American policy had suddenly shifted in 1947 or that his doctrine had resulted 
from a sudden intensification of rivalry with the Soviet Union.404 Rather, Truman 
contested that, politically, events had been leading in that direction since his April 
1945 talks with Molotov.405 This chapter explores Truman’s contention that the 
strategic change of the Truman Doctrine in fact manifested in the context of prior 
ideological contestation. 
Using Truman’s timeline of containment, this chapter will examine discourse 
about the structure of the postwar international system and America’s role within 
that system. The chapter will investigate the development of this discourse and the 
genre of U.S. international political thought across media such as speeches, 
newspaper articles, policy papers, and books by public intellectuals and 
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policymakers who formed a small elite.406 The chapter will show the degree to 
which the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 were fundamental ideological 
innovations in U.S. foreign policy that can be understood only by placing them 
within the context of contemporary discourse. These innovations can then be 
understood as illocutionary, political acts. 
The chapter’s analysis will be based on a Skinnerian contextualist approach. This 
analysis will show that containment was predicated on a number of assumptions 
based, in part, on an innovative reworking of the writings of a series of high-
profile intellectuals and policymakers such as Walter Lippmann, Henry Luce, and 
George Kennan. This chapter examines these individuals because they 
significantly contributed to a debate conducted both in public and in private by 
remarkably few participants. The chapter will employ a contextualist 
methodology, providing detailed portraits of individual thinkers as well an 
analysis of significant shifts in the language of politics that shaped the contours of 
American exceptionalism. 
The chapter will refer to American ‘international political thought’. That phrase is 
deliberately expansive, encompassing the complex of self-consciously articulated 
languages employed to envisage, interrogate, and potentially answer the questions 
raised by American involvement in international affairs. Political discourse rarely 
comprises a systematic, consistent body of doctrine. As Raymond Geuss 
observed, political theories are often, in practice, “historically congealed kinds of 
rhetorical appeal which make use of quasi-propositional fragments.”407 
In the language of Quentin Skinner, this chapter will suggest that the architects of 
the policy of containment were ‘innovating ideologists’ who manipulated 
discourse in order to serve specific political strategies. For the sake of clarity, the 
innovating ideologists in this chapter include Truman himself, as well as Paul 
Nitze, who chaired the NSC study group which produced NSC-68, and Dean 
Acheson, who was a key figure in the conception and drafting of the Truman 
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Doctrine. According to Skinner, “It is in large part by rhetorical manipulation . . . 
that any society succeeds in establishing, upholding, questioning or altering its 
moral identity.”408 
Within the historiography, containment has been characterised as “the American 
effort, by military, political and economic means[,] to resist communist expansion 
throughout the world.”409 After the publication of Kennan’s memoirs began in the 
late 1960s,410 the scholarly debate centred around what Kennan had meant by 
‘containment’ and the degree to which American grand strategy applied his vision 
of containment. 
In the late 1960s, Kennan protested that the press had unjustly elevated 
containment to the status of a doctrine. However, until the late 1980s, 
‘containment’ remained the pre-eminent description of early Cold War U.S. 
strategy among historians and policymakers. The historical debate remained 
preoccupied with questions of the Cold War’s origins and, ultimately, of 
responsibility. Amongst historians the term containment was used 
indiscriminately by orthodox,411 revisionist,412 and post-revisionist413 scholars, 
often without attempts at definition or to analyse its linguistic innovation as a 
form of political innovation and new conceptual ordering of the world.414 
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Some revisionist scholars did attempt to grapple with containment but did so 
within the same positivist paradigm as those preceding them. Chief amongst these 
was John Lewis Gaddis in his seminal book, Strategies of Containment, whose 
stated aim was to “‘reinterpret’ U.S. national security from a ‘strategic 
perspective’ by focusing on the ‘central preoccupation of postwar national 
security policy’ – the idea of containment.”415 Yet he limited his discussion of 
containment’s formation under Truman to the shift in military strategy after the 
drafting of NSC-68, effectively ignoring containment’s ideological origins and 
illocutionary significance. 
Gaddis allowed for the idea that a more aggressive policy was outlined within the 
strategy of containment. However, his argument was fundamentally proleptic: he 
reasoned ex post facto that because containment never amounted in practice to 
more than ‘balancing’ it had never been seriously considered as an all-
encompassing global grand strategy. Relying heavily on Kennan’s writing for his 
interpretation, Gaddis suggested that containment was the most coherent strategy 
devised for dealing with the Soviets during the Cold War. That claim may well 
have been true from Truman’s perspective but Gaddis committed two errors: he 
overestimated the direct relevance of Kennan’s work to policymaking, and he 
bestowed upon Kennan’s early writing more coherence than it could possibly 
have had before the existence of his later work. In fact, Kennan himself was 
acutely aware of and acknowledged his limited influence, and that many 
individuals within the Truman administration held a strategic vision different 
from his own and lobbied vigorously for Eastern Europe’s unconditional 
surrender.416 Kennan’s voice was far from the most influential, even if we 
concede that some of his analysis was later appropriated. 
Although the scholarship of early Cold War American grand strategy has 
significantly advanced since Strategies of Containment, this scholarship has 
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largely repeated Gaddis’s mistake: it has applied retrospectively defined analytical 
frameworks in order to categorise American grand strategy in both the late 1940s 
and early 1950s. Despite the recent trend toward recognising competing ideas for 
waging the Cold War, many contemporary scholars have consciously structured 
their work around a unitary, hegemonic pattern in a quest for a historical order 
that could not have existed at the time.417 In other words, containment, rollback, 
liberation, and other characterisations of American grand strategy became tools 
for imposing order on a past that included competing and chaotic visions of 
international political order. 
Skinner’s alternative approach demands that political texts must be understood 
according to their authors’ intentions, otherwise it would be impossible to 
determine what was genuinely distinctive about an individual work, and the 
interpreter would not notice that an author was declining to employ a 
conventionally accepted argument. According to Skinner, political ideas should 
not be dismissed as mere rationalisations of political action; prevailing ideas can 
determine political behaviour. Prevailing political assumptions and inherited 
concepts thus limit the kind of opposition that ‘innovating ideologists’ are able to 
marshal.418 
This chapter will place the early Cold War American grand strategy of 
containment within a contextual framework to examine the Truman Doctrine as 
an act of ideological innovation. Apart from an examination of the historiography 
of containment, already considered above, the chapter will explore the ideological 
context via wartime and postwar discourse. These strands include the triumphant 
heralding of the ‘American century’ by Luce, publisher of three of the most 
influential postwar magazines; the writings of Lippmann, the period’s pre-
eminent political commentator, who merged his early critique of American 
moralism with a realist defence of postwar cosmopolitanism; Woodrow Wilson’s 
rhetoric of freedom, which provided ideological tropes used by containment; and 
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Kennan’s “Long Telegram”419 to the U.S. State Department and his article “The 
Sources of Soviet Conduct,” written under the pseudonym ‘X’ and commonly 
referred to as the “X article.”420 Both the “long telegram” and the “X article” 
outlined a vision of containment and, more importantly, a vision of an intransigent 
enemy, which the Truman Doctrine utilised in its act of ideological innovation. 
Finally, the chapter will analyse the speech that announced the Truman Doctrine 
and NSC-68, which both anchored and extended this ideological stance. It will 
show the degree to which these documents represented both continuity with the 
discourse of U.S. international political thought and ideological novelty. 
Step one of contextual analysis: what was the author doing in writing a text 
in relation to other available texts that made up the ideological context? 
This section provides a sketch of the ‘available’ texts in the period before the 
declaration of the Truman Doctrine and also before the writing of NSC-68. These 
were the two key texts, which this chapter contends were ideologically innovative, 
and their innovative ideological reinterpretation of the world allowed an 
expansive version of containment to be pursued. This chapter makes no claim to 
contextual completeness, which is a task that is beyond the scope of a study which 
aims to survey a number of periods. However, the texts and authors under survey 
were chosen because they were so widely read at the time and, in the case of 
Luce, their opinions dispersed over a broad range of publications. As a result this 
chapter suggests that they were representative of major strands of ‘conventional’ 
American thought. 
Melvyn Leffler asserts that: 
At the time of Roosevelt’s death American officials did not regard the 
Soviet Union as an enemy and were not frightened by Soviet military 
prowess. Soviet power paled next to that of the United States. . . . [The 
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Soviets had] no capacity to attack American territory and had no 
ability to inflict damage on the American economy.421 
Nevertheless, the emergence of the concept of Cold War as a discrete taxonomy 
was intrinsically ideological, based on FDR’s theme of freedom via the Atlantic 
Charter combined with a “presupposition that no settlement or ‘peace’ in the 
traditional sense . . . was possible.”422 Whether or not the Cold War was, from the 
outset, a U.S. project is of coincidental significance to this thesis. The point is that 
the Cold War quickly became defined in ideological terms. In the West the 
ideology at stake was U.S.-style liberal capitalism, combined with a proselytising 
interpretation of America’s exceptional role in the world. 
New approaches of differing philosophical commitments, in the fields of both 
International Relations and diplomatic history, have sought to bring ideology back 
into the narrative of U.S. foreign policy.423 Scott Lucas makes the important point 
that orthodox Cold War narratives have not normally allowed the possibility that a 
U.S. ideology was at play in the Cold War424 and present ‘Americanisation’ as a 
one-way process in which foreign peoples welcomed the commodities and values 
of liberal democracy. In other words, U.S. Cold War ideology was so successful 
that it sanitised the history it was creating.425 
This is not to suggest that there was no ideological context during the pre-1945 
period; indeed, this section is engaged with recreating that context. The U.S. 
identification of Germany and Japan as the primary enemies during the Second 
World War had promoted the Grand Alliance and the associated rehabilitation of 
the Soviet Union in the United States. The extension of Lend-Lease to the Soviet 
Union in 1941 went hand in hand with Roosevelt’s desire to seek Soviet support 
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for a postwar order compatible with liberal democracy. Although Roosevelt’s 
personal political skill kept the Grand Alliance alive during the Second World 
War, peaceful coexistence would ultimately prove incompatible with American 
national identity; for the second time in a generation, an American president 
would fail in his attempt to achieve his vision for a postwar new world order. 
The Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms had established a wartime discourse 
largely in line with American liberal democratic values, including free trade, 
collective security against belligerents, and other ideals loosely inherited from 
Wilson’s Fourteen Points.426 Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (from want, from fear, of 
speech, and of worship)427 resonated not just with Americans but with the 
constituents of the nascent United Nations, whose declaration committed its 
members to the principles of the Atlantic Charter. 
The wartime strategy of unconditional surrender reassured Stalin, who distrusted 
his allies and suspected that the Atlantic Charter was largely directed at the Soviet 
Union. Unconditional surrender was a trope appropriated from Civil War general 
Ulysses Grant and fitted with America’s history of comprehensively 
exterminating foreign enemies, as during the American Indian Wars associated 
with domestic expansion westward, the Mexican–merican War (1846–8), and the 
hunting down of Filipinos. 
The New York Times military correspondent Hanson Baldwin later called 
unconditional surrender one of the great mistakes of the Second World War.428 
Although it allowed Roosevelt to maintain the Grand Alliance with minimal U.S. 
casualties, unconditional surrender encouraged Germany and Japan to extend the 
war as long as possible and, according to Baldwin, enabled the Soviets to extend 
their campaign across Europe.429 This chapter goes further by suggesting that the 
notion of unconditional surrender contributed to containment’s uncompromising 
character. 
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The wartime discourse of the Grand Alliance remained in place through the 1945 
Yalta Conference, which kept alive Roosevelt’s vision of a postwar order 
overseen by four enforcers: the United States, Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and 
nationalist China. Stalin signed on to the Yalta Declaration and its vision of 
‘liberated’ Europe, pledging to support the UN. Roosevelt triumphantly declared 
that the Yalta Declaration had eliminated “spheres of influence and balances of 
power and all the other expedients which have been tried for centuries – and have 
failed.”430 Yalta would represent “the best the Big Three could do to hold their 
alliance together, and it was not enough,” Lloyd Gardner states.431 Effectively, 
Europe was ideologically and materially partitioned before the Cold War began in 
earnest. 
The myth of U.S. universalism precluded America’s accommodating an extended 
Soviet sphere of influence. Many Americans believed that the United States was 
God’s chosen nation, obligated to assume world leadership and spread its way of 
life. Before intervention in the Second World War, Luce reaffirmed America’s 
national identity in his 1940 bestseller American Century.432 Much as John 
O’Sullivan had trumpeted Manifest Destiny during the Mexican–American 
War,433 a century later Luce, with no greater subtlety, called on the United States 
to “exert upon the world the full impact of our influence, for such purposes as we 
see fit and by such means as we see fit.”434 Truman employed a similar trope after 
the war: “[n]ow this great Republic – the greatest in history, the greatest the sun 
has ever shone upon – is charged with leadership in the world for the welfare of 
the whole world as well as our own welfare.”435 
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Henry Luce’s “American century” 
The antecedent of Truman’s grandiose evocation of the Republic’s mission was 
evident in Luce’s writings.436 Born to missionary parents in China, Luce had risen 
to prominence as publisher of Time, Life, Fortune, and the documentary series 
March of Time. With a worldview shaped by strong Protestant belief and fervent 
faith in America’s God-ordained global mission,437 Luce became one of 
America’s most influential private citizens, and he relentlessly lobbied for greater 
U.S. intervention in foreign affairs. As a Republican insider, Luce received 
unprecedented access to confidential material.438 Life’s popular appeal during the 
Second World War cemented his position.439 More concerned with foreign affairs 
than with the daily operation of his publications, Luce claimed responsibility as 
editor-in-chief for all of his magazines’ contents. 
Luce’s magazines had considerable cultural importance after the Second World 
War, which Luce had foreseen as precipitating U.S. global hegemony. The 
American Century dominated the 17 February 1941 issue of Life. In a 
groundbreaking editorial, Luce argued that Americans must reconcile themselves 
to the burdens of America’s being the world’s most powerful country. As he saw 
it, Americans were unable to face this fact either practically or morally. The 
twentieth century had become the American century; therefore, Americans were 
obligated to: 
accept wholeheartedly our duty and our opportunity as the most 
powerful and vital nation in the world and in consequence to exert 
upon the world the full import of our influence, for such purposes as 
we see fit and by such means as we see fit.440 
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Luce took issue with fellow interventionists who emphasised an Anglo-American 
postwar partnership.441 He argued that the United States would be the senior 
partner by virtue of a generation of economic ascendency. Luce saw isolationists 
as shirking America’s economic and political responsibility on a global scale.442 
Many of Luce’s justifications for expansionism were unexceptional insofar as 
they revived nineteenth-century Manifest Destiny arguments that the United 
States share its political institutions and liberties with the world. 
But Luce did not specify the contours of this putative American responsibility. 
The republic would not have a boundless role, he admitted: “our only alternative 
to isolationism is not to undertake to police the whole world nor to impose 
democratic institutions on all mankind.”443 After all, the postwar world would still 
include tyrannies, and warfare would not be eliminated by America alone or some 
“parliament of men.”444 However, Luce offered an expansive assessment of 
America’s postwar role; although freedom would not reign everywhere, he 
expected it to flourish in most of the world: 
the indivisibility of the contemporary world . . . Tyrannies may 
require a large amount of living space, but freedom requires and will 
require far greater living space than Tyranny. Peace cannot endure 
unless it prevails over a very large part of the world. Justice will come 
near to losing all meaning in the minds of men unless Justice can have 
approximately the same fundamental meanings in many lands and 
among many peoples.445 
As Luce instructed his employees at Time, America stood for one value above all 
others: 
If we had to choose one word out of the whole vocabulary of human 
experience to associate with America – surely it would not be hard to 
choose the word. For surely the word is Freedom . . . Without 
Freedom, America is untranslatable . . . And therefore it seems to me 
that we can sum up the whole of editorial attitudes and principles in 
one word ‘Freedom’.446 
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Luce’s American Century had been inspired partly by a Lippmann essay 
published in Time two years earlier: “The American Destiny.” Luce seemed to 
have mined the essay’s first two paragraphs. Lippmann had written, “[t]he 
American spirit is troubled not by the dangers, and not by the difficulties of the 
age, but by indecision.”447 Luce’s editorial began in a similar manner: “We 
Americans are unhappy. We are not happy about ourselves in relation to America. 
We are nervous – or gloomy – or apathetic.”448 To Lippmann this was merely part 
of a sustained critique of American apathy that informed much of his early 
writing. In his view this apathy stemmed from the nation’s “refusal to accept the 
large responsibilities” that accompanied “the American Destiny,” the 
“opportunity, the power and the responsibilities of a very great nation at the centre 
of a civilised world.”449 
The Luce–Lippmann thesis of historical inevitability had defenders. New York 
Herald Tribune columnist Dorothy Thompson quoted from Lippmann extensively 
and approvingly. She wrote, “[t]o Americanize enough of the world so that we 
shall have a climate favorable to our growth is indeed a call to destiny.”450 Her 
message could not have been more absolute in its Gibbonian invocation of the 
stakes: “This will be an American century or it will be the beginning of the 
decline and fall of the American Dream.”451 
Luce’s article reached millions of Americans and provoked heated controversy. 
Although U.S. Department of State memoranda cited the article positively,452 
there was also vigorous criticism from various groups. Leading isolationist 
senator Robert Taft argued that Americans could not impose their system on the 
world. He correctly predicted that Luce’s globalism would require a huge 
peacetime military establishment.453 
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In the nineteenth century Alexis de Tocqueville observed that the future might see 
the rise of two rival great powers, Russia and the United States.454 Luce’s postwar 
order did allow for other great powers. However, his ‘American Century’, like 
Lippmann’s “America’s Destiny,” was based on the assumptions that Great 
Britain’s days as the world’s police officer were over and that Great Britain would 
not remain an equal partner to the United States. 
Luce’s magazines gradually abandoned their wartime benevolence towards the 
Soviets, and in 1943 Luce began to regard the Soviets as the chief impediment to 
the American century. In a Life article of 4 September 1944 former U.S. 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union William C. Bullitt predicted that Stalin, still 
America’s ally, would soon replace Hitler, still to be vanquished, as the great 
threat to Europe.455 Luce’s magazines still vacillated in their view of ‘legitimate’ 
Soviet actions, on several occasions likening Russia’s concern with its eastern 
boundaries to U.S. hegemony over Latin America. The implication was that the 
Soviet Union and United States were equal powers. “From the standpoint of lesser 
nations, . . . the Big Two were dangerous not because their foreign policies were 
so different, but because they were so much alike.”456 
By 1946 Luce’s distrust of U.S.–Soviet cooperation had permanently hardened, 
and he expressed frustration with the failure of the Truman administration and 
larger newspapers to recognise the new rivalry. As 1946 progressed, Luce’s 
magazines contradicted themselves less often; individual stories combined 
summary and opinion more frequently and hardened their line towards the Soviet 
Union. His anger resulted in a Life editorial that expressed his views: 
It is time to face the truth. . . . [I]f we Americans want real peace, we 
will have to get used to the idea of living with this conflict. . . . We 
shall have to work hard and sleeplessly at the tough game of power 
politics and diplomacy.457 
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Walter Lippmann’s Cold War 
Despite ever-present nationalist undercurrents, many Americans had assumed that 
the end of the Second World War would provide a second chance to make the 
world ‘safe for democracy’. Wendell Willkie’s One World (1943) pushed the 
internationalism of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms.458 
Unsophisticated as a political tract, the book espoused a vision of human unity 
achieved through the common quest for freedom and justice realised through 
Russo-American cooperation. That fact that a million copies were sold contrasts 
with the fact that just after Willkie’s broadcasts accompanying publication 
American distrust of Russia fell to its lowest point in public opinion polls.459 
The Second World War had also had a profound effect on the celebrated journalist 
Walter Lippmann;460 once a champion of Wilsonian views, he violently rejected 
the Wilsonian inheritance. Lippmann’s U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the 
Republic (1943) codified his new theories of international relations and was 
followed in 1944 by U.S. War Aims.461 The works embodied a language of power 
and of military preparedness, alliances, and tactics that countered Lippmann’s 
earlier Wilsonian views. 
Lippmann relentlessly condemned his generation’s push for disarmament and 
collective security through the League of Nations. The central lesson of the 
century of total war, he argued, was that those who wished to forestall conflict 
could not do so by averting their attention from military problems. The aspiring 
peacemaker, the statesman committed to amicable relations among nations, had 
no option but to ready his country’s defence capabilities for seemingly inevitable 
strife. The constituents of a proposed foreign policy were to be determined 
according to a strict accounting of U.S. national interest. Of paramount 
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importance was the establishment of alliances potent enough to deter all 
aggressors in the postwar era and put into operation a settled balance of power 
among nations. Specifically, the wartime partnership among the United States, 
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union had to be cemented so that nothing could 
challenge its power (i.e., any war against the partnership would be avoided as it 
would be unwinnable). To Lippmann such a strategy was an essential corrective 
to the American predilection for taking issues of defence too lightly and believing 
“that our unearned security was the reward of our moral superiority.”462 The 
nation had to shed the misguided habits of isolationism and reluctance to forge 
alliances. Henceforth, the United States must vigilantly augment its security, a 
valuable contribution to world peace: the “elementary means by which all foreign 
policy must be conducted are the armed forces of the nation, the arrangement of 
its strategic position, and the choice of its alliances.”463 
Lippmann’s arguments implied that national interest was the most important 
consideration, an absolute value to be vigorously defended according to the logic 
of realpolitik. U.S Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims were Lippmann’s most 
nationalistic books. However, in light of his earlier work, notably An Inquiry into 
the Principles of the Good Society,464 his main thrust must be seen as avowedly 
anti-authoritarian rather than purely pro-American. Embedded within The Good 
Society was the rationale for a fighting creed. Lippmann theorised that 
totalitarianism was imbued with a primal militarism and that, as a result, the free 
nations were destined to become embroiled in conflict with them. As 
totalitarianism was synonymous with atavistic barbarism, Lippmann’s choice was 
clear: civilised nations either took up arms against the menace or risked 
annihilation. As he wrote in 1937: 
We are living in a world in which great militarized nations are bent on 
conquest. The democracies are potentially stronger than the 
dictatorships, but they are softer, more self-indulgent, and more 
confused. They are unwilling to face the fact that in dealing with 
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governments that are willing to fight, there is no form of influence 
which really counts unless it is backed by a willingness to fight.465 
Lippmann’s contention that fascism was unquenchably expansionist would prove 
all too prescient, and his writings of the period invoke a historic mission for the 
United States as the defender of Western Civilisation.466 In 1940 he proclaimed: 
To our unready and unwilling hands . . . there has been confided the 
task of maintaining a seat of order and of freedom – of establishing a 
citadel so strong in its defences that by our own example the world 
can eventually be redeemed and pacified and made whole again. This 
is the American destiny.467 
The same year he addressed a Harvard reunion, railing against the spread of 
“organized mechanized evil” in the world: “We here in America may soon be the 
last stronghold of our civilisation – the isolated and beleaguered citadel of law and 
of liberty, of mercy and of charity, of justice among men and of love and of good 
will.”468 
Both U.S. Foreign Policy and U.S. War Aims were notable because in them 
Lippmann railed against his generation’s involvement in Wilsonian collective 
security and disarmament. To avert war could not be done by turning away from 
military problems. He specifically called for the formation of a postwar grand 
strategy: “Our failure now to form a national policy will, though we defeat our 
enemies, leaves us dangerously exposed to deadly conflict at home and to 
unmanageable perils from abroad.”469 
The basic structure of this foreign policy was to be a measured assessment of 
international objectives most vital to the country’s security and well-being. Of 
paramount importance was the establishment of alliances strong enough to deter 
aggressors and to put in place a settled balance of power. The wartime alliance 
between the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union was to be cemented, 
specifically as a corrective to the American for not taking seriously issues of 
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security and believing “that our unearned security was the reward of our moral 
superiority.”470 
This was by no means intended as uncritical support for the democratic ideology 
underpinning the United States. Having identified totalitarianism as the arch-
enemy of democracy, Lippmann conceptualised the Allies as the protectors of that 
virtue. Lippmann nonetheless clarified: the postwar ‘policeman’ was not to be 
regarded as a provider of “the good life. He should be confined to the limited task 
of preserving an order within which the priest and teacher and constructor can 
proceed.”471 His endorsement of alliance among the victors was not intended to 
confer the task of governing the vanquished or ennobling civilisation. He 
explicitly was not advocating awarding the United States carte blanche to impose 
its own version of spiritual development worldwide. The superiority of victory 
was not to be confused with the salvation of humankind. 
For Lippmann, Wilsonianism had entailed a sense of superiority, doctrinaire 
moralism, and disregard for the diversity of people and societies. Most crucially, 
it did not recognise America as one nation among many potential allies, partners, 
and adversaries. Wilson conceived of war as criminal, impinging on both rights 
and privacy. Lippmann wrote of the Wilsonian ideal: 
Therefore, all wars are wars to end wars, all wars are crusades which 
can be concluded only when all the peoples have submitted to the only 
true political religion. There will be peace only when all the peoples 
hold and observe the same self-evident principles.472 
Although this was written after the period under review and cannot make up the 
‘context’ of this chapter, this conception is compatible with Lippmann’s earlier 
writing. The balance of power was effective not because all parties agreed to it in 
the fashion of collective security but because none could challenge it. Lippmann’s 
formulation of realpolitik was fused with his old critique of parochial American 
democracy. As much as the balance of power was couched in terms of U.S. 
military strength, it was also a de facto regulator of presumptive U.S. 
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omnipotence. Thus, after the war Lippmann supported accommodation and 
coexistence with the Soviet Union and hoped that the United States would 
conceive of the U.S.S.R. as another great power with legitimate needs, objectives, 
anxieties, and spheres of interest. 
In his 1947 compilation of newspaper articles entitled The Cold War and released 
after the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, Lippmann attacked Kennan’s ‘X 
article’ and the theory of containment with which he conflated it.473 Lippmann’s 
understanding of Kennan appears to be incorrect and in fact his critique was a 
coruscating attack on the nascent Truman Doctrine. At the practical level, it 
showed why containment was too costly and too unmanageable in terms of 
choosing reliable allies. Ultimately, containment would divert attention from 
America’s defence needs within the Atlantic alliance. 
The Cold War also reflected Lippmann’s broader philosophy of politics; 
containment was a “strategic monstrosity”474 because it suggested U.S. 
willingness to campaign for ideological hegemony. Crusades would be launched, 
predicated on the immature assumption that the American worldview was 
incontestably correct and more morally coherent than those of the Soviets or other 
rivals. Lippmann counselled that the United States should forswear ideological 
mortal combat and confront the Soviet Union and any other world power on the 
basis of global political realities and intelligible policy goals. Lippmann saw his 
critique of U.S. foreign policy as intimately linked to America’s sense of self; the 
lesson of Wilson was not that international commitments should be avoided but 
that they should be animated by the same dispositions and values that nurtured the 
nation’s isolationism and parochialism. 
According to Lippmann, substituting a newly interventionist and expansionist 
foreign policy would simply exacerbate the self-absorption of the United States as 
it revelled in its now-worldwide superiority. The American fundamentalist 
mentality for which he reprimanded Wilson must be avoided.475 Lippmann was 
concerned not only that the United States be protected from the world but also 
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that the world be protected from the United States and that the United States be 
protected from itself. 
Lippmann’s realism rested on a definition of the national interest that was elastic 
and could therefore accommodate widely divergent, at times contradictory, 
proposals. The elasticity allowed Lippmann to formulate policies that other 
realists, such as Kennan, could never share. Both were dedicated to pursuing the 
national interest and distrusted moralism and crusades for democracy, although 
more of this crept into their analyses than either of them probably would have 
cared to admit. Lippmann’s 1947 critique of the “X article” and Truman Doctrine 
showed the deep gap that had grown between him and the U.S. State Department: 
The history of diplomacy is the history of relations among rival 
powers, which did not enjoy political intimacy, and did not respond to 
appeals to common purposes. Nevertheless there have been 
settlements. . . . For a diplomat to think that rival and unfriendly 
powers cannot be brought to a settlement is to forget what diplomacy 
is all about.476 
Ultimately, it was the language of Lippmann’s earlier wartime writing which was 
to be given unbounded scope in the Truman Doctrine. The title of his volume The 
Cold War, although not the first use of the term, seems to have been its point of 
entry into the popular American lexicon.477 The point of examining both Luce and 
Lippmann is that their views were ideologically ‘conventional’ in the sense of 
being commonplace. They consisted of a mix of ill-defined cosmopolitan thought, 
a recognition of great power ambitions in a ‘spheres of influence’ arrangement, 
and a sense that whilst American values (principally ‘freedom’ in Luce’s case) 
had triumphed over fascism they should not be the sole determinant of the 
postwar order. 
Step two of contextual analysis: what was the author doing in producing a 
text in relation to available and problematic political action, which makes up 
the practical context? 
Both Luce and Lippmann were addressing and perhaps echoing the opinions of 
the newly emergent group of national security bureaucrats. The Second World 
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War had ushered in a profound bureaucratic revolution in the United States. The 
federal bureaucracy changed in two important ways. First, government agencies 
came to control the creation and disbursement of a significant share of the 
national wealth. Second, the balance of power within the federal bureaucracy 
decisively shifted to those agencies that concerned themselves with foreign and 
military affairs.478 In 1939 the federal government had about 800,000 civilian 
employees, about 10 per cent of whom worked for national security agencies; by 
the end of the Second World War that figure approached 4 million, of whom 75 
per cent were engaged in national security activities.479 The last pre-mobilisation 
defence budget represented 1.4 per cent of the gross national product; the lowest 
postwar defence budget, for about eighteen months between demobilisation and 
Cold War remobilisation, represented 4.7 per cent of the GNP. Once postwar 
remobilisation was under way, defence spending rarely dipped below 8 per cent of 
the GNP.480 
One of the greatest consequences of this was the coming to power of a national 
security elite remarkable for its homogeneity. Nothing like it had previously 
existed in the United States, and there were no equivalents in other branches of 
government. Although the Founding Fathers had been a governing class and had 
thought of themselves as such, they had shown far deeper ideological cleavages 
than existed among members of this national security managerial class. “Never 
before had a self-defining, self-selecting and self-perpetuating group held power 
for so long in American politics.”481 Between 1940 and 1967 “all first- and 
second-level posts in the national security bureaucracy were held by fewer than 
four hundred individuals who rotated through a series of key postings.”482 In 
short, as early as 1940 the national security managers represented a small, 
durable, and exclusive club. 
“Most shared the experience of having battled against parochialism and 
isolationism at home. Most – though not all – had been Atlantic Firsters.”483 In his 
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refinement of this establishment’s homogeneity, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. identified 
this group’s civil societal outlets and, crucially, their bipartisan dominance. The 
group 
furnished a steady supply of always orthodox and often able people to 
Democratic as well as Republican administrations. . . . The 
community was the heart of the American Establishment. Its 
household deities were Henry L. Stimson and Elihu Root, . . . its front 
organizations, the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie foundations and the 
Council on Foreign Relations, its organs the New York Times and 
Foreign Affairs. Its politics were predominantly Republican; but it 
possessed what its admirers saw as a commitment to public service 
and its critics as an appetite for power which impelled its members to 
serve Presidents of whatever political faith.484 
This chapter is not intended to recapitulate the period’s numerous bureaucratic 
and diplomatic studies or biographical studies of this group’s individual members. 
Reconstructing the careers of key figures is not the same as reconstructing the 
history of foreign policy. Instead, the purpose of identifying this group is to reveal 
the importance of this small epistemic community485 that dominated the 
machinery of government by 1946. 
However, it is important to avoid the suggestion of consensus even within such a 
restricted group of policymakers. Sixty years after the emergence of the Cold 
War, it is easy to fall into post hoc rationalisation and draw a line of continuity 
between the Second World War U.S. military machine and the postwar national 
security state. There was no return to peacetime levels of relative military 
inactivity. The policy of containment and the emergence of NSC-68 were not 
inevitable. Indeed, “state making unfolded in a political context that had 
ideological, cultural and party dimensions.”486 It was to precisely this group that 
innovative ideological change had to be addressed in order for it to be inculcated 
into the bureaucracy of the national security state. 
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Step three of contextual analysis: the identification of ‘containment’ as an 
ideological move 
The continuing influence of Wilson’s rhetoric of freedom was important to the 
policy of containment. With America’s assumption of a global role in the First 
World War, Wilson recast U.S. political culture for a global stage. Wilsonians 
attempted to use the U.S. normative model to solve a multitude of global ‘wrongs’ 
and reconstruct the world order. Wilson recast U.S. norms as universal norms, 
casting aside all who opposed those norms. The most obvious rhetorical example 
was Wilson’s condemnation of German submarine warfare as “warfare against 
mankind. It is a war against all nations.”487 
Wilson paved the way for total war and corresponding annihilation of the 
‘enemy’. Thus, he “[f]used, firmly in the American tradition, this secular concept 
of reasonable conduct with a thoroughly Protestant notion of election and mission 
into a full-fledged ideology of U.S. exceptionalism.”488 
The normative shift was immense. It was evident throughout the Second World 
War in Roosevelt’s view that “normal practices of diplomacy . . . are of no 
possible use in dealing with international outlaws.”489 
The implication was twofold: first, the only solution to such an enemy was total 
annihilation; and, second, Henry Stimson’s appropriation of Abraham Lincoln’s 
assertion that no nation could survive half slave and half free.490 In these terms the 
Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms represented a new formulation of U.S. 
ideology and offered a fundamentally new conception of the international system; 
freedom was no longer constrained by simple negative definition. Such logic was 
inherent in Roosevelt’s rhetorical expression: 
Any peace with lawless aggressors, then, was a mere pax falsa, 
merely “another armistice.” Having formulated a maximalist notion of 
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“peace” and simultaneously divested all non-western space of the 
traditional distinction between war and peace, Roosevelt had really 
declared that the United States was always already in a state of quasi-
war and would so remain until, negatively, the last dictator had been 
eliminated and, positively, the Four Freedoms had been everywhere 
secured.491 
Such language featured prominently in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s (FDR) wartime 
rhetoric. Returning from Yalta in 1945, FDR spoke of “the assurance that neither 
the Nazis nor Prussian militarism could again be revived to threaten the peace and 
the civilisation of the world.”492 Nonetheless, the Second World War did see 
genuine tripartite cooperation between the members of the Grand Alliance as well 
as convincing attempts to find a mutually acceptable form of postwar order. 
Roosevelt’s rhetorical reshaping of the political debate was clearly somewhat 
malleable, at least with respect to a flexible interpretation of who the ‘last 
dictator’ might be. 
Such rhetorical commonplaces, which included the term ‘civilisation’, had been 
used to legitimise wartime cooperation with the Soviets. As Patrick Jackson 
states, “Its replacement by the more restrictive ‘Western Civilisation’ was an 
important part of the postwar world,”493 intended to literally write the Soviet 
Union out of the ‘civilised’ world. Truman mobilised the concept of 
totalitarianism 
as a way of making sense of what was read as Soviet intransigence 
and impositions: crude power moves, subversion and conspiracy . . . 
‘Totalitarianism’ thus served to collapse the differences between 
fascism and communism.494 
The rhetorical use and refashioning of Wilsonian discourse paved the way for a 
whole range of new political norms, as well as policy legitimation, that would 
eventually find expression in the Truman Doctrine. Wilsonianism provided a 
language that could be refashioned to allow for global crusade and make the 
prospect of diplomatic engagement untenable. 
Some dissenters continued to argue for a much more focused conception of the 
national interest. The ultimate misuse of their alternative visions of grand strategy 
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indicates the degree to which containment was an ideological move. George 
Kennan,495 whose analysis of Soviet intentions would provide the most pervasive 
intellectual grounding for the Truman Doctrine, criticised the final idea of 
containment that Truman implemented. Those of Kennan’s writings that predate 
the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 presented an alternative conception of U.S. 
grand strategy, a vision of containment much more in line with what would now 
be called a realist school of thought. The fact that Kennan’s strongly realist views 
existed within the contested arena of the national interest debate shows the 
remarkable variance in meanings used to articulate and define the national interest 
in the late 1940s. 
Nonetheless, the Truman Doctrine would reconfigure the ideas that Kennan 
expressed in his “Long Telegram” and NSC-68 would draw upon the “X article.” 
Henry Kissinger’s assertion that “George Kennan came as close to authoring the 
diplomatic doctrine of his era as any diplomat in our history”496 constitutes a 
misinterpretation of Kennan’s position that Kennan took pains to correct. 
Kennan’s writing would enter the mainstream of early Cold War grand strategy, 
but his locutionary force, his illocutionary intention, and the perlocutionary 
consequences would diverge. 
In February 1946, while he was Chargé d’Affaires in Moscow, Kennan sent the 
8,000-word “Long Telegram” to the U.S. State Department. As previously 
mentioned, his article “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” appeared under the 
pseudonym ‘X’ in the July 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs.497 A gifted scholar with 
a subtle mind, Kennan was one of the Department’s most experienced Soviet 
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specialists. The idea of containment was not new when the “X article” introduced 
the term containment to the world. Kennan’s achievement lay in his giving 
intelligent expression to a U.S. view of the Soviet Union that was already 
unfolding. 
Kennan’s primary thesis in the “Long Telegram” was that U.S. policy toward the 
Soviets during and after the Second World War had been based on the incorrect 
assumption that there were no structural impediments to normal relations. Kennan 
asserted that Soviet foreign policy had little relationship to Western action and 
that the Soviet “party line is not based on any objective analysis of [the] situation 
beyond Russia’s borders. . . . [I]t arises mainly from basic inner-Russian 
necessities.”498 According to Kennan’s line of reasoning, the United States could 
not resume normal diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. because the U.S.S.R. 
relied on the fiction of external threat to maintain its internal legitimacy. Kennan 
wrote, 
At bottom of Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is traditional 
and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity . . . And they have learned 
to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction 
of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.499 
Kennan’s analysis revealed his realist assessment that the Kremlin would seek 
ongoing Soviet expansion, taking advantage of all opportunities and exploiting 
every weakness and vulnerability in the West. As might be expected of this type 
of reasoning, he suggested that although Soviet leaders were impervious to 
reason, they were responsive to force. 
Kennan said little about U.S. objectives, tactics, and capabilities. His analysis of 
Soviet policy clearly conveyed the message that Stalinist Russia was a totalitarian 
regime bent on expansion. Kennan’s telegram prescribed little and said little about 
U.S. interests other than the need to contain Soviet power. 
His “Long Telegram” and other dispatches were immediately disseminated in 
Washington. Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal was so impressed with 
Kennan’s analysis that he distributed copies within the administration and press. It 
served a more blunt but ideologically significant purpose, too: “For Forrestal, 
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Kennan’s message forever engraved the Nazi totalitarian image onto Soviet 
foreign policy.”500 Less than six months later, still before the Truman Doctrine 
was announced, the Clifford-Elsey report,501 commissioned by President Truman, 
effectively repeated much of the analysis of the “Long Telegram” but also started 
a process of toughening the American stance towards the Soviets. 
Kennan’s analysis did not provide a strategy, being devoted merely to defining the 
Soviet threat. However, from his recognisably realist starting point, it followed 
that the national interest would be best served by trying to restructure the 
international order not through a ‘universalistic’ grand strategy but through a 
particularist approach geared toward balance among the great powers. Security 
could be maintained by balancing power, interests, and antagonisms. For Kennan, 
perhaps this argument’s most important corollary was that not all parts of the 
world were equally vital to U.S. security. Kennan purposefully oversimplified his 
list to “only five centers of industrial and military power in the world, which are 
important to us from the standpoint of national security.”502 These centres were 
Great Britain, Germany, central Europe, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Only one of 
these centres (the U.S.S.R.) was in hostile hands. America’s primary interest was 
to see that no others fell under such control. Kennan recognised the need for a 
U.S. sphere of influence in the western hemisphere. He was saying that industrial–
military power was the most dangerous; therefore, keeping it under control was 
the highest priority. Priorities of interest had to be established because capabilities 
were limited.503 
Kennan’s view of international order was not devoid of optimism. Rivalries 
within the system could result in equilibrium. Because capabilities are finite, 
interests must also be limited; vital interests must be distinguished from non-
essential ones. The means must be subordinated to the ends, but indiscriminate 
methods could corrupt the ends. As Gaddis admits, Kennan the realist still 
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“insisted on using this perception of interests as a standard against which to 
evaluate threats, not the other way around; threats had no meaning, Kennan 
insisted, except with reference to and in terms of one’s concepts of interests.”504 
Kennan’s policymaking contemporaries, who read the “Long Telegram” and “X 
article,” did not appear to fully grasp his worldview. His logic was too subtle and 
at times too muddled to be clear. However, Secretary of State James Byrnes’ 
initial interpretation of Kennan’s stance was “patience and firmness” and for 
much of 1946 that stance became the guiding principal for policy with regard to 
U.S.–Soviet relations.505 
In Kennan’s later writings the force of his meaning of containment came through 
more plainly, but clearly these were not texts that were available to Kennan’s 
audience in the 1940s. Essentially, he had rejected universalism on the grounds 
“that men everywhere are . . . animated by substantially the same hopes and 
inspirations, that they all react substantially the same in given circumstances”; 
therefore, “to make national security contingent upon the worldwide diffusion of 
American institutions would be to exceed national capabilities, thereby 
endangering those institutions.”506 
Benefiting from Kennan’s subsequent writings, later historians have been able to 
impose order on his worldview. In 1946–7 Kennan’s thinking appeared confused. 
He accused the Soviets of being ideologically bound to expansion yet dismissed 
Marxism as a “fig leaf.”507 In the “Long Telegram” he discussed the Soviet 
Union’s “real” nature and intentions in terms of an absolute ideal truth, arguing 
that Soviet Communism’s vital principle was the destruction of all competing 
power, but he said nothing about immediate prospects.508 Whatever nuances 
Kennan had privately intended as America’s appropriate policy response to the 
Soviets, the subtlety of his analysis was overshadowed by his devastating critique 
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of Soviet ideology and ambition and his view that the U.S. strategic goal must be 
changing that system of government. 
It is not hard to see why Kennan had been interpreted in this way. He called on the 
administration to create the necessary will for victory, expressing his fear that 
Americans lacked the discipline needed to deal with the Soviet threat. The 
implication was that the federal government must inform Americans of Cold War 
realities and reform the national character. “I cannot over-emphasise the 
importance of this,” he stressed.509 Although a realist, Kennan argued that success 
depended on the “health and vigor” of our own society because Communism, like 
a “malignant parasite,” fed only on the “diseased tissue”510 of degenerate 
societies. He continued: 
Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of 
our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and 
community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over 
Moscow. . . . If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in the 
face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit.511 
Kennan was making an impassioned realist plea which ended with a conservative 
critique of America, as much as its main thrust had been Soviet Marxism. 
However, the subtlety of his analysis and his generalised pronouncement about 
the problems America faced in reacting to them were overlooked. For readers of 
the “long telegram,” reading without the context provided by the “X article” and 
Kennan’s later writing, it would have been easy (as Lippmann’s own misreading 
of Kennan suggests) to simply take away his strong rhetoric, combined with 
Manichean binaries. 
Truman would answer Kennan’s call to counter an enemy Kennan had defined in 
such inflexible and expansive terms. Although Truman’s solution would not enact 
the limited vision of containment that Kennan had anticipated or would later 
claim he desired, the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 would reflect Kennan’s 
conception of the Soviet threat. 
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Step four of contextual analysis: the Truman Doctrine 
Focusing on the Truman Doctrine, this section will address the question ‘What 
relation between political ideology and political action best explains the diffusion 
of certain ideologies, and what effect does this have on political behaviour?’ 
In less than twenty minutes Truman’s address to a joint session of Congress on 12 
March 1947 established the Cold War not as a military clash or even a struggle for 
economic supremacy but as a contest of values. Truman clearly stated his guiding 
principle: “I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
people who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.”512 
Soviet ruthlessness and the Soviet drive for expansion – as characterised by 
Kennan – began to infuse Truman’s rhetoric, lurking behind his warnings of 
coercion and political infiltration. Soviet ideology was to be countered by U.S. 
ideology, which was less systematic but dedicated to the defence of freedom and 
democracy. Truman’s speech presented a Manichean contrast between American 
life and values, which served as a beacon to the world, and their Soviet 
counterparts, which represented a perverted system that impoverished and 
enslaved its citizens. 
The speech signified a transformation in U.S. foreign policy and was in a sense 
the endpoint of a gradual narrowing of the administration’s perceptions and 
options. Truman’s speech built on the ‘Iron Curtain’ rhetoric513 that Winston 
Churchill had used in his infamous Fulton speech the year before and placed 
Churchill’s ideological commitments and Kennan’s vision of an expansive, 
intractable enemy (transmitted in simplified form via the Clifford-Elsey report) 
within the context of U.S. policy, lifting it to the status of doctrine.514 
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Great Britain’s decision to discontinue military and financial aid to Greece and 
Turkey triggered the Truman Doctrine. Truman presented Congress with a stark 
choice: either let Greece and Turkey, both vital to Mediterranean security, face 
internal and external pressures on their own, or go to their aid. 
The Truman Doctrine was an attempt to convince Congress, the press, and the 
American people that the decision to intervene in Greece and Turkey was 
justified. On first reading, Truman’s speech appears unproblematic, a relatively 
orthodox contribution to a familiar discourse on America’s role in the world, 
advocating increased involvement in international affairs (in this case, economic 
support for two collapsing governments). Luce’s American Century and 
Lippmann’s ‘American Destiny’ seemed to have been finally realised. Truman 
was no longer plagued by the indecision and apathy about America’s manifest 
role that Luce and Lippmann had railed against in their political editorials directed 
at Truman and their general analyses of the U.S. condition. 
However, the speech represented a more fundamental realignment of American 
ideological thought on grand strategy. Truman’s opening lines painted the 
situation in global terms, and also signalled that he was about to announce an 
unprecedented move away from America’s preceding foreign-policy stance, a 
move that required the attention of Congress and the policy elite. Truman linked 
the international crisis to U.S. foreign policy, which he linked, in turn, to national 
security. Within the space of two lines he expanded U.S. grand strategy to global 
proportions. 
Lippmann, Luce, and Kennan had called for a foreign policy rooted in U.S. 
national interest rather than fundamentalist idealism. Lippmann and Luce had 
emphasised America’s global responsibility and Luce had written on the theme of 
the indivisibility of the postwar world. Truman had reinterpreted their bounded 
concept of American internationalism. Truman’s emphasis on national security 
was also a significant innovation. It allowed him to articulate a grand strategy that 
ostensibly was based on traditional balance-of-power thinking but that actually 
projected global civilisational values. 
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Before the Second World War the term national security had rarely been used. It 
had started to feature in foreign-policy discourse only in the late 1940s. Earlier 
traditions had linked national interest to the rise of the nation state. It is well 
documented that the term interests of states had later been imported from Europe 
to America.515 The term national interest had remained a dominant construct in 
discussions of foreign policy, and by the 1920s it had acquired strongly negative 
connotations.516 Nonetheless, the concept had informed the writings of Luce, 
Lippmann, and Kennan. 
The phrase “national security”517 suggested: “a level of security midway between 
an individual’s ‘social security’ and the world’s ‘collective security’. Dovetailing 
with the emergence of the United States as a superpower, the term placed 
responsibility for security on the military preparedness of the nation-state.”518 In a 
1938 article advocating a proactive national policy that would prevent rather than 
merely respond to trouble, Edward Mead Earle of Princeton’s Institute for 
Advanced Study used the term national security as, effectively, a synonym for 
national preparedness.519 
‘National security’ provided common political ground on which internationalists 
of both the realist national-interest school and the collective-security school could 
press for the one basic goal on which they agreed, the necessity of U.S. 
involvement in the postwar world. The emergence of ‘national security’ is 
important because the concept reflects a concern with configuring an external 
environment compatible with U.S. domestic visions of a good society. 
The Truman Doctrine was about more than American geographic expansion or 
even the material protection of allied territory. Truman, Acheson, and their 
advisors repeatedly emphasised that the Soviet Union did not have to attack the 
United States to undermine its security. Soviet or Communist expansion into the 
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Eurasian land mass, and accompanying domination of its resources, would force 
the United States to alter its political and economic system. In Truman’s words, 
such expansion would require: 
a stringent and comprehensive system of allocation and rationing in 
order to husband our smaller resources. It would require us to become 
a garrison state, and to impose upon ourselves a system of centralised 
regimentation unlike anything we have ever known.520 
Truman’s announcement of his doctrine also evoked Wilson’s universalist 
rhetoric (‘making the world safe for democracy’) and the war rhetoric that FDR 
had used to rally Americans against fascism. Such rhetoric had appeared in the 
Atlantic Charter, the Yalta agreement, and various Truman speeches, but was now 
used to justify America’s global reach.521 The speech’s major theme was the 
contrast between the “free world” and “totalitarianism,” described as “alternative 
ways of life”;522 the suggestion was no longer in line with Lippmann’s postwar 
cosmopolitanism. 
From the speech’s outset, Truman clearly indicated that Greece and Turkey were 
inextricably part of U.S. national security but also symbolised a more fundamental 
problem. He reminded his audience of the Second World War’s ‘real’ meaning: 
the United States had fought that war to keep nations from imposing their way of 
life on others. Thus, an analogy linked the Second World War and the Cold War. 
Truman stated: 
At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must 
choose between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not a 
free one. 
One way of life is based upon the will of the majority and is 
distinguished by free institutions, representative government, free 
elections, guarantees of individual liberty, freedom of speech and 
religion, and freedom from political oppression. 
The second way of life is based upon the will of a minority 
forcibly imposed upon the majority. . . . I believe it must be the policy 
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of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. 
I believe that we must assist free people to work out their own 
destinies in their own way.523 
Truman had specified the ideological lens through which every American could 
see the central meaning of complex and difficult problems confronting the country 
in international affairs. He divided the world into a Manichean duality with no 
possible synthesis, minimising or ignoring differences within the so-called free 
world and within the Communist world, and he accentuated the moral and mortal 
conflict between the two worlds. 
Tocqueville, an early observer of U.S. exceptionalism, had said of such language: 
Democratic writers are perpetually coining abstract words . . . in 
which they sublimate into further abstractions the abstract terms of the 
language. Moreover to render their mode of speech more succinct, 
they personify the object of these abstract terms and make it act like a 
real person.524 
The personifications would come later, in NSC-68. For the moment, Truman stuck 
with abstract definition of the enemy, carefully avoiding direct reference to the 
Soviet Union. 
Within his eighteen-minute speech, Truman used the word free or one of its 
synonyms twenty-four times, totalitarian four times, democracy three times, and 
Communist only once. With respect to his distinction between political good and 
evil, his language transcended the actual conditions in Greece and Turkey and 
exaggerated their significance. In reality, events had not been as drastic as the 
speech suggested. The U.S. State Department had even worded the Greek 
government’s request for assistance. 
Truman faced a political and rhetorical problem in that neither Greece nor Turkey 
was a democracy. Therefore, in the sections of his speech that dealt with either 
country he used the word free loosely, to mean independent. The illocutionary 
force paved the way for alliances with nations that made no pretence to being 
‘free’. 
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It was also difficult to define the nature of the threat to Greece and Turkey. 
Neither the Soviet army nor Communist troops from any other country had 
invaded Greece or Turkey. Therefore, Truman defined the threat to both countries 
using the abstract terms militant minority, armed minority, and outside pressures. 
Truman defined strategic policy in universalist terms yet justified it in ideological 
terms. 
The speech did not have unanimous approval within the administration. Kennan 
objected to its ideological thrust and universal commitment. He particularly 
objected to the phrase ‘alternative ways of life’. He even wrote an alternative 
speech, which was rejected.525 However, the nature of the criticism of the speech 
attests to its success as a political, illocutionary act that created and legitimised a 
new strategic idea based on a revised ideological view of the world. 
The notion of a smooth transition from the end of the Second World War through 
Kennan’s writings to the Truman Doctrine is untenable. By examining 
contemporary political thought, we can suggest that the Truman Doctrine 
represented significant ideological innovation. From an ideological perspective 
the speech successfully became the basis for conventional policy wisdom (and 
would be extended in NSC68). 
Step five of contextual analysis: NSC-68 
As the final step in this chapter’s contextual analysis, this section will address the 
forms of political thought and action that are involved in disseminating and 
conventionalising ideological change. The analysis will focus on NSC-68. 
NSC-68 was the blueprint for military purpose and strategy in which the 
expression of containment became pronounced. Published in spring 1950, the 
document was the culmination of the first formative period of domestic political 
and policy debate about the nature of the U.S. approach to the Cold War. NSC-68 
recapitulated many arguments outlined in earlier NSC documents but gave them 
greater urgency and integrated them more fully into a national security ideology. 
However, in domestic terms NSC-68 and the primacy it would gain during the 
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1950s marked Truman’s failure to reconcile his post-1945 ambitions to create a 
domestic state on “something like a peacetime basis while also safeguarding its 
security”526 with America’s forging ahead as the foremost world power. Leffler 
notes: “When faced with a gap between goals and capabilities, the thrust of the 
Truman administration’s policy was almost always to expand capabilities . . . 
rather than to narrow goals.”527 
NSC-68 epitomised such a trend. Kennan had failed to articulate a clear strategy in 
either the “Long Telegram” or the “X article” and then had lost his public 
argument with Lippmann and private argument with Paul Nitze about the shape 
and scope of Cold War strategy. These failures allowed the Truman 
administration to pursue a primarily military-orientated policy that far exceeded 
the political and economic basis of containment. 
At first glance it is not easy to see the difference between Kennan’s conception of 
U.S. interests and the conception espoused in NSC-68, which proclaimed “the 
integrity and vitality of our free society which is founded on the dignity and worth 
of the individual.”528 Somewhat confusingly, given its stance on Leninism’s 
seemingly unstoppable expansionism, NSC-68 stated that a “free society relies 
primarily on the strength and appeal of its idea, and it feels no compulsion sooner 
or later to bring all societies into conformity with it.”529 NSC-68 appeared to rely 
on the balance of power to ensure that diversity. But that marked the end of any 
similarity to Kennan’s views. Kennan “had argued that all that was necessary to 
maintain the balance of power . . . was to keep centers of industrial–military 
capability out of hostile hands.”530 NSC-68 went much further: “What is new, 
what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now 
inseparably confronts the slave society with the free. . . . [A] defeat of free 
institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere.”531 
NSC-68’s new vision was of Wilsonian total negation of the enemy: “[T]he 
dynamic notion that freedom is always under threat, internally as well as 
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externally. . . . [T]he very threat of arbitrary imposition on the still independent 
self is a form of slavery.”532 The notion that freedom was indivisible found 
prominent expression in NSC-68, as did the corollary that Americans had no 
choice but to rethink the way they saw themselves and accept an identity as 
champions of freedom everywhere. NSC-68 indicated that the United States must 
be far more actively engaged with the world: “It is only by practical affirmation, 
abroad as well as at home, of our essential values, that we can preserve our own 
integrity.”533 NSC-68 very effectively drew the boundaries of America’s political 
identity in a way that tied the survival of democracy at home to its defence 
abroad. Americans would have to be willing to fight to defend their way of life 
but would also forge global conditions under which the U.S. democratic system 
could prosper. 
NSC-68 continued themes presented by FDR: “implacable enemy, infiltration and 
subversion, civilizational negation, worldwide struggle and infinite strategic 
needs.”534 In one sense NSC-68 did not say anything that other national security 
documents had not already expressed. However, it did add a sense of urgency, 
reduced whatever ambiguity existed in the aftermath of the Truman Doctrine, and 
firmly tied the concept of national security to a global vision of containment. 
It was a newly conceived world of total war. The distinction between war and 
peace, which had vacillated in the 1930s, had given way to “permanent 
struggle.”535 NSC-68 implied that Americans would have to redefine their identity 
and reject isolationism. The document concretely spelled out the meaning of “our 
way of life.”536 Whereas the Truman Doctrine had merely suggested the 
ideological stakes, NSC-68 explicitly defined them. The rhetoric of NSC-68 
marginalised domestic debate by nearly equating dissent with disloyalty and by 
implying that domestic debate threatened the security of the United States and the 
free world, of which the United States was the defender. 
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Emily Rosenberg has stressed the rhetorical power of binary opposites. Through a 
series of dichotomies, NSC-68 extended the Truman Doctrine into an overarching 
metanarrative of idealised U.S. identity versus Soviet society.537 The primary 
metanarrative at work is the contrast between slave and free man, which had been 
a guiding vision of the republic since its inception and which Wilson had 
appropriated. 
NSC-68 asserted that active internationalism, rather than isolationism, 
safeguarded American liberties against the persistent danger of the garrison state. 
Quoting from the Constitution, the document suggested historical continuity: its 
“fundamental purpose” was to “secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and 
our Posterity.”538 
NSC-68 managed to “wrap departures from tradition, in tradition itself.”539 The 
strategy extended U.S. exceptionalist political discourse, including Truman’s 
wartime rhetoric. The notion of Manifest Destiny was apparent, but now 
unfettered by the traditional limits of discursive interpretation: “Even if there were 
no Soviet Union . . . we would face the great problem of the free society, 
accentuated many-fold in this industrial age, of reconciling order, security, the 
need for participation, with the requirement of freedom.”540 
NSC-68 also served to delineate the ‘enemy’ and, in the absence of a current 
material threat, reconfigure the world as an ideological balance of power. The 
document stated that the U.S.S.R. had no plans for immediate war with the United 
States but was directed toward military growth and already had the ability to 
overrun Eurasia. 
In the absence of an immediate military threat, the question was not whether the 
United States should prepare for war but how it could prepare to prevent war 
while fighting an offensive Cold War. John Young and John Kent note that “NSC-
68 and its rearmament strategy, like NATO, were initially designed more to create 
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the conditions for a strong foreign policy geared to fighting the Cold War and 
strengthening allies, than to providing the resources for a military victory.”541 
In formulating NSC-68, the national security elite responded to the public 
commentary conducted by commentators such as Luce and Lippmann and the 
private analysis of George Kennan, but all of them had envisaged a very different 
American century. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a contextual analysis of the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68. 
Both documents drew on existing discourse about America’s place in the postwar 
world but successfully manipulated this discourse to create a strategy of 
containment that went far beyond a simple defensive posture and thus represented 
significant ideological innovation. Nevertheless, the path to the Truman Doctrine 
and NSC-68 was one of contestation and ultimately ideological novelty; it defies 
proleptic characterisation. 
Luce had acknowledged U.S. responsibilities but had failed to delineate them and 
had delegitimised postwar Soviet interests. Subtleties such as Lippmann’s 
warning that U.S. postwar military superiority should not be confused with the 
salvation of humankind had been subsumed. While adopting Lippmann’s 
rejection of isolationism, NSC-68 disregarded his plea that America not police the 
world. Perhaps most importantly, the Truman Doctrine had asserted the 
universality of American values, suggesting that a threat to ‘free’ nations was a 
threat to U.S. national security. Although Luce, Lippmann, and Kennan were clear 
about the need for U.S. engagement with the world, none of them fully defined 
the terms of that engagement or specified where it would end. 
This chapter represents an attempt to reconstruct what Truman and his advisors 
did see and the degree to which they were constrained by and innovated in the 
face of the existing context. The foundational texts of the emergent American 
grand strategy of containment were the Truman Doctrine speech to Congress and 
NSC-68. These texts shared a set of para-ideological convictions. The political 
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innovation of the Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 was to universalise the mission of 
American exceptionalism to create a grand strategy that represented a form of 
global anti-Communism. It was such a durable ideological innovation that it 
would dominate party political foreign-policy debate in the early 1950s and the 
policy of containment is still a touchstone of foreign-policy debate. Even Kennan, 
despite his haphazard realism, declared that: “Providence . . . [had] made their 
entire security as a nation dependent on their pulling themselves together and 
accepting the responsibilities of moral and political leadership that history plainly 
intended them to bear.”542 
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Chapter 5. The Rise and Fall of Détente 
The history of U.S. foreign relations has an assortment of terms that encapsulate a 
policy, outlook, or approach; these forms of shorthand have varied histories. In 
the early 1930s, appeasement first surfaced as a neutral or even positive way of 
describing European diplomats’ efforts to deal with Hitler. After the Second 
World War it became one of the pejorative labels in the foreign-policy lexicon. As 
discussed in Chapter 4, containment emerged as a description of the goal of U.S. 
policy with respect to Communist countries. 
This chapter will analyse détente’s rise and fall. It will examine the extent to 
which détente – usually seen as America’s closest approach to a realist grand 
strategy – was nonetheless imbued with ideas of U.S. exceptionalism. This 
chapter asserts that détente was chiefly a response to domestic unrest on both the 
left and the right of the American political spectrum. Despite these challenges, the 
ideological goal of containing Soviet influence did not disappear from American 
grand strategy but the methods by which this goal was pursued changed 
significantly. Although chiefly identified with the Republican administrations of 
the 1970s, détente had a longer lineage, both as a diplomatic device and as a 
popular buzzword.543 In analysing the degree of ideological and political 
innovation that détente represented, this chapter will consider earlier conceptions 
of détente. 
This chapter will focus primarily on the reshaping of the term détente in the 
Nixon administration (in which it rose to the level of grand strategy) and its 
eventual collapse, by which time it had become nearly synonymous with 
capitulation and almost as sullied as appeasement. Although U.S. usage of détente 
predates the Nixon administration, the Nixon administration was the first to use 
the term explicitly to describe its grand strategy. By the end of the Ford 
administration, the term was already used only in a historical sense.544 As outlined 
in Chapter 1 and applied in Chapter 3, the methodology employed in this chapter 
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will be a form of Cambridge School contextualism. The approach’s five analytical 
steps will structure the chapter. 
Step one of contextual analysis: the available meanings of détente and related 
concepts 
This section will address the contextualist question ‘In writing a text, what was an 
author doing in relation to other available texts that made up the ideological 
context?’ In particular, the section will identify available meanings of détente and 
related concepts that made up the ideological context of the Cold War era. 
Like many other terms of diplomacy, détente is a French word. It derives from the 
Latin de and tendere and originally had a meaning akin to ‘unstretch’. Originally 
applied to the release of a bowstring, détente eventually came to mean a release of 
tension between rival states.545 Within the context of the Cold War, the concept of 
détente, if not use of the term, can be traced back to early critics of containment. 
Walter Lippmann’s powerful critique of both George Kennan’s “X article” and 
the Truman Doctrine rejected global containment as a bankrupt policy that would 
lead to an unmanageable gap between expansive interests and finite resources.546 
America used its policy toward Europe as a guide547 for its policy toward the rest 
of the world. As a result the United States would be forced to respond to Soviet 
initiatives at her own (America’s) strategically weakest locations around the 
world. U.S. interests were not equally significant in all conflicts, and U.S. power 
was too limited to meet the demands of a policy that did not differentiate between 
central and peripheral interests.548 In squandering U.S. political, military, and 
economic resources, global containment would frustrate the United States long 
before it frustrated Soviet aggression. Lippmann accepted the division of the 
international system into Eastern and Western blocs and suggested that the United 
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States negotiate a modus vivendi with the Soviet Union to regulate and thus limit 
its expansion.549 
Although Lippmann’s detailed critique of the “X article” failed to include an 
alternative vision of the international system (and America’s proper role within 
that system), twenty years later Lippmann’s vision of the potential for living 
alongside an adversarial power started to come into U.S. policy. Even in the 
1950s, it planted the seeds for the possibility of a less costly way of containing 
Soviet influence than the global commitment of NSC-68. In Lippmann’s 
conception of national security, 
A nation is secure to the extent to which it is not in danger of having 
to sacrifice core values, if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if 
challenged, to maintain them by victory in such a way.550 
While rejecting the Truman Doctrine’s universalist orientation, Lippmann 
unabashedly advocated an internationalist line for U.S. foreign policy. In the 
realm of policymaking, a statesman’s ultimate challenge was to articulate and 
pursue a foreign policy sustainable within the limits and possibilities of the 
domestic consensus. In his Harvard University doctoral dissertation, Henry 
Kissinger underscored this position when he described the ability to form 
consensus around it as “the acid test of a policy.”551 
Along with Lippmann, former Vice-President Henry Wallace was a prominent 
critic of containment because encircling the Soviet Union would destabilise U.S.–
Soviet relations and increase the chances of war.552 A third branch of criticism of 
containment emerged during the 1952 presidential campaign, when vice-
presidential nominee Richard Nixon attacked containment as acceptance of the 
status quo in Eastern Europe and proposed instead a strategy of liberation or 
rollback.553 John Foster Dulles, who would become President Eisenhower’s most 
important foreign-policy advisor, had been equally critical of containment. 
Although Lippmann, Wallace, and some Republicans criticised containment on 
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substantially different grounds, together they laid the foundation for détente. Each 
asserted that containment was unsustainable: Lippmann because it was unfeasible, 
Wallace because it was unstable, and the Republicans because it was inadequate. 
Lippmann and Wallace recommended that the United States accept the status quo 
in Europe; the Republicans advocated rollback. 
Détente also had domestic roots in the New Look Doctrine that Dulles presented 
in his 1954 “massive retaliation” speech.554 Eisenhower shared Lippmann’s 
concerns about the gap between limited U.S. resources and expansive global 
interests. He took this gap into account in developing both his strategic doctrine 
and his diplomatic strategy. As viewed by the Eisenhower administration, this was 
not simply a means of containing Soviet influence but also a means of 
transforming the Soviet system in a way that containment had failed to do.555 
In response to Truman’s mobilisation posture, Dulles favoured a comprehensive 
strategy of deterrence. For reasons of cost, ease, and political persuasion, Dulles 
emphasised the strategic deterrent of massive retaliatory power.556 The press 
immediately seized on the slogan ‘massive retaliation’ and “portrayed it as a 
formula for turning every border skirmish into a nuclear showdown.”557 Attempts 
to clarify the meaning of the “massive retaliation” address could not overcome its 
contradictory logic. Critics quickly attacked the doctrine on the basis of military 
effectiveness, cost, and ability to be implemented, while Maxwell Taylor 
(Eisenhower’s Chief of Staff) suggested that more emphasis should be placed on 
the ability to stop crisis escalation.558 
The New Look Doctrine offered a vision of a postwar world in which the United 
States could impose its notion of strategic stability on the Soviet Union, thereby 
ensuring international order on the basis of U.S. technological superiority. This 
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vision would find clear articulation in détente. Dulles’s speech and U.S. 
overreliance on nuclear weapons provided no answer to the challenge of local 
aggression. To many strategic analysts, the existence of nuclear weapons 
demanded development of a strategic doctrine and of the ability to conduct 
limited wars along the periphery. Dulles’s speech focused attention on the 
problems of limited war and initiated an animated public debate.559 
Henry Kissinger wrote an article on the problems of defending “gray-areas.”560 
The article’s policy prescriptions strikingly resemble Nixon Doctrine proposals of 
a quarter-century later. Kissinger argued that stable indigenous governments were 
prerequisites of effective local action by the United States. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, Kissinger did not challenge the political assumptions then 
governing U.S. strategy. Although he extensively explored the prerequisites of 
limited war in terms of U.S. doctrine and capability, he did not question the 
political framework itself, the prevailing bipolar, zero-sum image of the 
international system. 
Although the Nixon administration was the first to use the word détente, texts of 
earlier presidential administrations referred to advanced forms of cooperation. 
During the period of relative calm after the Cuban missile crisis, European powers 
pressed the superpowers to reduce U.S.–Soviet tensions. French president Charles 
de Gaulle visited Moscow and sent diplomats to Eastern European capitals. 
During the same period561 West Germany started to modify its hard-line policy 
toward Communist countries. This pursuit of Ostpolitik (dynamic Eastern policy) 
was initially cautious, but after Willy Brandt became chancellor in 1969 Bonn 
forcefully moved toward normalising relations with the East, recognising East 
Germany and the postwar status quo beyond the Elbe.562 
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Even while he explored avenues for cooperation in the East, President Johnson 
did not use the term détente,563 speaking instead of “building bridges” between 
West and East. He first used that phrase in 1964, and it soon became his regular 
formulation for policy toward the Soviet bloc.564 The Johnson administration 
could not avoid the use of the word détente altogether, however. It appeared in a 
1967 NATO document after, in December 1966, the Belgian foreign minister, 
Pierre Harmel, advocated a NATO initiative to assess the alliance’s future in the 
wake of French withdrawal from NATO’s military command. In 1967 NATO 
formally adopted the initiative, which embraced the intention to “further a détente 
in East–West relations.”565 NATO stated: 
The relaxation of tensions is not the final goal but is part of a long-
term process to promote better relations and to foster a European 
settlement. The ultimate political purpose of the Alliance is to achieve 
a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe accompanied by 
appropriate security guarantees.566 
Given détente’s European origins it is not surprising that some of the constitutive 
and regulative conventions of pre-Nixonian détente are visible in the declamatory 
texts of Konrad Adenauer. In the early 1960s, seizing on West German public 
opinion, Adenauer declared himself “the peace chancellor.” He would provide 
some of the contextual architecture that Nixon and Kissinger would later adapt for 
their own form of détente. Adenauer was attempting to counter what he saw as the 
empty materialism of East–West rivalry and the threat of nuclear conflict. Seeking 
to connect his political activities to a deeper reservoir of religious belief, he hoped 
to reawaken public interest in a ‘Christian’ vision of a simple, devout life free of 
military tensions and centralised institutions.567 
The immediate threat to Adenauer’s bourgeois utopian vision was that “The epoch 
in which we live is characterised by the contradiction between communism and 
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anticommunism.”568 Adenauer wanted to foster pan-European unity, to erase the 
inheritance of half a century of continental war. Instead of pressuring Moscow, 
West Germany and its allies had to stabilise the balance of power.569 
Adenauer was early in his awareness of the Sino-Soviet split and that the potential 
for a new balance of power could lead to peace. In 1962 and 1963 he and de 
Gaulle discussed exploiting that split. Their analysis of the split led to both de 
Gaulle’s asking China to pressure the Soviets into a softer foreign-policy line and 
Adenauer’s appeals for a U.S.–Soviet agreement on arms control and reduced 
tensions in Central Europe. Paris and Bonn worked to present a united Western 
front in negotiations. Adenauer also floated the idea of a ten-year freeze in 
military action around Central Europe. With the promise of no threats to one 
another for a decade, the great powers would experiment with arms control, trade 
concessions, and expanded human contacts.570 
There was a key difference between Adenauer’s and the then U.S. president John 
F. Kennedy’s thoughts on détente. Adenauer sought international stability 
primarily in the interests of an Ostpolitik that would improve long-term conditions 
in the two Germanys and perhaps foster reunification. In contrast, Kennedy spoke 
vaguely of a “new frontier”571 which hinted at universal freedoms. Kennedy did 
not fully embrace Adenauer’s vision and, at a policy (if not strategic) level, he 
accepted the existing state of affairs in Europe; their shared concern was simply 
over the avoidance of military conflict.572 
As much as détente was a response to the practical emergence of Ostpolitik in 
Europe and its discourse, it was also an ideological response to prolonged 
domestic debate questioning the very nature of American ideology. In the 1960s 
and 1970s the United States experienced profound social change with 
fundamental critiques from both the Left and the Right challenging many 
ideological assumptions underlying the Cold War. 
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American sociologist Daniel Bell, the author of The End of Ideology (1960) was 
among the most widely read and influential thinkers who challenged the 
American ideological assumptions which had underpinned the start of the Cold 
War.573 His central insight was that: 
[Out] of all this history, one simple fact emerges: for the radical 
intelligentsia, the old ideologies have lost their “truth” and their power 
to persuade. 
Few serious minds believe any longer that one can set down 
“blueprints” and through “social engineering” bring about a new 
utopia of social harmony. At the same time, the older “counter-
beliefs” have lost their intellectual force as well. Few “classic liberals” 
insist that the State should play no role in the economy, and few 
serious conservatives . . . believe that the Welfare State is the “road to 
serfdom”. . . . [T]here is today a rough consensus among intellectuals 
on political issues . . . In that sense, too, the ideological age has 
ended.574 
It was a challenging critique because it asserted that no ideologies were any 
longer relevant. Bell’s central insight was that socialism had come to a dead end 
and that liberal capitalism was now more focused on restraining domestic pressure 
for international change, rather than enabling that change to happen. In a sense he 
was stating a defence of the status quo. In a world in which nuclear stalemate was 
accepted, there was little left to debate in the established language of international 
politics.575 It raised the question of exactly what was left for America to ‘contain’ 
and by implication suggested an inward focus for American society to rediscover 
its utopian impetus. As Bell put it, the old Cold War ideology, “which once was a 
road to action, has come to a dead end.”576 
In his 1958 book The Affluent Society, John Kenneth Galbraith had made a similar 
critique of American ideology.577 Galbraith provided much of the lexicon for the 
flipside to U.S. exceptionalism. Whilst economic growth during the Eisenhower 
administration had been remarkable, Galbraith objected to the inequitable 
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distribution of the nation’s wealth and criticized national policy as blind to 
economic inequality. 
The arguments of Galbraith, Harrington, and Bell were not entirely new. 
However, what was new was that these arguments occurred at the height of 
American economic and international political hegemony. 
Galbraith stated: 
We can no longer afford the notion that foreign policy is a dance, an 
intricate minuet, which some people, peculiarly endowed with skill, 
experience, or a penchant for fast foot-work can do with unique 
proficiency. . . . I would hope that our foreign policy would soon 
become the subject of the same kind of social and political debate that 
focused the conflicting attitudes towards the New and Fair deals.578 
Neither Bell or Galbraith were directly critiquing foreign policy but their work did 
attack the ideological core of postwar America and provided a powerful new 
lexicon for criticising the status quo’s shortcomings. Their writing made clear that 
not only was it no longer clear exactly what America was defending (either 
ideologically or materially) but it was becoming apparent that the ideological 
‘necessity’ of containment was having a detrimental economic impact on the very 
society it was meant to protect. 
Not all critics of U.S. stagnation were on the political Left. Eisenhower’s 
domestic and foreign policy evoked the wrath of so-called new conservatives such 
as William F. Buckley, Jr. and Barry Goldwater. Their voices made it difficult for 
Republicans to point to conservative support in favour of preserving the status 
quo.579 
Buckley, one of this new breed of conservatives, called for a stronger defence of 
U.S. ideals. Instead of affirming enduring moral principles vested in the dignity of 
the individual, Cold War discourse focused exclusively on technocratic methods 
and means without inherent value. Denouncing theories of development and 
democratisation closely connected with U.S. foreign policy, Buckley stated “Our 
preoccupation these days . . . is not so much with the kind of society democracy 
                                                
578 Galbraith, The Affluent Society, quoted in Suri, Power and Protest, 98. 
579 Alan Brinkley, “The Problem of American Conservatism,” The American Historical Review, 
99, no. 2 (1994): 409–29. 
 139 
brings forth in a given political situation, as with democracy itself.” Democracy, 
he continued, “has no program. It cannot say to its supporters: do thus, and ye 
shall arrive at the promised land.”580 
In his 1961 book Up from Liberalism, Buckley explicitly attacked The Affluent 
Society. Nonetheless, the two texts are close in terms of sentiment. Both were 
critiques of U.S. society during the Cold War and the type of thought that had 
created that society. In a sense, Buckley was echoing Bell and Galbraith’s fear 
that the ideological core of America no longer matched its material prosperity. 
Another powerful critic on the right was Barry Goldwater, a U.S. senator from 
Arizona. Although he lost the presidential election, Goldwater inspired the ‘New 
Right’ movement at about the same time that the ‘New Left’ began to emerge. His 
1960 book The Conscience of a Conservative reinvigorated American 
conservatism and added weight to criticism of perceived American decline.581 
Goldwater spoke of “victory” in the Cold War as the result of superior U.S. 
capabilities. “Peace,” he stated: 
is a proper goal for American policy – as long as it is understood that 
peace is not all we seek. . . . A tolerable peace . . . must follow victory 
over Communism. We have been fourteen years trying to bury that 
unpleasant fact. It cannot be buried and any foreign policy that ignores 
it will lead to our extinction as a nation.582 
Much like Buckley, Goldwater wanted a renewed “moral” purpose in American 
society. He focused his efforts on creating a more muscular, offensive U.S. 
foreign policy supported by reawakened patriotism at home. Calls for “victory” 
against Communism provided an organising mission that Goldwater thought was 
missing from current Western leadership. He explained, “If our objective is 
victory over Communism, we must achieve superiority in all of the weapons – 
military, as well as political and economic – that may be useful in reaching that 
goal.”583 
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As a senator, Goldwater had concentrated on defence policy and there was a 
degree of ideological continuity in his espousal of American exceptionalism in his 
race for the Republican presidential candidacy. The U.S. government would use 
overwhelming strength to protect its interests and otherwise avoid entanglements 
that stifled creativity and hindered independent action. Goldwater wanted 
Washington to lead at home and abroad without becoming needlessly encumbered 
in complex arrangements with allies or adversaries.584 In contrast to Bell’s 
argument about the effects of American prosperity, Goldwater argued that 
America’s military muscle and growing prosperity should serve as a beacon of 
freedom, not a restricting arm of the administration. In other words, he was 
espousing total victory over the Soviets. When asked in an interview whether 
disarmament negotiations were possible with the Soviets, he responded, “I don’t 
think negotiations are possible . . . If you mean what you say, Mr. Khruschev, put 
up or shut up – as we Western poker players say.”585 
It was in this context that Nixon came to power. As Melvin Small has noted, 1968 
was “the foreign policy election of the twentieth century.”586 He faced the 
challenge of seizing the initiative from the Europeans before Ostpolitik wrested 
the political initiative from America’s hand. More significantly, America was in 
the midst of domestic ideological turmoil. Profound critiques from both the left 
and the right linked her domestic situation, her state of ideological torpor, to her 
foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger’s challenge was to transform the ideological 
discourse of American grand strategy. Nixon’s response was to attempt to move 
from “an era of confrontation” to “an era of negotiation.”587 
Step two of contextual analysis: Nixon’s and Kissinger’s use of the word 
détente in relation to the practical context 
Step two of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘In producing a 
text, what was the author doing in relation to available and problematic political 
action that made up the practical context?’ It is important to understand Nixon’s 
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and Kissinger’s588 use of the term détente in relation to the available practical 
political context. 
Before the Nixon administration, presidential administrations had sometimes 
indicated a sense of moving toward limited U.S.–Soviet cooperation. However, 
their dominant foreign-policy arguments had focused on means of containment 
rather than serious challenges to containment; they had assumed that containment 
was legitimate and viable. 
The Vietnam War caused significant changes in U.S. foreign-policy discourse. 
First, the war cast doubt on the efficacy of U.S. military intervention, which failed 
to bring political success in Vietnam and proved costly in terms of lives and 
resources. Second, aspects of the conflict challenged the morality of the U.S. 
exceptionalism that had sustained the policy of containment.589 Third, the war 
destroyed the U.S. bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, which had largely been 
in place since Eisenhower outmanoeuvred the remaining Republican isolationists 
and cemented the foreign-policy consensus started under Truman.590 
The defence of freedom, capitalism, and liberal democracy – which the political 
elite had seen as a duty on the grounds of both self-interest and ideology – had 
resulted in a policy of undifferentiated globalism that proved disastrous in 
Vietnam. Equally, the Sino-Soviet split and the Soviet Union’s problematic 
attempts to maintain cohesion in Eastern Europe reduced the perceived power of 
America’s adversaries. The confidence and sense of purpose so evident in the 
earlier post-Second World War period had given way to demoralisation and 
disarray. The spectre of U.S. decline reared its head. 
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By the time Nixon was elected president in 1968 there was an opportunity to 
remould U.S. foreign policy. This chapter has already noted some attempts by 
previous presidents to craft a U.S.–Soviet relationship of competitive 
confrontation combined with mutual restraint. The adversarial elements remained 
dominant. Events had severely circumscribed presidents’ freedom to move toward 
U.S.–Soviet détente. 
As a foreign-policy hard-liner, Nixon had more room to manoeuvre than other 
presidents, unfettered by the possibility of political attacks for being soft on 
Communism. In addition, because of the Vietnam War, the conservatives in 
Congress and the executive branch were on the defensive, and liberals were all too 
aware of the costs of continued superpower competition. 
Nixon’s and Kissinger’s conception of détente was less revolutionary than 
generally believed in terms of adjusting U.S. objectives. Their conception was 
genuinely revolutionary, however, in terms of how these objectives were to be 
achieved. Nixon did not abandon long-term concerns about the Soviet threat to 
U.S. security or give up on the goal of containment. In the past, containment had 
depended on U.S. power and Soviet caution. Instead, the aim was now to make 
containment depend on Soviet self-restraint or ‘self-containment’.591 
Early in his career Nixon had reservations about détente. As late as 1967 he 
maintained that “Our goal is different from theirs. We seek peace as an end in 
itself. They seek victory, with peace being at this time a means towards that 
end.”592 In office Nixon endorsed the idea of détente but initially avoided using 
the word.593 When Nixon entered the White House in January 1969, détente was 
still a largely European concept,594 but whereas Europeans conceived of détente in 
European terms, as de Gaulle’s initiatives and Ostpolitik suggested, Nixon’s and 
Kissinger’s use of the term was global in conception.595 In addition, Nixon and 
Kissinger had doubts regarding the European meaning of détente. Kissinger 
wrote: 
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In times of rising tension, the Europeans feared American rigidity; in 
times of relaxing tension, they dreaded a U.S.–Soviet condominium. 
They urged us to be firm, then offered their mediation to break the 
resulting deadlock. They insisted that we consult with them before we 
did anything, but they wanted the freedom and autonomy to pursue 
their own détente diplomacy without restraint. If we were perceived to 
block détente, we would loose the support of our West European 
allies, who would then speed up their own contacts with the East, with 
no coordinated strategy.596 
The apparent solution was for the United States to accept détente in theory while 
assuming leadership on détente and steering policy in the direction U.S. officials 
thought best. Kissinger explained: “We came to the conclusion that we could best 
hold the Alliance together by accepting the principle of détente, but establishing 
clear criteria to determine its course.”597 
Nixon heralded U.S. leadership on détente when he announced in 1971 that he 
would travel to China to reopen U.S.–China relations. Whatever its strategic 
importance, the act had the effect of dwarfing European measures while opening 
the way to improved relations between Washington and Moscow. By February 
1972 Nixon was in Moscow signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) 
and announcing the twelve ‘Moscow Principles’ that would form the basis for 
U.S.–Soviet relations during the period of détente. In Washington the summit 
meeting was seen as having broad implications.598 
Nixon’s rhetoric of strength disguised the situation’s novelty. Presidential foreign-
policy reports to Congress stressed that negotiation with adversaries was only one 
prong of a three-pronged approach. The United States would maintain its military 
strength while encouraging its allies to share more of the burdens and 
responsibilities of Western security. The means of U.S. foreign policy 
substantially shifted, and a reduction in military spending provided a substantial 
‘peace dividend’ over and above that which resulted from reduced involvement in 
Vietnam. Self-reliance was replaced by reliance on others. The Soviet Union was 
being relied on to exercise self-restraint, which would allow the United States to 
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engage in “the orderly devolution of American power to incipient regional 
powers.”599 
Of these ideas, reliance on allies was least innovative. The notion of a division of 
labour in which U.S. allies would provide the local defence components of 
containment, backed by U.S. strategic power, had been a prominent theme of 
Eisenhower’s administration, which had been concerned with minimising the 
economic costs of military containment. The Nixon–Kissinger approach was 
similarly concerned with the cheap maintenance of containment. 
The encouragement of Soviet self-restraint was the innovative component of 
Nixon’s détente. Unrestrained superpower competition had become too expensive 
militarily and too divisive domestically. Instead of opting out of the competition, 
the Nixon administration attempted to co-opt the U.S.S.R as a willing partner in 
regulating that competition. The more the military dimension was regulated, the 
easier it would be for the United States to successfully compete diplomatically 
and politically, hence the early emphasis on strategic arms control. Nixon hoped 
that strategic arms control would provide long-term stability to U.S.–Soviet 
relations.600 
The second element of the regulatory process was to establish a code of conduct 
for operations in the Third World, a superpower agreement to refrain from 
attempts to obtain a unilateral advantage. It was recognised in Washington that 
such an agreement was unenforceable. Therefore, the third element of the U.S. 
strategy was designed to ensure that the U.S.S.R. followed the rules. This was 
known as linkage. Positive inducements (such as trade) and negative sanctions 
could encourage Soviet self-restraint.601 
If this approach succeeded, the Soviet Union would not take advantage of U.S. 
military retrenchment and the United States would maintain containment by 
proxy. For the strategy to succeed, however, several conditions had to be met. 
First, smaller nations must be able and willing to comply with the Nixon–
Kissinger grand strategy and replace U.S. commitment and power. Second, the 
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Soviet Union must be prepared to go along with the strategy as intended. Third, 
the Nixon administration must be able to establish and maintain a consensus in 
favour of détente. 
In large part, Nixon’s conception and articulation of détente were governed by the 
conventions of containment, but they also represented careful manipulation of 
traditional conventions of U.S. foreign policy. Détente’s ultimate downfall shows 
the limits of twisting and stretching an ideology. The Nixon administration failed 
to develop a domestic base sufficiently robust to sustain the détente policy, 
especially after its initial architects had disappeared from the scene. 
Step three of contextual analysis: Nixonian détente as an ideological move 
The third step of Skinnerian contextual analysis involves identifying an ideology 
and surveying how it formed, how it was criticised, and how it changed. It is 
concerned with identifying how and when the constitutive and regulative 
conventions of détente were manipulated by Nixon and Kissinger. This section 
will apply step three to the ideology of Nixonian détente. 
Even as he formalised the policy of détente, Nixon eschewed the label itself. 
During his first term as president he rarely used the word. Nevertheless, Nixonian 
détente represented an ideological move even if the move was less of an 
ideological shift from containment. Where President Johnson had favoured the 
phrase “building bridges”, Nixon came to prefer “structure of peace”. The Nixon 
volumes of Public Papers of the Presidents contain no index entry for détente.602 
In contrast, the volumes for Gerald Ford’s presidency have numerous index 
entries for the term.603 It was not until the signing of a series of bilateral 
agreements in May 1972 that U.S. government officials labelled U.S. policy 
towards the Soviet Union as détente. 
When de Gaulle gave the term fresh currency in the late 1950s, détente was used 
to describe the first step of a process that was to lead through entente to 
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cooperation and security between Eastern and Western Europe. For de Gaulle, 
détente was to result in the restoration of political independence to continental 
Europe.604 In Germany, which adapted its own form of détente in the form of 
Ostpolitik, American détente came to stand for abandonment of the Hallstein 
Doctrine, which emphasised national reunification,605 in favour of opportunities to 
engage in diplomatic and economic relations with Eastern Europe. In all three 
cases, détente was used to increase the room for domestic political manoeuvre.606 
The cautious, uninspired Nixon campaign for the presidency in 1968 gave little 
indication that the new administration’s foreign policy would co-opt, or be 
constrained by, any of the decade’s ideological fervour. Nonetheless, Nixon 
believed that the United States was likely to win the East–West competition. He 
contended that the “American Revolution . . . is the way of the future”607 and that 
the “people of this earth, including those in the Soviet Union, will inevitably 
demand and obtain more and more freedom.”608 At the same time, he concluded 
that the West should not consider itself invincible.609 
Echoing both the New Left and the New Right, Nixon maintained that the danger 
confronting the United States was not a superior Communist system but internal 
disintegration. In language strikingly similar to President Kennedy’s, Nixon 
stated: 
History is full of examples of civilizations with superior ideas which 
have gone to defeat because their adversaries had more will to win, 
more raw strength physically, mentally and emotionally, to throw into 
the critical battles.610 
He also remarked, “We know from history that great nations have become 
corrupt, soft, and decadent under the influence of prosperity.”611 The latter quote 
in particular appeared to be a reworking of both Bell and Goldwater, but 
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refashioned with the echo of decadent decline from Gibbon’s The History of the 
Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.612 
Nixon lamented the relative decline in U.S. resources: “Every well has a bottom. 
. . . [T]here is an inevitable limit to what we can do.”613 However, he was less 
concerned about the quantity of available resources than about the will and 
determination necessary to use those resources effectively. “Weary with war, 
disheartened with allies, disillusioned with aid, dismayed at domestic crises, many 
Americans are heeding the call of the new isolationism.”614 
As evidenced in the article “Asia after Vietnam,” Nixon linked domestic political 
and ideological change with foreign policy.615 Although the article displayed 
much familiar Cold War rhetoric, it was a harbinger of two of Nixon’s most 
important foreign-policy initiatives, the Nixon Doctrine as a formula for politico-
military retrenchment and the opening of U.S.–China relations. Nixon discerned 
that American attitudes had changed. Having severely strained the United States, 
the Vietnam War had prompted the social and political debate discussed above; it 
had shattered the foreign-policy consensus that had supported two decades of U.S. 
globalism. According to Nixon, the United States could not continue to police the 
world because it did not have a sufficiently robust political consensus to use its 
resources effectively. He stated: 
If another friendly country should be faced with an externally 
supported communist insurrection – whether in Asia, or in Africa or 
even Latin America – there is serious question whether the American 
public or the American Congress would now support unilateral 
American intervention, even at the request of the host government.616 
Given that the U.S. experience of the Vietnam War portended a decline in U.S. 
activism, Nixon pointed to nascent regionalism as a more indirect channel for 
U.S. influence. As in the Nixon Doctrine, he contended that the United States 
should offer direct military assistance only when doing so would significantly 
affect the political outcome and serve U.S. interests: 
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If the initial response to a threatened aggression . . . can be made by 
lesser powers in the immediate area and thus within the path of 
aggression, . . . the world is spared the consequences of great power 
action. . . . Only if the buffer proves insufficient does the great power 
become involved, and then in terms that make victory more attainable 
and the enterprise more palatable.617 
Nixon’s early concept of détente focused not only on changing Soviet foreign 
policy but on the value of U.S.–Soviet coexistence. Although Nixon was sceptical 
about negotiations, he considered them necessary: 
The alternative – to have no negotiations – would mean, obviously, 
that we would lessen our chances of achieving agreements with the 
Communists – slim as these chances might be. And that might mean, 
in turn, heading into an armed clash which could destroy civilisation 
as we know it.618 
The dichotomy between ‘the sword of annihilation’ and negotiations laid the 
foundation for the value that Nixon attributed, as president, to the process and 
results of negotiation. Although limited as a tool of transformation, negotiations 
facilitated efforts by the United States and Soviet Union to manage their 
competitive relationship. The less effective détente proved as a means of 
transformation the more valuable it became as an expression of U.S.–Soviet 
coexistence. 
These documents echo some early ideas of European Ostpolitik, encapsulating the 
drawback from superpower conflict and the threat of nuclear exchange as well as 
relative regional independence in handling conflict. However, Nixon primarily 
referred to crisis management rather than longer-term structural change in 
international affairs of the type Adenauer had desired. Nixon also echoed 
Goldwater’s rhetoric. The New Right’s demands necessitated the reminder that 
‘victory’ remained the strategic ‘end’. 
However, this did not represent a radical philosophical break with familiar tropes 
of America’s global role. Nixon was not acknowledging revolutionary 
independence in Vietnam, the Congo, or other points of Cold War conflict – 
independence that might have appealed to Galbraith. Nor was it clear how 
Nixon’s criteria for foreign intervention would be judged in practice. These 
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criteria showed prescience regarding the U.S. use of peripheral interventionist 
force, but nonetheless Nixon’s article “Asia After Vietnam” and, later, the Nixon 
Doctrine itself were strategically incoherent in that they failed to differentiate the 
categories and levels of possible threat. The criteria were not specific enough to 
facilitate actual choices for or against intervention. Nevertheless, the article served 
a domestic purpose in reaffirming the validity of U.S. overseas commitments. 
“Asia After Vietnam” anticipated the Nixon administration’s ground-breaking 
China initiative. While advocating a change in U.S. policy in order to “come 
urgently to grips with the reality of China,”619 Nixon continued to regard the 
People’s Republic of China as an implacable revolutionary power. In Nixon’s 
eyes, a true U.S.-Sino rapprochement would require evidence of China’s 
transformation from a revolutionary power into a status-quo-orientated power. At 
first glance, this approach fully accords with the era’s prevailing view that the 
United States could impose stability on China. However, the familiar anti-
Communist rhetoric belied a subtle shift toward a more flexible and pragmatic 
approach to U.S. relations with China. 
Nixon forcefully argued that developing a strong indigenous regional security 
system in Asia would best limit Chinese expansionism and thereby accelerate 
China’s transformation into a rational, status-quo-orientated power: 
The primary restraint on China’s Asian ambitions should be exercised 
by the Asian nations in the path of those ambitions, backed by the 
ultimate power of the United States. This is sound strategically, sound 
psychologically and sound in terms of the dynamics of Asian 
development. Only as the nations of non-communist Asia become so 
strong – economically, politically and militarily – that they will no 
longer furnish tempting targets for Chinese aggression, will the 
leaders in Peking be persuaded to turn their energies inwards rather 
than outward. And that will be the time when the dialogue with 
mainland China can begin.620 
Unsurprisingly, such language leads to the question of whether the Nixon 
administration had embraced a new image of the international system or merely 
sought new instruments with which to achieve, in the post-Vietnam War period, 
U.S. foreign policy’s familiar ends of containment and orderly change. 
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Step four of contextual analysis: détente and the alteration of political 
vocabulary 
Skinner’s fourth step of contextual analysis addresses the question ‘What relation 
between political ideology and political action best explains the diffusion of 
certain ideologies, and what effect does this have on political behaviour?’ Skinner 
posited that any political vocabulary contains a number of intersubjectively 
normative terms. Such terms not only describe but also evaluate. A term’s 
evaluative dimension is called its speech-act potential, which may be positive or 
negative. According to Skinner, a society establishes and alters its moral identity 
by manipulating intersubjectively normative terms. Using these terms in a 
conventional way legitimates existing practice. Using them in a way that changes 
their meaning or speech-act potential challenges prevailing ideology.621 Skinner 
stated: 
The problem facing an agent who wishes to legitimate what he is 
doing at the same time as gaining what he wants cannot simply be the 
instrumental problem of tailoring his normative language in order to 
fit his projects. It must in part be the problem of tailoring his projects 
in order to fit the available normative language.622 
The constraint has ideological and political aspects. When attempting to ‘stretch’ 
an ideological convention, an author usually grounds the change in that which is 
already accepted. An ideologist changes one aspect of an ideology by maintaining 
another aspect. The prevailing ideology limits the extent to which the author can 
legitimate particular political conduct. As a result, even if an ideological innovator 
does not believe in what they are espousing they are, to some extent, required to 
act in conformity with the established ideology within which they situate 
themselves.623 
This perhaps explains the ideological failure of détente to become ‘conventional’ 
in the way that containment did. It is important to note that this is different to 
evaluating whether détente was successful in its own strategic terms. Successive 
administrations failed to articulate a coherent, consistent concept of détente 
around which the American public could rally. The lack of coherence is partly 
                                                




explained by tension between the U.S. goal of transforming aspects of the Soviet 
Union and the U.S. interest in U.S.–Soviet coexistence. Transformation goals 
ranged from modifying Soviet foreign policy to changing the nature of the Soviet 
system. These goals were based on the American belief that the United States 
could not live with the Soviet Union as it was. However, there was never 
consensus as to whether the Soviet Union had to change fundamentally or only 
with respect to particular behaviour.624 
The U.S. interest in U.S.–Soviet coexistence was based on the beliefs that the 
United States and the Soviet Union could maintain a stable, productive 
relationship without a fundamental Soviet transformation and that the 
superpowers’ shared interests (particularly in avoiding nuclear war) outweighed 
their competing interests. This did not mean that current Soviet policies were 
acceptable; it meant that they need only be moderated rather than fundamentally 
transformed. There never was a consensus as to how to balance the need to 
moderate Soviet policies against the need for cooperation. 
John Lewis Gaddis suggested that the goal of transformation is often associated 
with containment and the value of coexistence with détente. In his view this 
binary was incorrect because at times containment also required coexistence: “The 
idea of containment has taken on not only a life of its own, but several lives; . . . 
different people – indeed, different administrations – have understood it to stand 
for very different things over the years.”625 
For example, within the context of a divided Europe, containment was understood 
to entail both the recognition of spheres of influence and an effort to modify them 
– that is, both an acceptance of the status quo and a means of revising it. In 
addition, U.S. foreign policy has usually been a mix of containment and détente 
rather than a stark choice between the two:626 at the peak of Cold War 
containment U.S. administrations sought to relax U.S.–Soviet tensions, and at the 
height of détente they sought to contain Soviet influence. 
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Détente and containment significantly differed, however, with respect to the role 
of negotiations in U.S. foreign policy: 
“Orthodox” containment, as it was articulated during the first decade 
or so following the Second World War, placed very little emphasis on 
negotiations between Washington and Moscow. The U.S.S.R. was 
considered to be virtually impermeable; the purpose of containment 
was to erect a barrier (what an earlier generation called a cordon 
sanitaire) behind which the Soviet state might evolve in more benign 
directions.627 
Unlike containment, détente suggested both a process and a state of relations in 
which the United States and Soviet Union realised the value of coexistence. 
Détente was grounded in the belief that the two nations must cooperate in order to 
prevent competition from precipitating crises, which could escalate into war. It 
did not imply an absence of conflict, but suggested that the two nations’ shared 
interests were more important than their competing interests. 
To understand and evaluate Nixonian détente it is necessary to understand the 
normative vocabulary of Nixon and his more scholarly advisor Kissinger. 
Kissinger considered coexistence – the pursuit of stability and the prevention of 
nuclear war – a moral imperative that transcended the gap between revolutionary 
and legitimate regimes. He suggested that nuclear vulnerability provided an 
incentive for the two types of regimes to reach a modus vivendi,628 which could 
not be based solely on good faith or the balance of power. Good faith placed too 
much reliance on self-restraint, and the balance of power was too amorphous to be 
reliable. Nuclear parity was an incentive, not a substitute, for accommodation. 
Nuclear parity in particular created an incentive for the United States and the 
Soviet Union to agree on the parameters of legitimate international behaviour. 
Although détente required the United States to recognise the Soviet Union as a 
strategic equal, the Nixon administration did not consider the Soviet concept of 
international behaviour to be equally legitimate.629 Thus, while the discourse of 
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détente emphasised the equality of the superpowers, the Nixon administration 
sought to maintain a U.S. position of primus inter pares. 
By means of linkage the United States would encourage the Soviets to adopt its 
concept of legitimate international behaviour. Progress in one area would have a 
positive effect on other areas. However, if détente comprised a complex web of 
interrelated agreements and understandings, the Soviets would be careful not to 
jeopardise their gains. This theory of linkage was based on the assumptions that 
the United States had a clear conception of a lack of self-restraint and was willing 
to sacrifice détente if the Soviets were not able to exercise self-restraint. Claims 
that this theory represented a form of realpolitik rather than an ideological 
reorganisation of the world were undercut by the fact that the Nixon and Ford 
administrations constantly redrew the line for their definition of ‘lack of self-
restraint’, thereby preventing Soviet challenges from destroying détente. 
After détente failed to prevent the Middle East War of October 1973, Nixon and 
Kissinger remoulded it. They retreated from the idea that détente would prevent 
crises and suggested instead that it would help manage crises. Nixon stated: 
We both [the U.S. and the Soviets] now realize that we cannot allow 
our differences in the Mideast to jeopardize even greater interests that 
we have, for example, in continuing détente in Europe, in continuing 
negotiations which can lead to a limitation of nuclear arms and 
eventually reducing the burden of nuclear arms, and in continuing in 
other ways that can contribute to peace of the world. As a matter of 
fact, I would suggest that with all the criticism of détente, that without 
détente, we might have had a major conflict in the Middle East. With 
détente, we avoided it.630 
Kissinger added: “If the Soviet Union and we can work cooperatively, first toward 
establishing the cease-fire and then toward promoting a durable settlement in the 
Middle East, then the détente will have proved itself.”631 
                                                
630 Richard M. Nixon, “News Conference” (26 October 1973), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4022#axzz1bzM0wSgt [accessed 05/03/11]. 
631 Henry Kissinger, “News Conference” (25 October 1973), in Richard M. Nixon, Public Papers 
of the Presidents of the United States, Richard M. Nixon: Containing the Public Messages, 
Speeches and Statements of the President, 1973, Vol. 69 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973), 591. 
 154 
As the rationale for détente weakened, the Nixon administration became almost 
desperate in its support for it. Presenting a stark choice between détente and 
Armageddon, Nixon asked: 
Do we want to go back to a period when the United States and the 
Soviet Union, the two great superpowers, stood in confrontation 
against each other and risk a runaway nuclear arms race and also 
crises in Berlin, in the Mideast, even in Southeast Asia or other places 
of the world, or do we want to continue on a path in which we 
recognize our differences but try to recognize also the fact that we 
must either live together or we will all die together?632 
In the aftermath of the Middle East War, the Nixon administration’s conceptual 
and normative vocabulary shifted. The administration increasingly emphasised the 
role of détente as a step not necessarily toward a better world but away from a 
worse one. In doing so, the administration de-emphasised the goal of 
transformation and underscored the value of U.S.–Soviet coexistence. The 
administration stressed the importance of negotiations in the face of continued 
confrontation and equated détente with peace, and peace with morality. As 
Kissinger would often repeat, preventing war was moral in and of itself because 
“in the nuclear age we are obliged to recognize that the issue of war and peace 
also involves human lives and that attainment of peace is a profound moral 
concern.”633 
Kissinger declared peace “a moral imperative.”634 In the aftermath of the Middle 
East War, Kissinger’s realism gave way to the view that peace was the ultimate 
objective, one to which all other priorities should be subjugated. 
When Ford became president in August 1974, he pledged to continue Nixon’s 
foreign policy and retained Kissinger as his chief foreign-policy advisor. 
Although U.S.–Soviet relations remained a priority, domestic concerns dominated 
the agenda. As the Ford administration continued, the concept and lexicon of 
détente became more confused. Ford acknowledged: 
I wish there were one simple English word to substitute for détente. 
Unfortunately, there isn’t. [Détente] means movement away from the 
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constant crisis and dangerous confrontations that have characterized 
relations with the Soviet Union. . . . It represents our best efforts to 
cool the cold war, which on occasion became too hot for comfort. To 
me, détente means a fervent desire for peace – but not peace at any 
price. It means the preservation of fundamental American principles 
not their sacrifice. . . . Détente means moderate and restrained 
behaviour between two super powers – not a licence to fish in 
troubled waters. It means mutual respect and reciprocity – not 
unilateral concessions or one-sided agreements.635 
Ford’s foreign-policy vision was a world away from Goldwater’s emphasis on 
‘victory’ as America’s strategic goal, an emphasis that Nixon had assiduously 
incorporated in 1967. The Ford administration failed to indicate clearly whether 
détente was a means to an end or an end in itself. However, détente increasingly 
looked like an ideological end. Kissinger stated: 
The United States believes that the policy of relaxation of tensions 
with the Soviet Union is essential for our two countries and for the 
peace of the world. We have seen no viable alternative to the policy of 
relaxation of tensions except rhetoric. We will therefore pursue it.636 
Ford concurred: “It would be very unwise for a President – me or anyone else – to 
abandon détente. I think détente is in the best interest of this country. It is in the 
best interest of world stability, world peace.”637 
By the time of the 1976 presidential campaign the Ford administration had 
stretched the lexicon of détente too far; détente was attacked from both the Right 
and the Left. Ronald Reagan focused on détente’s failure to stem the Soviet 
military build-up and restrain what he perceived as Soviet aggression.638 His 
critique was possible because détente had strayed too far from containment. On 
the Left, Henry Jackson and Jimmy Carter criticised détente’s amorality and its 
failure to take into account the Soviet Union’s violations of human rights and 
subjugation of Eastern Europe. Both sets of criticism focused on the Ford 
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administration’s valuing détente as an expression of U.S.–Soviet coexistence 
despite its failure to transform fundamental elements of Soviet domestic or 
foreign policy. 
Ford continued to defend détente as the least worst alternative: 
For a period of 25 years or thereabouts, we had a policy in this 
country . . . of a cold war. . . . Obviously that policy didn’t prevent 
war, and it didn’t prevent [the Soviets] from increasing their 
capability. It seems to me that a policy of negotiation is infinitely 
better than confrontation, and I think we can point to some success in 
that regard.639 
As Ford narrowed détente to an alternative to the Cold War, there was little left to 
the notion of legitimate international behaviour. Kissinger’s initial concept of 
détente was based on mutual self-restraint. In three years, détente evolved from a 
policy designed to overcome tensions to a policy of easing tensions when a crisis 
arose, from the first step toward a community with shared interests to a 
phenomenon relevant only to adversaries. Instead of replacing confrontation, 
negotiation would coexist with confrontation. Indeed, continued confrontation 
necessitated negotiation. To Kissinger, “the reality of competition” illustrated the 
“necessity of coexistence.”640 In 1969 Kissinger advocated linkage as a way of 
avoiding “the danger that the Soviets will use talks on arms as a safety valve on 
intransigence elsewhere.”641 In 1976 he declared: 
Limitation of strategic arms is therefore a permanent and global 
problem that cannot be subordinated to the day-to-day changes in 
Soviet American relations . . . we should not play with the strategic 
arms limitation negotiations . . . we will not use it lightly for 
bargaining purposes in other areas.642 
Thus, the Ford administration considered strategic arms limitation not merely an 
arms agreement but a process that embodied the quest for an achievement of 
peace. This formulation confused functional arrangements with a convergence of 
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principles. Agreement on an array of technical issues did not necessarily mean 
that the Soviets agreed to U.S. concepts of legitimate behaviour,643 but by the end 
of its term the Ford administration suggested that détente was arms control and 
arms control was peace. 
Step five of contextual analysis: détente’s decline 
Step five of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘What forms of 
political thought and action are involved in disseminating and conventionalising 
ideological change?’ This section will make the case that détente failed to become 
conventional. 
The extent to which Kissinger and the presidents he served actually believed that 
war was likely in the absence of détente remains unknown. However, at each 
crisis with the Soviet Union they suggested that the United States could either 
continue arms-control negotiations or allow increased instability that might lead 
to war. This simplistic dichotomy between détente and war was based on the 
assumption that the Soviet Union was far more cavalier about crises than the 
United States. That assumption conflicted with Kissinger’s earlier belief that both 
superpowers recognised the danger of nuclear war. It also was inconsistent with 
Kissinger’s understanding that deterrence, not just détente, played a role in 
guaranteeing peace. 
When others suggested alternative approaches Kissinger raised the spectre of 
instability and war, thereby subjugating all other interests to the cause of peace. 
As an academic, Kissinger rejected peace at any price; as a statesman, he was 
unwilling to risk sacrificing hard-won achievements of détente. 
During the 1976 presidential campaign conservatives criticised détente for not 
moderating Soviet involvement in the Third World, while liberals criticised it for 
not improving the lives of Soviet and Eastern European peoples.644 Both 
conservatives and liberals recognised the benefits of cooperation and valued 
balanced, verifiable arms-control agreements, but both had expectations, partly 
due to the administration’s statements, that détente would accomplish more. 
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Ultimately, the contradictions within détente resulted in its failure to satisfy these 
expectations. 
By 1976 détente was a controversial term and Kissinger a controversial figure. 
Both the Right and the Left criticised détente as too narrow. Ultimately, Nixon 
and Kissinger failed to build the political consensus needed for their ideologically 
innovative form of détente to become embedded. Initially they accomplished 
movement toward such consensus, partly through oversell and partly through 
spectacle. Détente’s rhetoric changed from somewhat cautious to somewhat 
hyperbolic. Suggestions that the ‘era of confrontation’ was giving way to the ‘era 
of negotiation’, as well as references to a ‘new structure of peace’, created 
unrealistic expectations. 
Détente never achieved ideological consistency. Dan Caldwell has suggested that 
Nixon and Kissinger failed to relate détente to important American beliefs and 
values.645 Stretched by the changes in ideological discourse on both the Left and 
Right during the 1960s, détente ultimately became too broad in its meaning. For a 
nation steeped in anti-Communism for twenty-five years, détente was a radical 
change for some on the Right but not radical enough for many on the Left. 
Critics of the policy of détente had two advantages that had been denied to critics 
of previous administrations’ Cold War policies. First, their arguments touched a 
debate started by Bell and Galbraith about the nature of American ideology. 
Second, the challenge to executive dominance initiated by liberals had led to the 
revival of Congress as a power centre from which it was possible to campaign 
against administration policy. Critics of détente had both incentive and 
opportunity to mobilise opposition against the Nixon–Kissinger policy. In 
addition, events (particularly Watergate) undermined the power and prestige of 
the presidency and facilitated the challenge to détente. 
Since 1976 the neoconservative Committee on the Present Danger, composed of a 
group of dissident national-security managers, had successfully equated 
opposition to SALT 2 with opposition to the Carter administration and the 
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remnants of détente.646 In her much-noted 1979 essay “Dictators and Double 
Standards,” Committee member Jeane Kirkpatrick asserted that liberals such as 
Carter had no monopoly on morality or idealism. She stated: “Liberal idealism 
need not be identical with masochism, and need not be incompatible with the 
defence of freedom and the national interests.”647 The Committee is often said to 
have been a breeding ground for neoconservatism,648 but Kirkpatrick’s rhetoric 
harked back to earlier tropes of containment and an older discourse of U.S. 
exceptionalism.649 
Carter’s foreign policy – especially détente – collapsed during the final days of 
1979. In response to revolutionary turbulence in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union 
invaded Afghanistan and installed a puppet government. Détente’s opponents 
charged Carter, as well as Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger before him, with naiveté, 
and as a result Carter lurched to the Right. The Carter Doctrine would later 
declare that if the Soviets went beyond Afghanistan toward the Persian Gulf the 
United States would use military force against them.650 Up to that point, no Cold 
War doctrine had explicitly threatened war against the Soviets. The Carter 
Doctrine would mark détente’s collapse into complete self-contradiction and 
incoherence. 
Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the 1980 presidential election, sealed 
détente’s fate as an overt policy and system of beliefs about the international 
system. In part, this was based on the following rhetoric of the Committee on the 
Present Danger: 
The two superpowers have utterly opposing conceptions of world 
order. The United States, true to its traditions and ideals, sees a world 
moving toward peaceful unity and cooperation within a regime of law. 
The Soviet Union, for ideological as well as geopolitical reasons, sees 
a world riven by conflict and destined to be ruled exclusively by 
Marxism–Leninism. . . . The Soviet Union, driven both by deep-
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rooted Russian imperial impulses and by Communist ideology, insists 
on pursuing an expansionist course. In its endless, probing quest, it 
attempts to take advantage of every opportunity to enlarge its 
influence. And military strength is more than ever the foundation for 
its underlying policy.651 
It recalled the Manichean rhetoric of the 1950s. The Committee’s 
recommendation to pursue ‘peace through strength’ was based on the assumption 
that the United States had significant influence over Soviet policy and that the 
Soviets’ defence efforts reflected a view of the United States as weak. According 
to Eugene Rostow, Reagan’s first director of the Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, détente was not “a reality but an aspiration,” a “figment of political 
imagination.”652 
Critics of détente accused advocates of arms control of blurring means and ends 
and losing sight of the framework in which agreements were negotiated. Pursuing 
arms control for its own sake obscured the fact that the U.S.–Soviet relationship 
was still fundamentally competitive. The attack on arms control was part of a 
larger critique of the “decade of neglect”653 associated with détente. According to 
this critique, during the presidencies of Nixon, Ford, and Carter the United States 
had failed to compete militarily with the Soviets and to cultivate a consensus as to 
the appropriate U.S. role in world affairs. Critics of détente contended that 
Americans had a tendency, in light of the Vietnam War, to equate U.S. power 
with evil and to see the quest for influence abroad as inherently wrong.654 
Conclusion 
Critics of détente urged the United States to address its military, economic, and 
political weaknesses and deal with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. 
They wanted Americans to demonstrate to the Soviets that the United States was 
prepared to pursue unilaterally what it could not achieve in negotiations. 
Deterrence, not diplomacy, would ensure security. Strength, not summits, would 
bring peace. 
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This chapter argues that détente emerged in the context of profound domestic 
disenchantment with the ideological status quo in America. Nixon and Kissinger 
had hoped to manage the domestic backlash to the Vietnam War and address 
some of the ideological challenges from both the Left and the Right that had 
challenged the old foreign-policy consensus.655 
As this chapter has demonstrated, the result was that, throughout its turbulent 
history, détente exhibited a tension between the goal of transforming aspects of 
the Soviet Union (effectively a continuation of containment) and the goal of 
perpetuating U.S.–Soviet coexistence.656 Although this grand strategy was 
ideologically innovative it not only failed to situate itself within the conventions 
of American exceptionalism but was also overt in its attempts to stress its own 
lack of ideology. In other words, détente was ideologically incoherent and was 
never able to explain the connections between issues, the hierarchy of interests, 
and the link between means and ends. As a result it was impossible to achieve 
solid public support for détente, in part because Nixon, Kissinger, and Carter 
conveyed contradictory messages about the meaning of the term détente and its 
strategic objectives, and ultimately this tension would prove unsustainable. 
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Chapter 6. Bill Clinton, ‘The New World Order’, and the Strategy of 
‘Engagement and Enlargement’ 
For over forty years the Cold War was the primary organising principle of U.S. 
grand strategy. As demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5, the discourse of U.S. 
exceptionalism was a powerful ideological and lexical constraint on the Cold War 
period’s two most noteworthy strategic policies, containment and détente. This 
chapter will examine the contested meaning of U.S. exceptionalism in the ‘new 
world order’ in the 1990s and the effect of that struggle on U.S. grand strategy in 
the period bookmarked by the end of the Cold War and the attacks on the United 
States on 11 September 2001. This period has been subject to a particular kind of 
proleptic reading which has discounted the presidencies of George H. W. Bush 
and Bill Clinton as a simple interregnum between the end of the Cold War and the 
tumultuous – in terms of grand strategy – presidency of George W. Bush.657 
Viewing this period in such a way suggests that the Clinton presidency was a 
period without significant ideological contest – in the words of Jeremy Suri, “the 
absence of effective grand strategy in the 1990s contributed to the crises of the 
early twenty-first century.”658 Instead, this chapter seeks to recreate the debate 
about America’s role in the world after the Cold War. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama 
suggested that ideological contest and therefore the march of history had 
effectively resolved itself.659 For Fukuyama Western-style democracy and 
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capitalism were ascendant, but neither his original essay nor the expanded book 
provided a vision of what America’s role in the world should be now that it had 
reached such a triumphant ideological position.660 Fukuyama was in fact a 
supporter of American “primacy.”661 However, during the 1990s, whilst “The End 
of History” was widely cited, it was also widely misinterpreted (seventeen years 
after the essay was written Fukuyama claimed that it had also been misinterpreted 
by fellow neoconservatives).662 Robert Kagan summarised what was perhaps the 
most important misinterpretation of Fukuyama – indeed, what he characterised as 
the mistake of that era: “The mistake of the 1990s was the hope that democracy 
was inevitable.”663 In other words, after the Cold War, “If the triumph of 
democracy was a fait accompli, what role did America have in consolidating its 
advance?”664 This chapter is an attempt to partially reconstruct that debate and see 
how Clinton tailored his vision of American exceptionalism to create and justify a 
grand strategy that articulated a role for America in the post-Cold War world. 
President Clinton was the first U.S. president to enter office without the burden of 
a strategic environment dominated by the Cold War. No other modern U.S. 
president inherited a stronger, safer international position. The major threats that 
had haunted U.S. policy for nearly fifty years had either disappeared or were 
rapidly receding, leaving the United States the sole superpower. In 1992 the most 
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seemingly intractable problems facing the U.S. were domestic, and Clinton’s first 
presidential campaign reflected his lack of interest and experience in foreign 
affairs. Clinton’s predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had been perceived as both 
prioritising foreign affairs over domestic affairs and having been ‘punished’ by 
voters for being out of touch with domestic affairs. Clinton’s grand strategy 
presents an interesting case because the end of the Cold War could have been 
expected to result in significant changes to the prevailing normative vocabulary of 
U.S. grand strategy. 
When the Cold War ended the United States was presented with an unprecedented 
opportunity to recast its grand strategy. Two years after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union President Clinton captured something of the optimism of the moment in a 
speech to the UN General Assembly in 1993: 
It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. Immense 
and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. The cold war 
is over. The world is no longer divided into two armed and angry 
camps. Dozens of new democracies have been born. It is a moment of 
miracles.665 
However, this rhetorical optimism was accompanied by the considerable 
challenge of redefining America’s strategic priorities, not to mention a more 
profound sense of her identity in an international environment which had radically 
changed. The United States had been victorious in the sense that the end of the 
Cold War had bought much of the world into alignment with her ideological 
orientation, but at the same time she was faced with a lack of purpose. It was by 
no means clear to what end her considerable resources would now be directed. 
Paul Kennedy suggested in 1993 that “the relief that the Soviet Union is no longer 
an ‘enemy’ is overshadowed by uncertainties about the United States’ proper 
world role.”666 Ronald Asmus probed the irony of the situation further: 
The paradoxical impact of the end of the Cold War is that it 
simultaneously vindicated American purpose and past policies and 
forced a rethinking of the assumptions that guided U.S. foreign policy 
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for nearly half a century. While liberating the United States from its 
overriding concern with the Soviet threat, the end of the Cold War 
also compelled Americans to again confront core issues concerning 
definitions of our national interests and our role in the world.667 
Many assessments of Clinton’s foreign policy have accentuated his 
administration’s sacrifice of policy coherence to the needs of competing domestic 
agendas.668 As William Hyland put it, “In the absence of an overall perspective, 
most issues were bound to degenerate into tactical manipulations, some successful 
some not.”669 This chapter is not intended to add to the scorecard assessments of 
the perceived success or failure of Clinton’s grand strategy. Instead, it will 
examine both persistence and change with respect to American ideological tropes, 
in so far as they informed grand strategy during the post-Cold War period, 
especially during Bill Clinton’s presidency. 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were intellectually fertile periods for 
prognosticators of grand strategy.670 The debate about American power and 
strategy had gathered fresh momentum in the late 1980s as academics, politicians, 
policy-makers, and public intellectuals entered the fray, even before the Berlin 
Wall had fallen.671 As a result Clinton came to power in the midst of an 
ideologically rich debate, from the economic and military decline of the United 
States forecast by Paul Kennedy672 to the re-emergence of Daniel Bell,673 refuting 
his 1975 declaration of the end of American exceptionalism.674 This was, 
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however, a debate about more than just American grand strategy and the re-
emergence of prophets of U.S. decline. It was concerned with what John Lewis 
Gaddis would characterise as the “geology” of the international system, the 
“tectonic” shifts of history rather than the surface events of geopolitics. Even if 
many commentators agreed that the events occurring at the end of the twentieth 
century constituted a fundamental transformation, their conceptions of the new 
world were at considerable variance. Francis Fukuyama’s vision was a world in 
which ideological struggle was coming to an end, the “end of history” in his 
grandiose conception,675 and with it the emergence of the possibility of perpetual 
peace among liberal democracies.676 It was a picture that contrasted dramatically 
with Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilisations,”677 which was a much more 
pessimistic (and is still a controversial) vision of a fragmented world, premised on 
Western decline and exhorting the necessary abandonment of Western universalist 
pretensions.678 
This chapter will focus primarily on Clinton’s strategy of “engagement and 
enlargement”679 and is intended to elucidate the ways in which his administration 
envisaged “the new world order”680 and America’s place within it. Like previous 
chapters, it will employ a form of Cambridge School contextualism that involves 
five analytical steps. 
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Step one of contextual analysis: the ideological context of the Clinton 
presidency 
The first step of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘In writing 
a text, what was an author doing in relation to other available texts that made up 
the ideological context?’ An ideology is a language of politics defined by its 
conventions and employed by a number of writers. Methodologically, this 
encompasses not only lexical choices but also principles, assumptions, and criteria 
for testing knowledge-claims. This section will examine the strategy of 
engagement and enlargement in terms of that strategy’s ideological context. 
Specifically, it will explore the pronouncements of George H. W. Bush as well as 
the post-Cold War debate about America’s place in the world. In short, this 
section will examine the ideological context of the Clinton presidency. 
In November 1990 George H. W. Bush declared that the Cold War was over. He 
heralded a new era premised on a “new world order.”681 It was not immediately 
clear what Bush meant by his concept. The speech emphasised several major 
points: ‘order’, ‘peace’, ‘democracy’, and ‘free trade’. Some scholars have 
suggested that international stability and the defeat of aggression were its only 
real concerns.682 Despite these analyses, Bush was equally as concerned with 
freedom and democracy: 
Today is freedom’s moment . . . The possibility now exists for the 
creation of a true community of nations built on shared interests and 
ideals – a true community, a world where free governments and free 
markets meet the rising desire of the people to meet their own 
destiny.683 
As the last section of the address stated emphatically, Bush’s objectives were 
completed by a commitment to the creation of free markets and free trade. 
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Brent Scowcroft elaborated on Bush’s vision: 
The Soviet Union was standing alongside us, not only in the United 
Nations, but also in condemning and taking action against Iraqi 
aggression . . . If the attack on Kuwait marked the end of forty-odd 
years of such superpower confrontation, what vistas might open up? 
The Security Council could then perform the role envisioned for it by 
the UN framers. The United States and the Soviet Union could, in 
most cases, stand together against unprovoked interstate aggression 
. . . From that point forward we tried to operate in a manner that 
would help establish a pattern for the future.684 
It was a conception that might have evoked Walter Lippmann’s sympathies, based 
as it was on multilateral cooperation but underpinned by American global 
leadership. Scowcroft continued: 
Our foundation was the premise that the United States henceforth 
would be obligated to lead the world community to an unprecedented 
degree, as demonstrated by the Iraqi crisis, and that we should attempt 
to pursue our national interests, wherever possible, within a 
framework of concert with our friends and the international 
community.685 
Bush believed that the post-Cold War era was comparable to the periods 
immediately after the two world wars. For the third time in a century, history 
seemed to be at a crossroads from which the road map could be redrawn.686 
The fluidity that had marked the two post-world-war periods had congealed into 
an American consensus for isolationism in 1919–21 and for internationalism in 
1945–7. In the early 1990s Jeane Kirkpatrick, former Ambassador to the UN (who 
now formed part of a small group of neoconservatives who no longer advocated 
democratic crusades after the Cold War),687 articulated the challenge: the 
objective of foreign policy was to enable the United States to become a “normal 
country in normal times.”688 
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The issue at stake was precisely what ‘normalcy’ was supposed to look like. It 
was clear that it wasn’t simply a case of ‘back to the future’, the return of great 
power politics, as John Mearsheimer predicted.689 Bush faced a myriad of options. 
Would the United States return to the 1920s and turn its back on the world’s 
troubles? More plausibly, would it return to the 1940s and make fresh 
international commitments? If the United States was the only remaining 
superpower, how should it use its power? Would it reorder the world in its own 
image? In October 1992 a TIME magazine editorial asked, “Is the U.S. in an 
irreversible decline as the world’s premier power?”690 Paul Kennedy predicted 
that U.S. power would significantly wane in the post-Cold War world.691 Former 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara urged immediate 50 per cent defence 
cuts.692 For Kennedy the logical corollary was to reinvest the ‘peace dividend’ in 
the American social and economic infrastructure and in so doing tackle the reality 
of decline.693 
James Chace urged a responsible ‘new internationalism’ rooted in international 
economic and financial institutions designed to safeguard the dollar and global 
free trade.694 His voice was joined by those who called variously for American 
leaders to promote international democracy, maximise world order (with the U.S. 
acting as international policeman, to resurrect Carter’s ‘global community’ ideas 
of his early presidency), or defend Western culture and values against new 
nationalisms and revived Islam.695 
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Bush administration officials were aware of the opportunity they had to recast 
American foreign policy and their response was the concept of the new world 
order, outlined to Congress during the 1990s Gulf War: 
We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment . . . Out of 
these troubled times . . . a new world order can emerge . . . Today, that 
new world order is struggling to be born, a world quite different from 
the one we have known, a world where the rule of law supplants the 
rule of the jungle, a world in which nations recognize the shared 
responsibility for freedom and justice, a world where the strong 
respect the weak.696 
The Gulf War allowed the new world order concept to be developed and executed. 
Prior to the conflict Bush had certainly used similar language, suggesting that it 
was time to move “beyond containment to a new policy for the 1990s”697 and that 
Washington’s aim was “ultimately to welcome the Soviet Union back into the 
world order”;698 he referred to an “extraordinary new world,”699 but his language 
at that point was ambiguous and was not attached to an explicit broader vision of 
what that “extraordinary new world” should look like. Bush coined his use of the 
term during an August fishing trip with Brent Scowcroft where they discussed the 
unfolding Gulf crisis.700 Bush’s 11 September address to Congress did give his 
vision greater coherence but it was not until a year later at the United Nations that 
Bush laid out the specific goals of the new world order. It would, he said, be 
“characterized by the rule of law rather than the resort to force, the cooperative 
settlement of disputes rather than anarchy and bloodshed, and an unstinting belief 
in human rights”.701 
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However, in Europe, as elsewhere, the United States was still the linchpin in a 
security system resting on U.S. treaty commitments to defend America’s Atlantic 
allies. On both sides of the Atlantic there was little sentiment in favour of 
complete U.S. disengagement. Bush’s rhetoric reflected continued American 
hegemony far more than his new world order concept suggested. In the Iraq war 
America had acted with an international coalition and with the blessing of the UN, 
but it seemed that the administration was willing to act unilaterally if the coalition 
or UN objected. So, whilst the new world order contained some echoes of 
Woodrow Wilson, it was certainly not a crusade for global democracy or renewed 
multilateralism. Instead it represented an adaptation of Pax Americana to a world 
in which America had to recognise that it did not have undisputed sway.702 Bush 
did suggest that the UN would be the forum for the development and maintenance 
of the new world order, that it would “offer friendship and leadership” whilst 
establishing “a Pax Universalis built upon shared responsibility and 
aspirations.”703 Yet in his 1991 State of the Union Address it was very clear that 
Bush’s new world order would be dominated and defined by the U.S. His speech 
made clear that “American leadership is indispensable” and he reaffirmed 
America’s manifest destiny: 
[We] know why the hopes of humanity turn to us. We are Americans; 
we have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom. And 
when we do, freedom works . . . If we can selflessly confront the evil 
for the sake of good in a land so far away, then surely we can make 
this land all that it should be. If anyone tells you that America’s best 
days are behind her, they’re looking the wrong way . . . We have 
within our reach the promise of a renewed America. We can find 
meaning and reward by serving some higher purpose than ourselves, a 
shining purpose, the illumination of a Thousand Points of Light.704 
Bush’s conception of the new world order relied heavily on American leadership 
and strength with the unmistakeable animating principle of missionary 
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exceptionalism. Bush still assumed the universal applicability of traditional 
American values: 
I feel strongly about the role the United States should play in the new 
world before us. We have the political and economic influence and 
strength to pursue our own goals, but as the leading democracy and 
beacon of liberty, and given our blessings of freedom, of resources 
and of geography, we have a disproportionate responsibility to use 
that power in pursuit of common good. We also have an obligation to 
lead . . . The United States is mostly perceived as benign, without 
territorial ambitions, uncomfortable with exercising our considerable 
power.705 
The U.S. was not going to cede power to the collective will of the UN but would 
define its own priorities, preferably, but not necessarily, with the support of the 
international community. As Bush and Scowcroft put it, “we opposed allowing 
the UN to organize and run a war. It was important to reach out to the rest of the 
world, but even more important to keep the strings of control tightly in our own 
hands.”706 
James Petras and Morris Morley described the new world order as an attempt to 
recreate “a world of uncontested U.S. power, in the process of subordinating the 
ambitions of competitor allies to American interest.”707 They were correct to pick 
up the embodiment of themes from the early days of containment and 
preponderant power. Bush was concerned, much like Truman, with countering 
domestic isolationist threats708 and, whilst he favoured American hegemony, 
preferably maintained multilaterally, he took a limited view of American security 
interests.709 American primacy meant that the U.S. could prohibit state-to-state 
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aggression by rogue dictators, as had happened in the Gulf War (and in contrast to 
the regime change of his son’s presidency). The Cold War lasted almost until the 
end of the first Bush administration – he left office barely a year after Boris 
Yeltsin dissolved the Soviet Union – and, perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
administration thus carried the prudence of the Cold War into the new world, such 
that it didn’t seem very new at all. 
At the same time as the emergence of the new world order concept, at the 
Department of Defense Dick Cheney ordered two teams to prepare studies of 
post-Cold War American grand strategy.710 One team was headed by General 
Colin Powell, then chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The other, the now notorious 
‘Team B’, was headed by Paul Wolfowitz and included Lewis Libby and 
Cheney’s chief of staff, Eric Edelman, who would become key figures in the next 
Bush presidency. Cheney preferred the Team B version and the president was due 
to make public at least some of the ideas at a major address in August 1990. The 
plans were interrupted by the invasion of Kuwait and, overshadowed by these 
events, the president’s speech attracted no unusual recognition.711 
Cheney’s ‘Team B’ report finally came to light in 1992 as Defense Planning 
Guidance for 1994–1999. It portrayed a very threatening international 
environment and, in response, advocated the maintenance of Cold War levels of 
military readiness. However, there was a paradox at the core of the report. On the 
one hand it admitted that the United States “no longer faces either a global threat 
or a hostile non-democratic power dominating a region critical to our interests,”712 
while on the other it was hectoring in its insistence that the United States must 
take up a new vital mission: 
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Our first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival, either 
on the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere that poses a 
threat on the order of that posed formerly by the Soviet Union. This is 
a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense 
strategy and requires that we endeavour to prevent any hostile power 
from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated 
control, be sufficient to generate global power.713 
In short, this would be a new world order based on “convincing potential 
competitors that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive 
posture to protect their legitimate interests.”714 The United States would also have 
to deal with regional conflicts and instability in a way that would encourage 
democracy.715 Equally, the document suggested that the Bush administration’s ad 
hoc coalition formed during the Gulf War represented the preferred ideal type of 
limited multilateralism for the U.S. “ad hoc assemblies, often not lasting beyond 
the immediate crisis, and in many cases carrying only general agreement over the 
objectives to be accomplished.”716 This aimed at outright hegemony for the U.S. 
When it was leaked to The New York Times there was an outcry against an 
apparently open-ended commitment to competition and coercion, especially as the 
document indicated Germany and Japan amongst the most likely competitors.717 
In the political turmoil Cheney and Wolfowitz distanced themselves from the 
document. The revised version, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional 
Defense Strategy,718 no longer made such open-ended commitments to deter the 
emergence of a rival power to the U.S. and removed Germany and Japan as 
competitors. In its place was the broader task to “deter or defeat attack from 
whatever source.”719 Lewis ‘Scooter’ Libby believed that he had managed to 
preserve the original draft’s emphasis on maintaining U.S. preponderance through 
the use of euphemisms.720 This suggestion that the final, toned-down version 
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veiled firmer strategic commitments721 was affirmed by Wolfowitz, who 
commented on the final draft: “What is published, while I admit some of the 
corners are rounded off on it, reflects my views.”722 
Both documents were underpinned by a strong belief in American exceptionalism 
and by a return of the neoconservative critiques of détente, primarily that America 
must resist the return of multipolarity and find a renewed ideological purpose. 
Multipolarity was seen by these neoconservatives as the cause of uncontrollable 
security dilemmas in the form of arms races. In other words, they turned the logic 
of realism on its head, ascribing the idea of a global balance of power with 
responsibility for a litany of offences. As the Regional Defense Strategy put it: 
It is not in our interest or those of the other democracies to return to 
earlier periods in which multiple military powers balanced one against 
another in what passed for security structures, while regional, or even 
global peace hung in the balance. As in the past, such struggles might 
eventually force the United States at much higher cost to protect its 
interests and counter the potential developments of a new global 
threat.723 
This was not simply a structural argument: it was an argument very specifically in 
favour of American unipolarity. As Ben Wattenberg put it “A unipolar world is a 
good thing, if America is the Uni.”724 The neoconservative ideological 
commitment was expressed at the time by Joshua Muravchik, who called for 
making the promotion of democracy the “centrepiece”725 of America’s post-Cold 
War foreign policy, as he put it: 
In both China and the Soviet Union the old structures are crumbling, 
and democracy is a possible outcome. For our nation, this is the 
opportunity of a lifetime. Our failure to exert every possible effort to 
secure this outcome would be unforgivable.726 
Muravchik provided an element of linkage between the neoconservatives and 
Clinton. Largely because of his disgust that President H. W. Bush did little to 
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promote democracy in China and had chosen not to remove Saddam Hussein from 
power Muravchik would go on to support Clinton727 and, indeed, helped him to 
draft a foreign-policy address in 1992 (although he would ultimately become a 
supporter of President George W. Bush). Although Clinton was not a 
neoconservative he did share with them an overt emphasis on democracy 
promotion. However, there was a significant ideological gulf between the 
neoconservative vision of polyarchy and Clintontian democratic enlargement.728 
The timing of the two Cheney-sponsored papers is important to emphasise 
because the neoconservative grand strategy floated in Defense Policy Guidance 
for 1994–1999 represented a possible policy direction in the early 1990s.729 The 
first President Bush did not pursue such a far-reaching conception of American 
grand strategy and unrestrained democracy promotion, even if elements of 
American hegemony were present in his conception of the new world order. 
Instead, as the first Bush presidency fizzled out the United States adopted a new 
strategy based on the fear that the country might have to fight two regional wars 
simultaneously – most probably in Korea and the Persian Gulf. The strategy 
called for sequential engagement of the Korean and Gulf threats and was blurry 
enough to satisfy both hawks and doves. In a move that reflected budgetary 
constraints rather than visionary grand strategy, U.S. armed forces were reduced 
to a “Base Force”.730 
As events unfolded, the 1992 presidential election did not substantially engage 
with the issue of foreign policy. The phrase drafted by Clinton’s campaign team – 
“it’s the economy, stupid!”731 – was partially intended to turn his inexperience in 
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foreign policy compared to the incumbent president to his advantage. It became 
fashionable to mock Bush’s ‘new world order’, which critics called the “new 
world disorder.”732 Some saw Bush’s vision as too timid, placing too much 
emphasis on maintaining stability rather than promoting values.733 Leading 
realists considered it premature to dismiss the perennial struggle for power,734 
although Henry Kissinger acknowledged that the American public could not be 
won over to policies based on an “apparent moral neutrality.”735 Kissinger argued 
that centuries of the balance of power could not be brushed aside in favour of a 
new system that defied definition.736 
By Election Day in November 1992 there was no clear consensus regarding the 
direction of foreign policy. As late as January 1993, as Clinton was replacing 
Bush as president, Bush elaborated criteria for military intervention which still 
favoured international engagement, albeit a more selective engagement which 
recognised the constraints imposed by public opinion and limited resources. 
Under those criteria military intervention could be pursued if: 
the stakes warranted the use of force, force could be effective, no 
other policies were likely to prove effective, the application of force 
could be limited in scope and time, and the potential benefits justified 
the potential cost and sacrifice.737 
According to H. W. Brands this represented the reality of the new world order: 
that in fact the “1990s produced a crisis in American thinking about the world.”738 
Likewise, former Secretary of State Madeline Albright also maintained that 
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articulating America’s role for the 1990s was the fundamental problem that 
Clinton faced throughout his presidency.739 
A number of critics rushed to define this intellectual void. In the summer of 1989 
Francis Fukuyama’s article “The End of History” appeared in the neoconservative 
quarterly The National Interest.740 It sparked intense debate in Washington after 
parts of the article appeared in The Washington Post, The New York Times, TIME 
magazine, and a host of international publications.741 Fukuyama heralded the end 
of the Cold War by declaring the victory of the liberal West over the Communist 
East. He characterised the Cold War as an epic battle between two ideologies to 
determine the direction of man’s evolution through the course of modernity. The 
West’s victory was ‘the end of history’, at least history as understood as the 
process of social and political evolution driven by a dialectical clash of ideologies. 
After two centuries of violent competition, liberal democracy had triumphed over 
hereditary monarchy, fascism and, ultimately, Communism. Furthering his 
argument, Fukuyama suggested: “While earlier forms of government were 
characterised by grave defects and irrationalities that led to their eventual 
collapse, liberal democracy was ultimately free from such fundamental internal 
contradictions.”742 
The victory of liberal democracy, which also encompassed the triumph of 
capitalism, was, in part, based upon the innate human thymotic743 struggle for 
recognition, which Fukuyama asserted only liberal democracy could satisfy.744 
This was a thesis that melded easily with American exceptionalism, where 
America was the liberal democracy par excellence and the beacon for universal 
thymotic expression.745 Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to characterise 
Fukuyama as an uncritical cheerleader. In his original article he suggested that the 
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“common marketization” of the world would not lead to the universal realisation 
of thymos but rather its suppression: 
The end of history will be a very sad time. The struggle for 
recognition . . . will be replaced by economic calculation, the endless 
solving of technical problems . . . I can feel in myself and see in others 
around me, a powerful nostalgia for the time when history existed.746 
Despite his own sense of nostalgia for ‘history’, an underappreciated nuance to his 
writing, Fukuyama’s work served to offer support for a conception of history 
which was embedded in Western, and especially American, culture. In that sense 
his argument was illustrative of a trend of American optimism prevalent in the 
late 1980s747 that contrasted with the ‘declinist’ trend of the 1970s to the mid-
1980s which had been spurred by the Vietnam War, the oil crisis of 1973 and the 
trade deficit with Japan.748 His original article was prescient in both expressing 
the American sense of triumph and acting as a guide, or so it appeared, to the 
radical global changes occurring.749 
Fukuyama’s extension of his original essay in 1992 endorsed a number of 
important intellectual concepts which became “the lingua franca of contemporary 
international relations.”750 Fukuyama was important because he sought to define 
what liberalism stood for in the absence of its Communist antithesis.751 Fukuyama 
suggested that the world would be divided into an expanding ‘post-historical’ 
realm of liberal democracies and a contracting ‘historical’ realm of authoritarian 
states, almost exclusively in the developing world. This is a recognisable form of 
the democratic peace, the claim that liberal democracies do not go to war against 
one another, and thus a liberal democratic world would be a peaceful one.752 This 
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was an image of a prevailing international order as Washington wished it to 
appear: essentially benign, so long as the American model continued to win 
greater acceptance. The merging of ‘the end of history’ with the democratic peace 
allowed a distinctive ordering of the world split between a liberal core, the zone of 
democratic peace, and a violent Hobbesian periphery “mired in history.”753 Those 
who did not conform with the prevailing norms were presented as culturally and 
historically backward, without norms worthy of preservation. In the main these 
zones would “maintain parallel but separate existences,”754 but in this world 
intervention by liberal democracies was justified both in terms of maintaining 
order but more in terms of dealing with widespread human rights violations. In 
practice, this type of intervention would ultimately be selective.755 
Rekindling long-neglected Wilsonian strands, the Clinton administration would 
use such thinking to justify its policy principle that, to preserve world peace, 
democracy had to be promoted.756 The reasoning was clear: “By promoting 
democracy abroad, the United States can help bring into being for the first time in 
history a world composed mainly of stable democracies.”757 Others were less 
optimistic. Robert Kaplan saw the post-Cold War arena as the setting for “coming 
anarchy.”758 He envisioned a future in which small nations would break down 
amid dysfunctional environments. The global environment would create 
numerous problems, including ethnic, religious, and tribal conflicts such as those 
that occurred in Sierra Leone (which inspired him to write the article), Rwanda, 
Somalia, and Bosnia. For Kaplan, the threat of anarchy posed problems to the 
great powers and international institutions.759 What was the case in West Africa at 
the time of writing would, in Kaplan’s view, spread further as environmental 
problems generated migration and this, in turn, would become a principal national 
security issue for the United States in the next century. His rhetorically powerful 
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analysis of neo-Malthusian themes paralleled U.S. media coverage of Africa at the 
time.760 
Samuel Huntington shared Kaplan’s pessimistic view of the post-Cold War world; 
he rejected Fukuyama’s assumptions of universality and invoked a sense of the 
‘West’ as being in decline and in need of defence. However, he argued that the 
world was headed not toward anarchy but toward a ‘clash of civilisations’, 
amongst the Western, Sinic, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin-
American and “possibly African.” Societies. For Huntington the end of the Cold 
War signalled the collapse of ideological identification as a central feature of 
international relations. As technology weakened the role of the nation-state as a 
political community and enhanced cultural and religious identity, Huntington 
believed that both the cohesion within and the tension between civilisational 
groups would increase.761 The main conflicts Huntington forecast were those on 
‘Fault-lines’ between civilisations.762 Although he did acknowledge the potential 
for conflict within civilisations, he made the assumption that these would be less 
intense and less likely to spread.763 
Whereas Fukuyama envisioned a post-Cold War world of integration, Kaplan and 
Huntington predicted disintegration.764 Huntington’s suggested response was for 
the West to abandon any notion of embodying universal values and focus instead 
on cohesion, protecting its own interests and restraining itself from undue 
interference in other civilisations. In other words, unlike Fukuyama, Huntington 
was both descriptive and prescriptive. In the context of American grand strategy 
Huntington made the observation that the United States has always defined itself 
in antithesis to someone; in the post-Cold War environment he therefore asked 
“How will we know who we are if we don’t know who we are against?”765 
Equally, he suggested that a certain degree of world order would be maintained by 
“Core-states” within civilisations. These were the most powerful and culturally 
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central states within a civilisation and it is a description very reminiscent of great 
powers within a classical realist analysis.766 
Writing in the middle of Clinton’s presidency, John Ikenberry contended that 
views such as Kaplan’s and Huntington’s were off the mark. For Ikenberry the 
common assumption that the international environment would disintegrate after 
the Soviet Union’s collapse was fundamentally wrong. In his view, the world 
order created after the Second World War was thriving in the form of 
international organisations created in the 1940s, such as the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, NATO, and the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT). According to Ikenberry, this world order was more robust 
than during its Cold War years767 and thus his argument seemed to support an 
inexorable movement towards Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ and to repudiate 
Huntington.768 
Though the Clinton administration were by no means wholehearted in their 
support for Fukuyama – they seem to have avoided using his ‘End of History’ 
phrasing – they did seem to accept his core argument that they were living 
through a period that left “the ideal of democracy – if not always its practice – as 
the sole surviving form of government.”769 
Step two of contextual analysis: Clinton’s ideological manoeuvre as a 
political manoeuvre 
Step two of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘In producing a 
text, what was the author doing in relation to available and problematic political 
action that made up the practical context?’ In this section, the analysis will focus 
on Clinton’s ideological manoeuvre as a political manoeuvre. The section will 
place the strategy of engagement and enlargement within its practical political 
context (i.e., the political activity that authors addressed and to which the strategy 
responded). 
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Bill Clinton had defeated George H. W. Bush in the 1992 presidential election 
largely by focusing on the nation’s troubled domestic agenda. Clinton’s campaign 
had gone further; by focusing on domestic economic renewal they had managed 
to make Bush’s foreign-policy strength into a weakness as he was forced to 
engage with domestic policy. Despite this, Governor Clinton’s campaign foreign-
policy speeches had been hard to separate conceptually from those of his 
opponent. 
During the campaign two speeches in particular, the “New Covenant for National 
Security” speech and his speech to the Foreign Policy Association, codified 
Clinton’s foreign-policy position. It was his “New Covenant for National 
Security”770 speech which first laid out his position on foreign affairs and 
suggested a necessity to transcend the barrier between foreign and domestic 
policies. In April 1992 his speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New York 
began to assert some of the concerns which would preoccupy his presidency. 
Most importantly, he prioritised assistance to newly independent states with the 
strident exceptionalist call to action: “History is calling upon our nation to decide 
anew whether we will lead or defer; whether we will engage or abstain; whether 
we will shape a new era or instead be shaped by it.”771 He suggested that Bush 
had failed to “offer a compelling rationale for America’s continued engagement in 
the world.”772 Nonetheless it was apparent to commentators at the time that there 
was little space between the foreign policy of the president and his opponent.773 
During the debate with Bush in St Louis, Clinton outlined his version of the 
‘democratic peace’. “We ought to be promoting democratic impulses around the 
world. Democracies are our partners. They don’t go to war with each other.”774 In 
the speech Clinton attacked his rival for his timidity in the face of the Tiananmen 
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Square massacre and also promised to consider lifting the arms embargo on 
Bosnian Muslims. He noted that the U.S. “can’t get involved in the quagmire of 
Bosnia.”775 
When Clinton entered office there were more U.S. troops deployed in more 
nations than had been the case for any new commander in chief since Truman. As 
of January 1993 U.S. Marines were in Somalia, the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard 
had undertaken a quarantine of Haiti, and the U.S. Air Force had just bombed 
radar stations in Iraq and was preparing for an airlift to Bosnia. 
Clinton argued that, for the first time in his lifetime, it was consistently possible to 
advocate freedom, democracy, and human rights. His inaugural address described 
his concept of the new world order: 
Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes 
new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom. 
. . . Our hopes, our hearts and our hands are with those on every 
continent who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is 
America’s cause.776 
This reflected stronger internationalism than had been present in Clinton’s 
campaign pronouncements. Like John F. Kennedy’s pronouncements, which had 
a similar ring, Clinton’s pronouncements were not easy to translate into policies. 
It was not clear at what risk and price Clinton would champion democracy. 
Clinton’s foreign-policy inclinations were extremely cautious; he was not 
prepared to sacrifice his presidency on the alter of idealism.777 In the first eight 
months of his presidency he made only four major foreign-policy speeches and all 
of them stressed continuity with his predecessor.778 All of these speeches stressed 
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Clinton’s commitment to multilateralism and a desire to pursue policies that 
stabilised the fractured international environment. 
The president received considerable criticism from House Republicans that 
summer for over-reliance on the UN in Somalia, lack of action in Haiti, and a 
mercurial Bosnian policy. As Brent Scowcroft suggested, Clinton was pursuing a 
“peripatetic foreign policy at prey to the whims of the latest balance of forces.”779 
Sensitive to the suggestion that he was disinterested in foreign affairs, it was in 
the midst of this context that Clinton organised the so-called “Kennan 
sweepstakes,”780 a competition to come up with a phrase that would encapsulate 
the grand strategy of the administration. 
The phrase decided upon was “democratic enlargement”; it was explicit about the 
possibilities opened by the end of the Cold War and avoided the negativity of 
“End of History” or “Clash of civilizations”. Crucially, it also articulated a goal, 
although it was so distant that success or failure could not be measured in a 
meaningful or, more to the point, a politically damaging sense. 
In September 1993 Clinton’s National Security Advisor Anthony Lake explained 
to an audience at Johns Hopkins University that the United States would 
transform its grand strategy “From containment to enlargement.”781 “Throughout 
the Cold War,” Lake explained: 
we contained a threat to market democracies; now we should seek to 
enlarge their reach, particularly in places of special significance to us. 
The successor to a doctrine of containment must be a strategy of 
enlargement – enlargement of the world’s free community of market 
democracies.782 
Lake clarified the four kinds of action which would underpin the strategy: 
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(1) “We should strengthen the community of major market 
democracies – including our own – which constitutes the core 
from enlargement is proceeding.” 
(2) “We should help foster and consolidate new democracies and 
market economies, where possible in states of special 
significance and opportunity.” 
(3) “We must counter aggression – and support the liberalization – of 
states hostile to democracy and markets.” 
(4) “We need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by 
providing aid, but also by working to help democracy and market 
economics take root in regions of greatest humanitarian 
concern.”783 
The speech was a self-conscious invocation of Wilson in which Lake railed 
against the “neo-know-nothings”784 who believed that America could retreat from 
responsibility. Markets and democracies were Lakes’s solution to all foreign-
policy problems, but the strategy of enlargement rejected the expansionist view 
that the United States was duty-bound to promote democracy and human rights 
everywhere. Both self-interest and the common good were served by the mix of 
principle and pragmatism: 
The expansion of market-based economics abroad helps expand our 
exports and create American jobs, while it also improves living 
conditions and fuels demands for political liberalization abroad. The 
addition of new democracies makes us more secure because 
democracies tend not to wage war on each other or sponsor 
terrorism.785 
Clinton echoed the speech the following week at the UN, echoing the enlargement 
strategy and developing his vision of the effects of globalisation: 
We cannot solve every problem . . . but we must and will serve as a 
fulcrum for change and a pivot point for peace. In a new era of peril 
and opportunity, our overriding purpose must be to expand and 
strengthen the world’s community of market-based democracies.786 
The intellectual wellspring of the Clinton policy flowed mainly from Lake, 
Madeline Albright, and Strobe Talbott. Several core ideas bound this group. They 
shared an aversion to pure power politics and, in their view, a balance of power 
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and traditional geopolitics were ill-suited to the new era and were no longer 
sufficient reasons to spend U.S. resources.787 They agreed that the use of force 
should not be limited to the defence of vital interests but should extend to 
disinterested intervention in the name of moral principles when the will and 
conscience of the international community was breached. Force should be discreet 
and carefully applied. Finally, they believed that the test of a valid foreign policy 
was whether it would receive domestic and international support.788 
However, there were also important differences between them. Lake and Talbott 
were determined to define limits on the use of U.S. power, whereas Albright 
believed the problem was how to legitimise the exercise of power. She argued that 
international support legitimised actions, and whilst Talbott and Lake did not 
disagree, they were less hawkish. All three attributed great importance to the UN; 
Albright said that the UN would be central to Clinton’s new internationalism and 
that history would record the end of the Cold War as the beginning of a new era 
for the UN. She went so far as to say that ‘state building operations’ would be 
“another dimension of collective security.”789 
Observers of the Washington scene reported a struggle between Lake and Warren 
Christopher (then Secretary of State) to define the President’s approach to foreign 
policy. Lake pushed the ‘strategy of enlargement’ with a globalist, moralist, and 
interventionist thrust. Christopher privately supported a strategy of active 
engagement which was less ambitious and based on the premise, as one of 
Christopher’s swiftly disavowed aides recognised, that “We [America] simply 
don’t have the leverage, we don’t have the influence, we don’t have the 
inclination to use military force.”790 While he was forced to reassert American 
leadership, Christopher had wanted America to have a limited focus on certain 
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key geographic regions such as Russia, Western Europe, East Asia, and the 
Middle East.791 
Step three of contextual analysis: the strategy of engagement and 
enlargement as an ideological move 
Step three of Skinnerian contextual analysis focuses on how ideologies are 
identified and how they form, are criticised, and change. This section will analyse 
the strategy of engagement and enlargement as an ideological move – that is, the 
degree to which the strategy was conventional and the nature of any ideological 
innovation. The analysis will demarcate the point at which ideological 
reinforcement or change was attempted. 
Lake characterised the Clinton administration’s overall strategy as pragmatic neo-
Wilsonianism. For the United States the choice was either isolation or a new 
doctrine of internationalism: not Wilson’s crusading idealism, but a practical 
application of his principles of democracy.792 According to Lake, Wilson’s core 
beliefs – spreading democracy to other nations, adhering to principles, and 
stressing the need for engagement – were more vital than ever. Americans could 
not fully embrace power politics as represented by Theodore Roosevelt’s doctrine, 
but they could rally around Wilson’s “deeper resonance”, allowing the United 
States to lead the world in the name of principle.793 Wilson had understood, Lake 
argued, that what occurred within nations fundamentally affected what occurred 
between them. Therefore, the “character of foreign regimes” would shape U.S. 
security.794 
Strobe Talbott reinforced Lake’s Wilsonian vision. He asserted that other nations’ 
internal affairs were no longer off-limits. Humanitarian intervention was gaining 
acceptance. Americans wanted U.S. foreign policy to be rooted in “idealpolitik as 
well as realpolitik.”795 Lake agreed that overwhelming violations of human rights 
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might require the use of force.796 Rectifying human-rights abuses was a 
completely new rationale for U.S. military intervention. 
Joseph Nye of Harvard University, who later served in the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) and the Department of Defense under Clinton, wrote about the new 
liberal dispensation in foreign policy. According to Nye, the evolution of 
transnational communications, economic integration, and interdependence were 
making more relevant a “liberal conception of a world society of peoples, as well 
as states and of order resting on values and institutions as well as military 
power.”797 Liberal views once regarded as utopian now seemed less far-fetched. 
Nye wrote that the idea of a UN force that would preserve international order was 
“an idea worth detailed practical examination” in the aftermath of the Cold War 
and Gulf War.798 
Some outside policy groups reinforced the administration’s thinking. The 
Progressive Policy Institute, a creation of the Democratic Party, strongly 
advocated putting commercial diplomacy at the centre of America’s new security 
strategy.799 For example, trade policies and other leverage could be used to 
encourage political and economic change in China. Other recommendations 
included encouraging and aiding democratic forces abroad that were struggling to 
hold free elections; revamping foreign aid by shifting from country-by-country 
assistance to broader goals; replacing the Cold War military establishment with 
more mobile and more flexible forces capable of rapid deployment to regional 
trouble spots; and reinvigorating the institutions of collective security.800 
All of these musings were converted into Lake’s Johns Hopkins’s speech on 21 
September 1993. He declared that the purpose of U.S. power was to preserve and 
promote democracies. The strategy of enlarging democracies would replace the 
strategy of containment. Lake argued that America’s security mission was to 
promote democracy and market economies. Democracies did not fight each other, 
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he asserted.801 Lake insisted that the United States should not only help 
democracies but support the liberalisation of nations hostile to democracy. 
‘Backlash’ states, such as Iran and Iraq, would have to be isolated. Lake 
weakened his case by adding the caveat that the United States would “at times 
need to befriend and even defend undemocratic states for ‘mutually beneficial 
reasons.”802 
Throughout spring 1994 the White House considered a number of draft proposals 
for a national-security strategy as it tried to reconcile the different perspectives of 
the State Department, the Pentagon, and other government departments. In July 
1994 the administration issued President Clinton’s first comprehensive strategy 
document, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement.803 As 
the title suggests, the president chose to straddle the issue in the hope that, over 
time, seemingly opposing viewpoints could be reconciled. From then on, the 
formulations and general objectives outlined in the strategy documents that the 
administration annually sent to Congress changed little and may be assumed to 
reflect the continuity of Clinton’s basic outlook on foreign policy. 
Neo-Wilsonianism was appealing to a nation exhausted by the Cold War, but 
Wilsonianism was a utopian island in a world dominated by new, virulent 
nationalism, religious fanaticism, the disintegration of empires, the demise of 
ideology, regional wars, and superpower disarray. 
In some senses it is hard to reconcile the ideological impetus of the strategy of 
engagement and enlargement with the realities of Clinton’s foreign policy. It is 
important to remember that whilst Clinton tried to situate his grand strategy 
within the larger democratic, exceptionalist tradition, he was not prepared to 
engage in “reckless crusades”804 to expand the realm of international freedom. 
Whilst he accepted that America had a special destiny, this did not mean it could 
or would force its ideals on other nations. “Our actions” abroad, he suggested, had 
“always to be tempered with prudence and common sense.” After all, he 
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continued, there were “some countries and some cultures” that were “many steps 
away from democratic institutions.”805 The speech heavily indicated that 
democracy promotion was not a moral duty to override all other goals but one 
objective that would help guarantee America’s place in the globalised world.806 
Talbott reinforced these points. Whilst his argument criticised isolationists for not 
comprehending why the support of democracy in certain countries was in 
America’s interest, he was also careful to distinguish between a policy driven by 
ideals and Clinton’s, which was guided by enlightened self-interest. He concluded 
that support for democracy was “not an absolute imperative.”807 
This showed the nature and, perhaps more importantly, the limits of Clinton’s 
ideological innovation. He was prepared to refashion American exceptionalism, to 
adopt the Wilsonian crusade of democracy promotion, but only insofar as it would 
bolster America and, in particular, American trade. His vision comingled 
domestic and foreign policy. 
The once bright line between domestic and foreign policy is blurring. 
If I could do anything to change the speech patterns of those of us in 
public life, I would almost like to stop hearing people talk about 
foreign and domestic policy and, instead start discussing economic 
policy, security policy, environmental policy – you name it.808 
Therefore, the focus of U.S. substantive foreign policy was to be on the North 
American–European–Japanese core and the international economic regimes, 
institutions, and arrangements designed to foster trade. This was necessary 
because the assumption that U.S. economic recovery and long-term prosperity 
were inextricably intertwined with global economic growth, especially of the 
democratic capitalist core, was at the heart of the Clinton administration’s 
strategic assessment and response. The domestic and the foreign were co-
constitutive. This political–economic nexus was considered the essence of U.S. 
security policy in an international system in which there were no plausible 
challengers to U.S. security as traditionally conceived. 
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When the Clinton administration engaged beyond the democratic capitalist core, 
however, its international strategy lost clarity. The geostrategic areas of greatest 
concern were Russia, the remnants of the former Soviet Union, and China. 
Economic engagement was part of Clinton’s approach, but the perilous state of 
the economies and political institutions of Russia and Central Europe precluded 
their rapid incorporation into the core. Insofar as Russia and China had been the 
foci of containment, Cold War residua now demanded attention. Not surprisingly, 
the approach to enlargement in Russia and China was weighted toward more 
traditional political and strategic issues of arms control, nonproliferation, and 
shoring up the teetering presidency of Boris Yeltsin.809 
With respect to Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea810 the administration 
adopted the language and instrumentality of containment, not the modalities of 
economic engagement. For example, U.S.–Iraqi relations remained frozen in 
economic sanctions and a low-intensity air war of attrition. In the Middle East 
Clinton personally engaged in intense diplomatic efforts with regard to the 
Palestinian–Israeli conflict. For more than twenty years his predecessors had 
worked the same agenda, and his efforts toward resolving the conflict also failed. 
In its original conception of foreign-policy strategy, the Clinton administration 
considered humanitarian intervention a tertiary priority. However, the complex 
political and humanitarian disaster of Balkan disintegration remained a top 
priority throughout Clinton’s presidency and led to NATO’s first military action. 
U.S. policy was anything but strategic in conception and implementation. 
Initially, the administration attempted to disengage through a policy of sceptical 
support for European and UN diplomacy and peacekeeping in Bosnia during 
1993–4. By the late summer of 1995 that policy failed, as Serbs overran what was 
supposed to be a UN-protected safe area. Only after the Clinton administration led 
a UN-sanctioned NATO air campaign did the following occur: a ceasefire; 
negotiations near Dayton, Ohio in November; and, finally, a NATO-based 
peacekeeping force, under UN mandate, on the ground.811 
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Nonetheless, the Balkan Wars persisted with the Kosovan conflict. The Clinton 
administration rejected European appeals to seek UN Security Council 
legitimisation of military action in Kosovo. Instead Clinton pushed for and 
received authorisation for NATO air strikes against Serbia, which would last three 
months. 
Despite its early reluctance, the Clinton administration ultimately enlarged the 
U.S. presence in the Balkans. The UN Security Council sanctioned the U.S.-led 
NATO intervention in Bosnia but not the Kosovo intervention. Throughout the 
1990s the Clinton administration had repeated its commitment to engagement and 
enlargement through multilateralism in order to construct a liberal international 
order. However, Operation Allied Force, although justified with the moral 
imperatives of humanitarian intervention by a willing NATO coalition, was 
essentially a U.S.-led intervention against a sovereign state acting without 
Security Council authorisation. This was not altogether surprising, as Lake had 
explicitly refused to privilege multilateralism, though he had hoped “that the 
habits of multilateralism may one day enable the rule of law to play a more 
civilizing role in the conduct of nations, as envisioned by the founders of the 
United Nations.”812 
By the end of the 1990s the strategy of engagement and enlargement had lost its 
focus. Although NATO, the very institutionalisation of the liberal democratic 
core, had enlarged to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, its 
internal balance, mission, and purpose had become problematic. During the 
interventions in the Balkan Wars, especially in Kosovo, the radical asymmetry 
between U.S. and European military capabilities had become obvious. In addition, 
there were accumulating instances of U.S. impatience with European multilateral 
diplomacy in the Balkans and the International Criminal Court. Thus, there were 
fissures within the democratic capitalist core of the post-Cold War world. 
The Battle of Mogadishu, the prolonged and brutal struggle in the Balkans, the 
collapse of negotiations in the Middle East, the failure to contain ‘backlash’ 
nations, and, by the end of Clinton’s second term, the emergence of an al Qaeda 
capable of bombing the World Trade Center all indicated that much of the world 
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was far less receptive to U.S. ideas of market economics and liberal democracy 
than the first post-Cold War administration had assumed. 
The Clinton administration had come into power with significant intellectual 
baggage. This was not a hangover of 1960s radical chic,813 but a more traditional 
liberal critique of U.S. policy: the nation had been too preoccupied with power; its 
foreign policy had not reflected Americans’ ideals; the nation had failed to 
support human rights abroad; too often it had acted unilaterally in support of a 
national interest that was too narrowly defined. 
The administration had come to power vowing that it would not simply refine or 
remake Bush’s new world order. Instead it would create its own grand strategy. 
However, although the president and his advisors were comfortable with moments 
of Wilsonian-inspired rhetoric and were determined to pursue Wilsonian goals, 
Clinton himself was more of a centrist. His preoccupation with domestic politics 
overshadowed his interest in foreign affairs: 
His advisors mistook this as a green light to pursue their own policy 
predilections. When their views clashed with reality, they needed 
Clinton’s firm support, but Clinton was not inclined to take political 
risks for policies he never fully embraced.814 
Step four of contextual analysis: the strategy of engagement and enlargement 
and the alteration of political vocabulary 
Step four of Skinnerian contextual analysis centres on the relation between 
political ideology and political action. This sections starts from Skinner’s 
observation that political vocabulary contains intersubjectively normative terms 
which simultaneously describe and evaluate. Skinner argued that a society 
establishes and alters its moral identity by manipulating normative terms. He 
noted a tension between political actors’ desire to tailor their normative language 
to fit their projects and the reality that projects must be altered to fit the available 
normative language.815 
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American jubilation at the Cold War’s conclusion masked significant unresolved 
strategic and rhetorical problems. Since the mid-1940s a particular conception of 
American exceptionalism incorporating the concept of ‘national security’ 
(explored in Chapter 4) had served as a profoundly unifying concept. Yoking 
foreign policy, military decisions, and domestic affairs, this nationalistic concept 
blended moralism and pragmatism. 
Neither President Clinton nor President Bush employed an unmodified Cold War 
rhetorical paradigm to explain U.S. grand strategy, but nor did they completely 
abandon Cold War rhetoric. Cold War political vocabulary enabled both 
presidents to anchor their political projects. Clinton’s rhetoric of a democratic 
world order perpetuated some Cold War themes. The vocabulary and 
constructions in which this rhetoric was embedded had strong overtones of 
national insecurity and vulnerability. 
Efforts to move away from Cold War premises characterised Clinton’s rhetorical 
model, which represented an attempt to redefine the basis of U.S. national 
security, principally by linking U.S. domestic policy (especially economic policy) 
to foreign-policy concerns. However, in detailing the changes confronting the 
United States after the Cold War Clinton resorted to the familiar trope of war 
metaphors, which he used most frequently when describing weapons of mass 
destruction and the outlaw nations, terrorists, and organised criminals who sought 
to acquire them. He often bracketed his arguments with the reminder that the 
United States was the “indispensable nation” and thereby reinforced the premises 
of U.S. global interests and U.S. exceptionalism. Clinton did not attempt to 
completely supplant Cold War discourse, but the Cold War provided more context 
than rationale for his action: 
The fact is America remains the indispensable nation. There are times 
when America and only America can make a difference between war 
and peace, between freedom and repression, between hope and fear. 
Of course, we can’t take on all the world’s burden. We cannot become 
its policemen. But where our interests and values demand it and where 
we can make a difference, America must act and lead.816 
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In the post-Cold War environment, with no predictable adversary, no familiar 
structure of conflict, and few external constraints, the challenge was to build a 
new foundation from which to articulate a foreign policy, especially a policy that 
most voters would tolerate if not embrace. Clinton and many members of his 
diverse audience shared an interest in minimising foreign-policy costs and 
promoting domestic prosperity. Clinton had come to office by downplaying 
foreign affairs, emphasising instead the need for a new domestic agenda after 
decades of national obsession with Cold War needs. He had promised to “focus 
like a laser beam” on the economy if elected.817 His plan for promoting a healthier 
economy and retiring the national debt involved downsizing the military and 
reshaping it for new types of conflict.818 In a campaign address, he emphasised the 
need for aligning foreign and domestic policy: 
Throughout this campaign I have called for a new strategy for 
American engagement: to revamp our Cold War military forces to 
meet our nation’s changing security needs; encourage the 
consolidation and spread of democracy abroad; and restore America’s 
economic leadership at home and abroad. . . . [W]e are in a position to 
do more with less than at any time in our recent history. During the 
Cold War, we spent trillions to protect freedom where it was 
threatened. In this post-Cold War era, the West can spend a fraction of 
that amount to nurture democracy where it never before existed. 
America’s challenge in this era is not to bear every burden, but to tip 
the balance. . . . [M]ost important, none of this will be possible unless 
we restore America’s economic strength.819 
The Cold War had led administrations to subordinate domestic concerns to an 
international agenda. Reversing that approach, Clinton promised to make 
domestic prosperity the driving influence on his foreign policy. In an echo of Paul 
Kennedy, domestic economic renewal became inextricably linked to America’s 
continued exceptionalist mission and in turn to the spread of democracy. 
Lake, Clinton, Christopher, and Albright coordinated a set of addresses that 
explained democratic enlargement as the logical post-Cold War successor to 
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containment. Eight speeches820 presented within six weeks offered an 
extraordinary opportunity to examine the self-conscious launch of a unified 
foreign-policy frame. It is possible to examine these speeches, as they were 
explicitly issued by the administration as coordinated texts delivering a single 
grand strategy. 
Certainly, aspects of democratic enlargement had twentieth-century antecedents. 
For example, Wilson’s foreign policy had focused on expanding U.S. influence 
and ideas. Eisenhower’s New Look programme had been aimed at reducing 
defence costs while maintaining the military strength and flexibility needed to 
deter aggressive forces and promote peace. Eisenhower’s administration had 
argued that it was economically necessary for free nations to share the burdens of 
defence costs. The New Look’s rhetorical and strategic success had depended on 
the credible assertion of an ongoing U.S. prerogative to act and retaliate where, 
when, and how America thought best. The United States had asserted the right to 
choose among and reconfigure foreign-policy means, uncoupling U.S. military 
capacity from commitments to use that capacity in any particular case.821 Like 
Clinton, George H. W. Bush had faced the ill-defined threats of the post-Cold 
War period and a concomitant lack of American interest in foreign policy. In 
response, the Bush administration, too, had urged global integration of market 
democracies and experimented with various rhetorical devices to make its case.822 
Despite historical antecedents, the eight speeches that showcased democratic 
enlargement suggested that it was a new approach for new times. Borrowing from 
John F. Kennedy, the Clinton administration rhetorically declared the beginning 
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of an era so unique that it rendered the past obsolete. Clinton told the UN General 
Assembly, “It is clear that we live at a turning point in human history. Immense 
and promising changes seem to wash over us every day. The Cold War is 
over.”823 Albright suggested that the moment was similar in magnitude to 1918 
and 1945.824 The current time was “a moment of immense democratic and 
entrepreneurial opportunity”825 in which “the momentum of the Cold War no 
longer propels us in our daily actions.”826 Americans “need a new lens and even a 
new vocabulary . . . We must fashion new policies that reflect the immense 
changes that have come with the end of the Cold War.”827 
The Clinton administration argued for a world actively shaped through selective 
U.S. engagement. In words that would be strikingly echoed by Robert Kaplan, 
Albright forcefully warned that the United States should not withdraw into a post-
Cold War foxhole that would consign the rest of the world to “rot in its own 
anarchy.”828 Christopher, too, advocated global involvement: “The new world we 
seek will not emerge on its own. We must shape the transformation that is under 
way in a time of great fluidity.”829 Lake opined: 
America’s core concepts – democracy and market economics – are 
more broadly accepted than ever. . . . This victory of freedom is 
practical, not ideological: Billions of people on every continent are 
simply concluding, based on decades of their own hard experience, 
that democracy and markets are the most productive and liberating 
ways to organise their lives. . . . Our leadership is sought and 
respected in every corner of the world.830 
While the administration’s discourse provided the grounds for continuing U.S. 
global leadership, Clinton also explicitly stated that the United States would not 
retreat from the position it had achieved at the end of the Second World War. For 
Clinton, the United States occupied a ‘unique position’ in international politics in 
the age of globalisation. He declared “There are times when only America can 
make the difference between war and peace, between freedom and repression, 
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between hope and fear. . . . [W]e must act and lead.”831 Clinton’s use of the phrase 
“indispensable nation” in the speech was by now a familiar refrain which 
reasserted America’s providential role in the world, linking to American 
exceptionalism. 
Clinton devoted considerable energy to making the case that the United States 
should continue its providential mission. The case for leadership by the United 
States was contained in two overarching and at times overlapping claims. First, 
continuing the U.S. role as world leader venerated and emulated the legacy of 
transitional leadership that American generations had shown in the past, 
especially after the Second World War. Second, the United States needed to lead 
so that it could shape a better future for itself and the international community. 
Leadership by the United States was necessary to provide the proper direction for 
change, and it was imperative to immediately chart the path because of the 
opportunity’s fleeting nature. Both claims served to promote America’s 
commitment to intervention and reaffirmed its position as global leader. 
Clinton skilfully used and reshaped the rhetoric of America’s exceptionalist 
mission to support his ideological programme. He publicly stated that a 
continuance of U.S. global leadership was the proper response to “the third great 
moment of decision in the 20th century, the third great transition period in U.S. 
foreign affairs.”832 For Clinton, uncertainty about America’s future place in the 
world resembled the uncertainty that had followed each world war: 
Twice before in this century, history has asked the United States and 
the other great powers to provide leadership for a world ravaged by 
war. After World War I, that call went unanswered. The United States 
was too unwilling. The great powers turned inward, as violent, 
totalitarian powers emerged. We raised trade barriers. We sought to 
humiliate rather than rehabilitate the vanquished. And the result was 
instability, then depression, and ultimately a Second World War.833 
By causally linking the rise of totalitarianism, economic depression, and 
America’s historical unwillingness to play a global leadership role Clinton 
forcefully made the case for continued involvement in world affairs. This 
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rhetorical call was attached to specific policy decisions. In 1993 Clinton 
convinced sceptical Republicans in the U.S. Senate to support a financial 
stabilisation package for Russia. Clinton would later recall that Bob Dole “came 
around on the argument that we didn’t want to foul up the post-Cold War era the 
way the victors in World War I had done. Their short-sightedness contributed 
mightily to World War II.”834 
Clinton’s second important historical analogy invoked an idealised vision of U.S. 
action in the wake of the Second World War: 
When World War II was won, profound uncertainty clouded the 
future. Europe and Japan were buried in rubble. Their peoples were 
weary. People did not know what to expect or what would happen. 
But because of the vision of the people who were our predecessors 
here in the United States, . . . the path that was followed after World 
War I was abandoned and instead the world was embraced with 
optimism and hope.835 
Although Clinton’s recollection of the attitudes of postwar American 
policymakers was selective at best and misleading at worst, he invoked a 
particularised historical vision that the post-Cold War transition should ‘benefit’ 
from U.S. leadership and, most importantly, stability. 
Although historical analogy provided stability for the strategy of engagement and 
enlargement, the ideological innovativeness of the strategy became apparent as it 
looked to the future. For Clinton, U.S. leadership was vital to shape the present 
and future environment toward U.S. national interests. Leadership by the United 
States was urgently needed because the forces of globalisation were transforming 
the global landscape. “Change is upon us,” Clinton stated. “We can do nothing 
about that.”836 If the United States did not proactively manage change across the 
globe, its global position would be compromised. Clinton saw Americans as 
properly “shapers of events, not observers of it.” If they failed to act, “the moment 
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will pass and we will lose the best possibilities of our future. We face no 
imminent threat, but we do have an enemy. The enemy of our time is inaction.”837 
Clinton’s words revealed three important beliefs. First, the United States must 
commit to global leadership so that the international environment could be 
moulded to the country’s benefit. Second, if the United States did not shape the 
future in its image the country would lose its influence on the world’s direction 
and, over the long term, experience decline. Third, the United States had only a 
short time in which to shape globalism and must, therefore, seize the moment. 
This last belief contradicted a central tenet of U.S. exceptionalism, the belief that 
the United States had the perennial ability to escape the deterioration that other 
great powers eventually experienced. Traditionally, U.S. presidents, including 
George H. W. Bush, had upheld that tenet. Clinton was different in that he saw 
America’s position as a temporary result of human agency; depending on 
circumstances, the United States could lose its power. 
Clinton admitted as much in his first inaugural address. He stated that, despite the 
end of the Cold War, America was just as vulnerable as other countries: 
Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the cold war assumes 
new responsibilities in a world warmed by the sunshine of freedom 
but threatened still by ancient hatreds and new plagues. Raised in 
unrivaled prosperity, we inherit an economy that is still the world’s 
strongest but is weakened by business failures, stagnant wages, 
increasing inequality, and deep divisions among our own people.838 
During his presidency, Clinton refashioned the notion of U.S. exceptionalism. 
Although he would continue traditional advocacy of U.S. intervention, with 
echoes of declinism and even Huntington, Clinton knew that U.S. primacy might 
not last. By continuing to lead and construct the international landscape in a way 
that promoted U.S. interests, America could obtain some security even if it lost 
some power. The future of the globalised international community could be drawn 
in America’s image. 
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Clinton’s logic extended further, in more familiar ways. The United States must 
shape the changes brought by globalisation not only for its own security but also 
for the world’s. Clinton stated: 
Change is inevitable but the particular change is not. And we have to 
make some decisions to seize the opportunities and meet the 
challenges before us. To put it another way, the train of globalization 
cannot be reversed, but it has more than one possible destination. If 
we want America to be on the right track, if we want other people to 
stay on the right track and have the opportunity to enjoy peace and 
prosperity, we have no choice but to try and lead the train.839 
Clinton saw the age of globalisation as unruly. In his view, leadership by the 
United States acted as a counterweight to the unpredictable state of the 
international environment. Using the mission of exceptionalism to justify 
continued U.S. engagement and leadership, Clinton simultaneously highlighted 
the limits of U.S. leadership. This was an important ideological innovation, a 
significant departure from traditional exceptionalist discourse. 
Apart from his unprecedented acknowledgement of temporal limits to U.S. power, 
Clinton saw U.S. leadership as limited by the amount of power the United States 
actually had and the extent to which it could make leadership commitments. 
Clinton stated “We can’t take on all the world’s burden. . . . We cannot become its 
policeman.”840 The implication was that America’s power to lead was great but 
the international community needed to share the burden of leadership. 
Acceptance of this point constituted acceptance of at least partial decline from 
America’s Cold War position. Clinton was making a strategic commitment 
markedly different from that of his Cold War predecessors. John F. Kennedy had 
claimed that the United States would be a leader that would “pay any price, bear 
any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the 
survival and the success of liberty.”841 Unlike Kennedy, Clinton had no clearly 
defined enemy to oppose; moreover, George H. W. Bush’s failure to be re-elected 
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partly reflected the American public’s limited appetite for international 
engagement. The United States would have to pick and choose its battles. 
Although Clinton still intended to pursue America’s exceptionalist mission, it 
would be in tandem with a recalibration of America’s organisational and regional 
relationships. 
In Clinton’s construction of the post-Cold War world, multidimensional 
interdependence and globalisation were the dominant constitutive dynamics of an 
emergent global system. In that worldview, traditional security concerns persisted; 
however, insofar as economic forces of globaliation grew in importance, security 
was redefined in terms of trade and economics. From Clinton’s perspective, the 
proper strategic response to this new world was engagement. Because the 
economic forces of globalisation derived from America’s most fundamental 
values and strengths,842 the United States should embrace interdependence and 
globalisation. Globalisation, then, would become both an instrument and an end 
of U.S. foreign and national-security policy. Insofar as U.S. strategy was based on 
engaging the forces of globalisation and strengthening the institutions for 
regulating and fostering liberal globalisation, the sphere of democratic capitalism 
would be expanded and U.S. strategic interests advanced. 
With respect to Clinton’s reworking of exceptionalist discourse, the tension 
between multilateralism and unilateralism indicated the extent to which the 
administration’s early involvement in multilateral UN peacekeeping operations 
had evaporated after the Battle of Mogadishu. U.S. withdrawal from Somalia was 
soon followed by new doctrine regarding U.S. approval of or involvement in UN 
peacekeeping operations. Presidential Decision Directive 25843 seemed to ensure 
that few, if any, multilateral peacekeeping operations would include U.S. 
involvement without a priori agreement to U.S. command and control.844 The 
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United States would not support UN missions that “impinge directly on the 
national security interests of America or its allies.”845 
America’s refusal to support decisive multilateral intervention in Rwanda and her 
vacillating response to European and UN operations in Bosnia were consistent 
with this stance. When decisive international action came to the Balkans in 1995 
and to Kosovo in 1999 it was in the form of U.S.-led and U.S.-implemented air 
wars. Indeed, in the latter campaign the Clinton administration explicitly rejected 
trying to obtain UN Security Council authorisation. Instead, the administration 
prepared for what was essentially U.S. action by gaining a priori NATO approval 
for the United States to act without UN authorisation. Clinton seemed 
unconcerned that the resulting intervention was regarded as a violation of the UN 
Charter with respect to the use of force.846 
In sum, from the outset the Clinton administration showed strategic drift. Early 
on, Lake explicitly refused to adopt a rigidly multilateralist posture. In the same 
speech in which he laid out the fundamentals of the Clinton administration’s 
strategy of engagement and enlargement, he concluded: 
For any official with responsibilities for our security policies, only one 
overriding factor can determine whether the U.S. should act 
multilaterally or unilaterally, and that is America’s interests. We 
should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests – and 
we should act unilaterally when that will serve our purpose. The 
simple question in each instance is this: What works best?847 
Step five of contextual analysis: “enlargement,” the new world order? 
Step five of Skinnerian contextual analysis focuses on the question “What forms 
of political thought and action are involved in disseminating and 
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conventionalizing ideological change?”848 Such analysis illuminates how some 
ideological change becomes conventional, woven into ways of acting. 
From the outset Clinton and his team sought a more open system of international 
relations in which the United States would lead through consensus, markets, and 
institutions, in place of Bush’s new world order, which they perceived as having 
“failed to articulate clear goals.”849 Their approach to foreign policy was liberal 
and internationalist. The United States would be less imposing militarily, but it 
would exert greater political, economic, and cultural influence abroad. Nye’s 
phrase “soft power”850 captured Clinton’s approach. 
When Clinton entered office an elderly George Kennan urged the new president, 
via Strobe Talbott, to avoid “oversimplification” and develop a “thoughtful 
paragraph or more” explaining U.S. interests, aims, and challenges.851 Tony Lake 
hoped that his September 1993 speech would do just that and have an effect 
similar to that of Kennan’s “Long Telegram.”852 Despite critics who accuse 
Clinton of strategic drift and inconsistency at a policy level, this chapter has 
argued that the Clinton administration successfully harnessed wide-ranging debate 
about America’s purpose into a rebooted ideological narrative which informed 
their grand strategy. 
From the outset, Clinton incorporated some of the arguments of declinists such as 
Paul Kennedy, who emphasised the need for American economic regeneration. 
Clinton’s foreign policy was rooted in a number of interlinked assumptions: first, 
“foreign and domestic policy are two sides of the same coin,” and, second, “If 
we’re not strong at home we can’t be strong abroad. If we can’t compete in the 
global economy, we’ll pay for it at home.”853 The innovative aspect was the 
Clinton administration’s linkage of American domestic renewal with the 
economics of the global market and in turn with democracy promotion. As this 
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chapter has demonstrated, the administration repeatedly highlighted what they 
perceived as the positive link between capitalism and democracy.854 Support for 
market democracy was Lake’s solution to most foreign-policy problems. His view 
was based on democratic peace theory. According to Lake, support of markets and 
democracies served both self-interest and the common good; it was both high 
principle and basic pragmatism. His “From Containment to Enlargement” speech 
framed the administration’s foreign policy. Indeed, “what Clinton liked best about 
Lake’s enlargement policy was the way it was inextricably linked to economic 
renewal with its emphasis on making sure the United States remained the number 
one exporter.”855 There was more to it than the simple self-interest of market-
access. As Cox suggests: 
In some larger sense they really did think that over time democracy 
could not function without the market, or the market without 
democracy . . . and free enterprise the only secure foundation upon 
which to construct and sustain democracy . . . It was no accident that 
Clinton and his advisers persistently coupled the two words together 
and employed the term ‘market democracy’ to more fully describe the 
policy of enlargement.856 
Despite many inconsistencies in policy over the next seven years, Lake’s speech 
roughly characterised the aims of Clinton’s international activities. The 
administration attempted to use economic incentives and promises of public 
respectability to encourage democratic reform overseas. 
America’s hesitation in the former Yugoslavia was exemplative of the problems 
with Clinton’s grand strategy. As articulated by Lake and his successors, the 
strategy of enlargement suggested preferences for market economies and for 
democracies. However, it did not identify the key priorities in pursuing those 
ends. Were the Balkans more important to U.S. interests than North Korea or 
Iraq? Was stopping genocide more important than nurturing productive, stable 
relations with regional leaders? Enlargement promised much without giving any 
sense of trade-offs and sacrifices, even though those are the tough decisions that 
should be at the core of any strategy. 
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The Clinton administration never thought systematically about the ‘hard-power’ 
capabilities it would need to pursue its ends.857 Clinton’s sophisticated 
understanding of international political economy distracted him from thinking 
seriously about when, where, and how the United States would deploy its military. 
How would the United States integrate military capabilities into plans for 
enlargement? Under what conditions would the nation send U.S. forces abroad? 
Which threats would leaders emphasise in military procurement and planning? As 
shown in Chapters 4 and 5, these questions were all central topics of debate 
during the Cold War, but disappeared from the policy process during the Clinton 
years. 
Conclusion 
The language of the Clinton administration promised a great deal with very little 
sacrifice and Clinton’s reworking of U.S. exceptionalism promised a great deal 
under U.S. stewardship. While hinting at multilateral burden sharing and setting 
ill-defined limits to U.S. intervention, this reworking suggested that selective 
engagement would entail little cost. Lake’s 1993 speech had suggested that the 
United States could enlarge the landscape of democracy without hard military 
choices. 
For John Ikenberry, however, Clinton’s grand strategy was less innovative than it 
might appear.858 He suggests that two orders were built in the 1940s. One was the 
Cold War order that emerged from America’s struggle with the Soviet Union and 
ended with the Soviet Union’s collapse. The other was the U.S.-led international 
order that was built inside the bipolar system in the shadow of the Cold War. The 
second order was the Western liberal order, reinforced by the Cold War. 
However, it is less obvious that this liberal democratic agenda represented a grand 
strategy rather than a collection of values shared between allies. 
This chapter has suggested something distinct: that the Clinton grand strategy 
went much further than Ikenberry’s conception of Western structural integration. 
Clinton’s strategy envisaged a democratic peace led by exceptionalist America 
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and predicated on the triad of domestic economic renewal, the spread of market 
economics, and democracy promotion beyond the confines of the ‘West’. The 
Clinton administration made a number of ideological issues conventional parts of 
American foreign policy. First, the administration renewed the commitment to 
American global involvement and reshaped it for the post-Cold War world. 
Second, they gave renewed centrality to economic issues in U.S. foreign policy. 
Whilst these had always been an issue, the Clinton administration gave them 
particular ideological prominence, putting them on a par with traditional security 
interests.859 The promotion of market economics became a significant part of 
American grand strategy, intimately tied to democracy promotion and also at the 
heart of the regeneration of American exceptionalism.860 For better or worse, the 
third legacy Clinton bequeathed to the post-Cold War environment was the 
confused ‘Clinton doctrine’ of humanitarian intervention and democracy 
promotion, both of which would take on a new life under Clinton’s presidential 
successor. 
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Chapter 7. The Bush Doctrine and the Neoconservative Moment 
As the previous chapter demonstrated, the early post-Cold War era was one of 
strategic ambiguity, but not because either George H. W. Bush or Bill Clinton 
avoided strategic articulation. Both presidents had pursued strategic policy very 
different from containment.861 The phrases new world order, enlargement, and 
beyond containment came to be used as expressions of fact, as having come to 
pass, rather than being seen as attempts to fashion a successor to containment. 
Under President Clinton there was a strong rearticulation of American purpose 
which did led to recognisable grand strategy, albeit without the strictures of neatly 
ordered adversaries or a rival ideology. Nonetheless, American thought about the 
use of force remained undisciplined throughout the Clinton presidency. U.S. 
interests and the threats to them were numerous and diffuse, and the Clinton 
administration did not consider them in uniform terms. 
This chapter will examine continuity and change in U.S. ideological tropes during 
the presidency of George W. Bush, the post-Second World War president with 
perhaps the most controversial foreign policy since that of the Vietnam War. It 
will focus primarily on Bush’s grand strategy after 11 September 2001.862 In the 
wake of a hotly disputed presidential election,863 Bush came to power as the 
champion of compassionate conservatism at home. He was more concerned with 
establishing his domestic authority than with foreign policy. His foreign-policy 
campaign message had been largely realist and based on the promise that he 
would pursue “distinctly American internationalism,”864 by which he meant not 
only being more “humble” in recognising the limits of how far he could change 
the international system but also a form of unilateralism that was distinct from the 
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863 For details of the vote recount and controversial legal decision which decided the outcome of 
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864 George W. Bush, “A Distinctly American Internationalism, Ronald Reagan Presidential 
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presidencies of both Clinton and his father.865 George W. Bush expressly 
criticised Clinton as a serial intervener and resolutely stated that he would steer 
clear of nation-building.866 Indeed, “before 9/11 Bush struck his neocon and 
hardline conservative supporters as a half-hearted unipolarist.”867 This is not to 
suggest that American primacy was not already apparent in Bush’s pre-9/11 
foreign policy and, as the next section makes clear, there were strands of both 
realism and American primacy even before 9/11, reflecting the two strands of 
Bush’s foreign-policy advisors. Nonetheless, 9/11 did have a transformative effect 
and not only settled the orientation of the president’s strategic thinking but also 
shifted the intellectual and political locus of grand strategy creation towards 
neoconservatism and its stronghold within the Pentagon.868 
Bush’s grand strategy after 9/11 is sometimes confusingly characterised as 
“Wilsonianism with boots,”869 the suggestion being that it was primarily 
concerned with democracy promotion and a strong degree of ideological 
continuity with previous dominant understandings of American exceptionalism.870 
This chapter disagrees with this suggestion of ideological continuity871 and seeks 
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to reconstruct the strategic arguments after 9/11. In doing so, it suggests that the 
neoconservatives who flourished in the wake of that attack saw that moment in 
time as an opportunity for a profound reworking of American exceptionalism. 
They were engaged in an ideological project concerned not with democracy 
promotion, in the liberal sense that Bill Clinton had envisaged, but rather with a 
“‘new birth’ of the confidence we used to have in ourselves and in ‘America the 
beautiful’.”872 In other words, they were concerned with what they perceived as a 
decades-long domestic crisis in America and its resolution through both the 
creation of an international order predicated on the maintenance of American 
hegemony873 and their perception that “A liberal democracy that could fight a 
short and decisive war every generation or so to defend its own liberty and 
independence would be far healthier and more satisfied”.874 This was an 
ideologically innovative grand strategy the aim of which was a very particular 
conception of domestic regeneration, predicated on the export of a minimal form 
of democracy, which helped sustain a particular international environment. 
This chapter will analyse the Bush Doctrine and the ways in which it envisaged 
‘the new world order’ and America’s place within it. Like the previous chapter, 
this chapter will employ a form of Cambridge School contextualism and the 
method’s five analytical steps will structure the chapter. 
Step one of contextual analysis: the Bush Doctrine’s ideological and linguistic 
context 
The first step is concerned with examining the ideological and linguistic context 
of the Bush Doctrine in order to understand the point of his administration’s grand 
strategy. An ideology employs a language of politics defined by its conventions 
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Wiley, 2005). 
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and usually employed by a number of writers. Methodologically, this 
encompasses not just the use of specific lexical choices but also principles, 
assumptions, and criteria for testing knowledge-claims. In short, this is meant as 
an examination of the ideological context of the Bush presidency. This section 
will pay particular attention to the differing pre-9/11 stance of Governor, then 
President, Bush and the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine. 
Bush’s foreign-policy positions during the 2000 presidential campaign flowed 
from criticisms of Clinton during his presidency and from advice that Bush 
received from his team of foreign-policy experts.875 Bush argued for increased 
military spending and for the transformation and modernisation of America’s 
armed forces. He criticised the “open-ended deployments and unclear military 
missions”876 of the Clinton era and promised to be much more careful about 
considering the consequences of sending U.S. forces abroad.877 He also called for 
limited cuts in America’s military presence overseas, suggesting that, for 
example, U.S. peacekeepers in Bosnia could be brought home.878 
In many ways, Clinton’s grand strategy had continued the traditional Wilsonian 
approach of building a world order based on the rule of law. During his October 
2000 presidential debates with Al Gore, Bush underscored his scepticism 
regarding “nation-building missions.” He indicated that, if he had been president, 
he would not have intervened in Haiti or Somalia. Bush called for clear criteria for 
the use of force based on “vital national interests” rather than humanitarian 
objectives. He stated: “I would be guarded in my approach. I don’t think we can 
be all things to all people in the world. I think we’ve got to be very careful when 
we commit our troops.”879 This chimed with his earlier ‘Distinctly American 
Internationalism’ speech. 
                                                
875 The self-styled ‘Vulcans’ led by Condoleezza Rice. Rice was not a neoconservative herself but 
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In the defense of our nation, a president must be a clear-eyed realist. 
There are limits to the smiles and scowls of diplomacy. Armies and 
missiles are not stopped by stiff notes of condemnation. They are held 
in check by strength and purpose and the promise of swift 
punishment.880 
In contrast to this apparent realism, later in the speech Bush set in motion an 
important dynamic of his nascent foreign-policy thinking. He made explicit the 
centrality of ideology to the creation of grand strategy: 
Some have tried to pose a choice between American ideals and 
American interests – between who we are and how we act. But the 
choice is false. America, by decision and destiny, promotes political 
freedom – and gains the most when democracy advances . . . I will 
address these responsibilities . . . To each, I bring the same approach: 
A distinctly American internationalism. Idealism, without illusions. 
Confidence, without conceit. Realism, in the service of American 
ideals.881 
That Bush was a naïf in terms of foreign policy during his presidential campaign 
was not surprising: so too had Clinton been during his candidature. Nonetheless, 
Clinton had expressed his views with a degree of eloquence and coherence which 
the Texan governor did not match. This made deciphering Bush’s worldview 
difficult, largely because there were elements of realism but also of idealism. The 
philosophy was unremarkable in terms of what it posited as the goals of American 
international engagement: security, prosperity, freedom, and the advancement of 
democracy. What was distinctive was that it suggested that these goals should be 
pursued through the unilateral exercise of American power.882 
At the same time Governor Bush began to narrow his conception of the national 
interest, in contrast to Al Gore’s inheritance of an effectively Clintonesque 
foreign-policy platform. In the first presidential debate, when questioned about 
the appropriate use of force, Bush replied: 
Well, if it’s in our vital national interest, and that means whether our 
territory is threatened or people could be harmed, whether or not . . . 
our alliances are threatened, whether or not our friends in the Middle 
East are threatened. That would be a time to seriously consider the use 
of force . . . I don’t think we can be all things to all people in the 
world. I think we’ve got to be very careful when we commit our 
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troops. The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of 
troops. He believes in nation-building. I would be very careful about 
using our troops as nation builders . . . I believe we’ve overextended 
in too many places. And therefore I want to rebuild the military 
power.883 
Whilst Bush seemed to present himself as a realist and urged the prudent 
application of force only when a narrow set of vital interests were challenged, his 
final sentence was paradoxical. If he intended to reduce nation-building missions, 
why did he also advocate the shoring-up of military power? It was a theme which 
was asserted more vigorously in Bush’s inaugural address in January 2001: 
We will build our defenses beyond challenge, less weakness invite 
challenge . . . The enemies of liberty and our country should make no 
mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by 
choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom.884 
This last phrase reappeared in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United 
States,885 and the earlier usage in the inaugural address does not seem to have 
attracted as much scholarly attention. The superficial effect of the phrase was to 
suggest both affiliation with a realist strategic approach and continuity with 
American democracy promotion of supposedly universalist values; however, “the 
term does not really describe a ‘balance of power’ at all. Rather it is superficially 
Realist-sounding terminology for a decidedly liberal notion: the coalition of all 
major powers in furtherance of some notional common good.”886 However, the 
very concept of ‘shaping’ a balance of power suggested American primacy in an 
international order with shared values – in other words, not a balance of power at 
all. 
Despite the uneasy mixture of elements of realism and elements of profound 
idealism, Bush’s rhetoric in the presidential debates and during his pre-9/11 
presidency suggested a grand strategy that was more modest in terms of actual 
intervention than that of his predecessor. Condoleezza Rice, who was his principal 
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foreign-policy advisor at the time, reinforced this sense at the time, putting 
forward a more straightforwardly realist worldview for the Bush campaign. She 
echoed Bush’s more prominent campaign rhetoric when she suggested that the 
primary foreign-policy goal should be the promotion of “national interests” above 
all else.887 The rationale was that liberal humanitarian concerns would be of lower 
priority than considerations of U.S. national interest. Bush stated in the third 
presidential debate: “When it comes to foreign policy, that’ll be my guiding 
question: is it in our nation’s interests?”888 
Bush’s initial foreign-policy pronouncements and appointments reflected a split in 
Republican thought about U.S. foreign policy. At the time commentators usually 
expressed the split as between the ‘multilateralist’ position of Secretary of State 
Colin Powell and the ‘unilateralist’ position of Donald Rumsfeld and Dick 
Cheney.889 It is hard to understand the Bush speeches during the 2000 election as 
unfettered support for neoconservatism. That is certainly not how Bush was 
perceived by William Kristol and other prominent members of the Project for the 
New American Century (PNAC). Kristol felt “moderately unhappy” about the 
Bush/Cheney ticket throughout the election. Although Paul Wolfowitz had 
contributed to some of Bush’s campaign speeches, Kristol suggested “I wouldn’t 
say that if you read Wolfowitz’s Planning Guidance from 1992, and read most 
Bush campaign speeches and his statements in the debates, you would say, ‘Hey, 
Bush has really adopted Wolfowitz’s worldview’.”890 Speaking about Rice, 
Kristol asserted that “She was skeptical about a lot of these claims that the U.S. 
really had to shape a new world order . . . she was much more, I think, kind of a 
cautious realist than she is today.”891 
In a frequently quoted panegyric from 2001, Charles Krauthammer told his 
readers that 
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An unprecedentedly dominant United States . . . is in the unique 
position of being able to fashion its own foreign policy. . . . [T]he first 
task of the new administration is precisely to reassert American 
freedom of action.892 
For Krauthammer, U.S. unipolarity was a given, as it had equally been under 
Clinton. What the foreign-policy debate during the election of 2000 and the early 
months of the Bush presidency centred on was not whether the United States 
would engage in the world but how. 
Krauthammer’s brand of unilateralism found a home in the PNAC, formed in 
1997 to advance neoconservatism. The choice of their name seems less than 
accidental, echoing Henry Luce’s “American Century” fifty years earlier. Ronald 
Reagan was their hero and Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton were cast as opponents 
of U.S. hegemony.893 The PNAC advocated substantial increases in U.S. military 
spending, aggressive pursuit of U.S. interests, and support for U.S. hegemony. 
Reagan “Championed American exceptionalism when it was deeply 
unfashionable,”894 wrote the PNAC’s two founders, who suggested in the same 
article that the United States should seek to overturn dictators and that “The 
purpose was not Wilsonian idealistic whimsy . . . Support for American principles 
around the world can be sustained only by the continuing exertion of American 
influence.”895 George H. W. Bush joined Clinton as a subject of attack from the 
PNAC: “Republicans have spent the past few years attacking Clinton for his 
handling of Iraq, the Balkans, Haiti and Somalia,” Kagan said, “Yet every one of 
these was an unexploded Bush bomblet.” Bush’s greatest sin, in the view of 
PNAC, had been his failure to remove Saddam Hussein.896 
The signatories to the PNAC’s statement of principles represented a broad cross 
section of neo-conservatives,897 many of whom had held national security 
positions under either Reagan or George H. W. Bush. The group included Dick 
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Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld (Secretaries of Defense under the elder Bush and 
Gerald Ford respectively). 
As early as 1997, individuals who became key figures in the Bush administration 
– Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Armitage, John 
Bolton, Douglas Feith, and ‘Scooter’ Libby – had signed on to the vision of U.S. 
primacy laid out by William Kristol in “Project for a New American Century.”898 
The objectives were: 
(1) we need to increase defense spending significantly if we are to 
carry out our global responsibilities today and modernize our 
armed forces for the future; 
(2) we need to strengthen our ties to democratic allies and to challenge 
regimes hostile to our interests and values; 
(3) we need to promote the cause of political and economic freedom 
abroad. 
(4) we need to accept responsibility for America’s unique role in 
preserving and extending an international order friendly to our 
security, our prosperity, and our principles.899 
Some scholars have explicitly attempted to locate the birth of neoconservatism’s 
unipolarity in the 1990s with the PNAC.900 Yet the goal of achieving American 
predominance did not originate during the presidency of George H. W. Bush. 
It is important to examine the evolution of neoconservative thought to elucidate 
its complex relationship with the American liberal ideology in response to which 
neoconservatism was formed, otherwise neoconservative beliefs about foreign 
policy are open to misinterpretation. Neoconservatism emerged as a response to 
the rise of the ‘New Left’ in late 1960s and early 1970s America.901 It was a 
specific response to the loss of authority which neoconservatives believed the 
state had suffered at the hands of limitless demands for democratisation from the 
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Left. As Joshua Muravchik described it, “The left drove us from the Democratic 
Party, stole the ‘liberal’ label, and successfully affixed to us the name 
‘neoconservative’.”902 The point of tracing these roots is that it reveals 
neoconservatism not as ‘liberal conservatism’ but as a school of thought which is 
“is in fact ferociously predatory on liberal values – both in domestic and global 
politics.”903 In other words, neoconservatives are not the heirs of Wilson, and 
were not resorting to power politics to pursue a liberal agenda with the intention 
of deepening the normative fabric of global liberal order. In fact: 
neoconservative attachments to liberalism are predicated on an 
atavistic conservative philosophy which is at the service of values – 
authority, hierarchy, elitism, nationalism, community, sacrifice – that 
are inimical to the transformative mechanisms of liberal governance 
and the progressive discourse of democracy and human rights.904 
Instead, neoconservatives envisage democracy promotion as the establishment, by 
force, of a set of institutions and electoral mechanisms designed to transform the 
‘deficient’ political culture of the targeted states and to manufacture consent from 
above for “an externally imposed neoliberal-political-economic infrastructure.”905 
Democracy promotion here is “an identity conferring strategy of statecraft 
designed to make the international system safe for American hegemony in a world 
that is and will always be characterized by war, violence and geopolitical 
rivalry.”906 The type of ‘democracy’ promoted by neoconservatism is polyarchic, 
based on competing elites battling for the votes of a largely passive electorate.907 
The ‘top down’ basis of polyarchic democracy explains why it has not been 
successful when exported to other countries. Polyarchic democracy delegitimises 
the bottom-up struggle of civil society, removing the transformative potential of 
democracy and lacking legitimacy in the eyes of the people who are meant to be 
the beneficiaries. 
This distinction with Wilsonianism is key, because this type of understanding of 
neoconservatism and what neoconservatives mean by ‘democracy promotion’ 
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fundamentally alters any recreation of the Bush Doctrine as an ideological 
intervention in the discourse of exceptionalism. 
Neoconservatism had been a significant element in foreign-policy debate since the 
Nixon–Kissinger era of détente, but scholars of that era have overlooked its 
relevance because that era’s neoconservatives did not strongly influence foreign 
policy.908 It was in neoconservative critiques of détente that the ideological 
antecedents of the Bush Doctrine have their roots. Henry Jackson launched a 
multi-faceted attack on détente in which his most important points were, first, that 
détente downplayed the importance of human rights within the Soviet Union; and, 
second, that peace and security “depend not on a balance of power, but on a 
certain imbalance of power favourable to the defenders of peace – in which the 
strength of the peace keeper is greater than that of the peace upsetter.”909 This was 
a premise which resurfaced in the 1992 Defense Planning Guidance910 and 1993 
Regional Defense Strategy.911 The assumption was that stability was a product not 
of a constructed global balance of power but of the presence of a militarily 
preponderant power capable of halting the ambitions of both regional and global 
aggressors. Jackson’s ideas found considerable support in the pages of 
Commentary. Theodore Draper questioned whether it was actually the case “that 
the danger of war arises if one nation becomes infinitely more powerful than 
others?”912 Norman Podhoretz worried that the opening to China would allow 
America to “rely on the China card as an excuse for failing to build up our own 
power.”913 This latter view was still echoed by Paul Wolfowitz twenty years after 
Podhoretz.914 
George W. Bush’s administration included neoconservative policymakers, but the 
foreign-policy elite had included neoconservatives for at least several decades, as 
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this thesis has already illustrated. The presence of neoconservative ideas did not 
make their ultimate dominance in the post-9/11 Bush Doctrine inevitable and 
during the 1990s neoconservatism was in fact widely considered dead.915 
Justin Vaïsse has identified the mid-1990s as the beginning of the third age of 
neoconservatism. During this period, neoconservatives became a mainstream, 
albeit weak, part of the Republican party.916 Some third-age neoconservatives saw 
the promotion of democracy as inextricably linked to the containment of 
Communism and therefore saw a reduced role for U.S. involvement in post-Cold 
War international affairs.917 However, many third-age neoconservatives rejected 
this view as dangerously close to the type of realpolitik that had led to détente.918 
Ben Wattenberg spoke for them when he asked “Doesn’t the spread of democracy 
enhance our national interest? . . . As the last superpower we should try to shape 
evolution.”919 Elsewhere, Wattenberg referred to the United States as the “first 
universal nation.”920 For this group of neoconservatives the Cold War had been 
primarily ideological; the defence of American democracy had been 
containment’s central tenet. Similarly, in his 1991 book Exporting Democracy: 
Fulfilling America’s Destiny, Joshua Muravchik suggested that the way to create a 
“favorable environment” for the United States was to encourage the proliferation 
of democratic regimes because democratic peace theory had confirmed that the 
more democratic the world, the more peaceful.921 
Michael Ledeen’s Freedom Betrayed: How America Led a Global Democratic 
Revolution, Won the Cold War, and Walked Away appeared in 1996.922 
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Muravchik followed with The Imperative of American Leadership: A Challenge 
to Neo-Isolationism.923 Both books asserted that the United States had a special 
responsibility. The nation would betray its universalist values if it did not 
intervene, especially in the Balkans, to enforce respect for human rights, defend 
democracy, and shape the world in its own image. In his 1999 tract Tyranny’s 
Ally,924 David Wurmser pushed to the limit the idea of betrayal of U.S. values and 
complicity with dictatorial regimes. If the United States had the means to 
overthrow a tyrant – in this case, Saddam Hussein – and did not do so, it was an 
ally of tyranny. 
The immediate post-Cold War context of U.S. grand strategy was the debate 
about the new world order. The Clinton years had failed to decisively answer 
what America’s role in that order would be, and the debate still raged at the end of 
the 1990s. Charles Krauthammer spent most of the 1990s attacking Clinton, yet 
he enthused “America bestrides the world like a colossus.”925 Krauthammer 
expected this ‘unipolar moment’ of U.S. hegemony to last for at least a 
generation, although he warned that the laws of history, especially with respect to 
international politics, “cannot be defied forever.”926 
Krauthammer differed from other neoconservatives in recommending that the 
United States use military intervention to spread democracy only when vital U.S. 
interests were at stake.927 By his measure, U.S. military intervention in the 
Balkans had not met this criterion, whereas other neoconservatives had clamoured 
for such intervention in Bosnia and then Kosovo.928 For Krauthammer, it was fine 
to declare, as President George W. Bush had done, that the United States was 
prepared to put an end to tyranny everywhere, but the nation should act on that 
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intention only “where it counts”: in Krauthammer’s example, in Afghanistan and 
Iraq but not in Liberia or Burma.929 
In January 2000 Krauthammer espoused four strategic responsibilities for the next 
administration: (1) deter and disarm rogue nations that acquired weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD); (2) contain China; (3) guard against a revanchist Russia; and 
(4) maintain order as the ultimate guarantor of world stability. The United States 
was “the balancer of last resort in the world.”930 The nation required enormous 
resources to maintain its vast military might and must be ready at all times to put 
down rogue nations that no other country could subdue. 
In the 1990s Congress increasingly wished to exploit the ‘peace dividend’, 
whereas Cheney (then Secretary of Defense) and Wolfowitz (then Undersecretary 
of Defense for Policy) worried about cuts to the military and sought to define a 
military strategy for the post-Cold War period. In March 1992 the draft strategy 
Defense Planning Guidance was leaked to the press. This document had 
significant input from a wide range of neoconservative thinkers931 and stated that 
the United States should maintain clear military superiority in order to discourage 
any other nation from challenging U.S. world leadership. Although the document 
never became policy and the administration attempted to distance itself from the 
document, later versions showed only slightly more multilateral language. Cheney 
authorised a mildly modified version entitled Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The 
Regional Defense Strategy, in which strongly asserted hegemony nonetheless 
remained a prominent theme.932 
Defense Planning Guidance and Defense Strategy for the 1990s laid the 
groundwork for the neoconservative approach to the post-Cold War era. The goal 
was to prevent the emergence of a new rival comparable to the Soviet Union. To 
that end, the United States would seek to prevent any other nation from 
dominating any region. Cheney wrote, “Together with our allies, we must 
preclude hostile nondemocratic powers from dominating regions critical to our 
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interests and otherwise work to build an international environment conducive to 
our values,” a “peaceful democratic order in which nations are able to pursue their 
legitimate interests without fear of military domination.”933 According to Cheney, 
the United States could not depend solely on collective approaches to 
international security. The nation would have to maintain the forces necessary to 
act alone. Furthermore, “history suggests that effective multilateral action is most 
likely to come about in response to U.S. leadership, not as an alternative to it.”934 
In short, whenever the international community was divided the United States 
would have to take the lead and its allies eventually would follow, more often in 
the form of ad hoc coalitions than through the UN. 
In the late 1990s Barry Posen and Andrew Ross sketched the four alternative 
approaches to U.S. grand strategy which had the most support at the time:935 neo-
isolationism, selective engagement focused on maintaining peace, multilateralism, 
and maintenance of U.S. primacy.936 A small band proposed the neo-isolationist 
approach, but most of them avoided the term isolationism. Earl Ravenal and 
Patrick Buchanan preferred the term disengagement,937 and Doug Bandow used 
benign detachment.938 Only Eric Nordlinger embraced the term isolationism.939 
Proponents of neo-isolationism advocated drastic reductions in the military 
budget. The version of realism that underlay neo-isolationism had a very limited 
strategic imperative at its core, based on the assumption that no country had the 
power to threaten U.S. sovereignty. 
Proponents of selective engagement focused on maintaining peace among the 
nations with the most military and industrial power.940 During the 1990s only 
China, Russia, Japan, and the European Union seemed capable of altering the 
international order. According to advocates of peace-focused selective 
engagement, the United States should concern itself with regional conflicts only if 
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they threatened the global equilibrium. Although this strategy would require a 
substantial military budget, expenditures would be less than during the Cold War. 
The greatest challenge to those who advocated this strategy was ‘mission creep’ – 
the danger that the strategy would become one of primacy.941 
Advocates of multilateralism (cooperative security) believed that peace was 
effectively indivisible.942 Therefore, the United States had a significant national 
interest in world peace and would act collectively through international 
institutions as much as possible.943 Proponents of this view saw all nations as 
interdependent. At the root of this interdependent world was a chain of logic 
which connected the security of the U.S. and its more traditional allies to a host of 
distant troubles; thus those distant troubles could not be ignored by the U.S.944 
Proponents of a strategy centred on U.S. primacy focused on preventing the rise 
of a peer power and maintaining U.S. hegemony by convincing other powers of 
the purity of America’s intentions. As set forth in Defense Planning Guidance, in 
this strategy the United States would seek to prevent the rise of challengers by 
promoting international law, democracy, and free-market economics and 
preventing the emergence of regional hegemons. 
President Clinton had seemed to opt for multilateralism at the beginning of his 
first term but then had shifted to a mix of selective engagement and primacy.945 
The administration of the second President Bush made its distrust of nation-
building and humanitarian intervention abundantly clear. The George W. Bush 
foreign-policy team wanted U.S. national-security policy to focus on great-power 
politics and concrete national interests. The administration’s emphasis on the 
selective use of force, the balancing of strategic commitments and military 
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capability, and the avoidance of international social engineering was especially 
visible in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001,946 which prioritised homeland 
security and deterrence.947 The administration did not embrace a policy of rolling 
back rogue nations and, as in the case of Iraq, took no aggressive action against 
them. In 1999 Richard Haass articulated the then-dominance of foreign-policy 
pragmatism when he wrote, “Order is more fundamental than justice.”948 Bush 
appointees such as Powell, Rice, and Haass were openly sceptical of any sort of 
crusading idealism in foreign affairs.949 
Step two of contextual analysis: Bush’s ideological manoeuvre as a political 
manoeuvre 
The second step is concerned with identifying Bush’s ideological manoeuvre as a 
political manoeuvre. This step seeks to place the Bush Doctrine in its practical 
political context – that is, the practical political activity that the authors were 
addressing and to which the strategy was a response. 
As the previous section showed, before 9/11 Bush had laid out his vision of 
American values but the administration did not have a coherent grand strategy; 
“ABC” or “anything but Clinton”950 was the guiding mantra and Bush’s foreign 
policy was cast in the broadest terms: the administration supported freedom, free 
trade, and a strong defence. 
At the start of Bush’s presidency the administration had no clear criteria for 
investing political capital in foreign affairs. In the first eight months of Bush’s 
presidency the White House indicated that it did not wish to continue business as 
usual with North Korea and in the Middle East but failed to provide a good 
alternative, creating a policy vacuum and receiving criticism from all sides.951 
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Bush had pitched his foreign policy and defence principles in terms of strong 
values, but he had also called for a humble tone and attitude. In his inaugural 
address of January 2001 he stated: “We will seek defenses beyond challenges, we 
will confront weapons of mass destruction [and] shape a balance of power that 
favors freedom.” He also stated, however: “We will show purpose without 
arrogance.”952 The latter theme had often appeared in Bush’s campaign speeches, 
in which Bush had spoken of “power exercised without swagger and influence 
displayed without bluster.”953 By spring 2000 such words were largely forgotten: 
America’s European allies were already complaining of feeling “bullied”954 and 
Democrats picked up on this refrain, calling Bush “unilateralist.”955 
The events of 9/11 marked a clear shift in Bush’s strategy and linguistic 
constructions. Within hours of learning of the attacks on the World Trade Center, 
Bush declared to his aides, “We’re at war.”956 Given how little information he had 
at that point, his conclusion seemed rushed. Later the same day, as he was flying 
above the burning Pentagon, Bush said, “That’s the 21st-century war you have 
just witnessed.”957 
The differences that had divided the United States from its allies before 9/11 gave 
way to widespread solidarity and support. A 13 September editorial in the Left-
leaning French newspaper Le Monde declared, “Nous sommes tous Américains” 
(“We are all Americans now”).958 Bush and his advisors interpreted the 
international outpouring of sympathy as a mark that, as much as other countries 
might dislike specific U.S. policies, they understood that the United States was a 
just and beneficent power.959 It was an unusual interpretation; international 
support was perhaps best symbolised by the first invocation of article 5 of the 
                                                
952 Bush, “Inaugural Address.” 
953 Bush, “A Period of Consequences.” 
954 Evan Thomas and Roy Guttman, “See George. See George Learn Foreign Policy,” Newsweek, 
18 June 2001, 2l; Carla Anne Robbins, “Allies at Odds: Behind U.S. Rift with Europeans,” Wall 
Street Journal, 27 March 2003, 1. 
955 Roger Cohen, “America the Roughneck (Through Europe’s Eyes),” New York Times, 7 May 
2001, A6. 
956 George W. Bush, quoted in Bill Sammon, Fighting Back: The War on Terrorism from inside 
the Bush White House (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Pub., 2002), 94. 
957 Ibid., 128. 
958 “Nous Sommes Tous Américains.” Le Monde, 13 September 2001, 1. 
959 Daalder and Lindsay, America Unbound, 79. 
 227 
North Atlantic treaty, to come to the defence of fellow members under attack, not 
to give blessing to ad hoc, U.S.-led intervention. 
In his 9/11 Oval Office address Bush declared “We will make no distinction 
between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them,”960 
and yet he had not yet decided what concrete action to take and which countries to 
tackle first.961 In his 14 September speech in the National Cathedral he reached 
out to Muslim Americans, and even liberal commentators expressed amazement at 
his “Islamophilia.”962 Apparently, Bush realised that impugning or implicating 
Islam might lead to a “clash of civilizations.” Instead, he placed 9/11 within a 
larger ideological context: “Just three days removed from these events, Americans 
do not yet have the distance of history. But our responsibility to history is already 
clear; to answer these attacks and rid the world of evil.”963 In so doing Bush 
depicted the conflict as not between competing interests or perspectives but 
between good and evil. On 16 September he went so far as to call the war on 
terrorism a “crusade.”964 By presenting the conflict in terms of moral absolutes, 
Bush indicated what would be the overall thrust of U.S. foreign policy, even if 
specific objectives remained as yet unclear. 
Bush was quick to draw up specific responses to 9/11, and by 16 September he 
gave Rice a point-by-point “war plan.”965 He endorsed the role of the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) as proposed by its director, George Tenet, and 
approved domestic surveillance, urging the Pentagon to support the CIA in order 
to “hit with all military options.”966 He also ordered a specific ultimatum to the 
Taliban: to relinquish Osama Bin Laden or face military action.967 The next day, 
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he reconsidered military action in Iraq and discussed the issue with the full 
National Security Council. Bush knew that Wolfowitz favoured removing 
Saddam Hussein, but nonetheless stated “We have to be patient about Iraq.”968 
Before 9/11, many critics in the United States and Europe had called Bush’s 
foreign policy “unnerving unilateralism.”969 After the attacks, some thought he 
had suddenly converted to multilateralism. On 19 September Bush prophetically 
commented, “Two years from now only the Brits may be with us.”970 In reality, 
both before and after 9/11, Bush’s idea of international cooperation was a 
coalition of like-minded nations pursuing specific values and interests. As 
expressed by Rumsfeld, “The mission must determine the coalition, and the 
coalition must not determine the mission.”971 Despite the UN resolution 
condemning the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks and NATO’s invocation of 
Article 5, the United States largely rejected offers of help from its allies, with the 
notable exceptions of the United Kingdom and Australia with respect to waging 
the Afghanistan War. 
Within three weeks the Bush presidency had turned from a domestic focus to a 
focus on a global war against terrorism. In December 2001 Bush announced that 
the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty. The White House 
blocked international efforts to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention. In 
additon, throughout 2002 the Bush administration intensified its campaign to 
block the International Criminal Court from having jurisdiction over U.S. citizens. 
When Bush spoke at the Citadel on 11 December 2001 he stated that “a few evil 
men”972 intended to use WMD to threaten civilisation. “Our military has a new 
and essential mission,”973 he said. “For states that support terror, it’s not enough 
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that the consequences be costly – they must be devastating.”974 In his State of the 
Union address in January 2002 he made clear the fundamental political reordering 
that his emerging doctrine would advance.975 He used the speech to reset the 
boundaries of U.S. grand strategy. Conceptually and linguistically, Bush moved 
the target from the sponsors of terrorism to the sponsors of the next weapons of 
terrorism. The new strategy became preventing these weapons from coming into 
terrorist hands, and the idea of pre-emption flowed from the idea of prevention. 
This was a critical turning point and, after the Taliban refused to hand over Bin 
Laden, the Bush administration launched military action in Afghanistan. This step 
indicated a more aggressive approach to counterterrorism than under Clinton, but 
it had broad public support, congressional backing, and extensive international 
support.976 Given that the Taliban had supported the orchestrators of the worst 
terrorist attack in U.S. history and then refused to hand them over, the U.S. 
response was predictable. 
Within the United States the war in Afghanistan was initially viewed as a major 
success after the swift transfer of control to the International Security Assistance 
Force in December 2001. The war did not trigger immediate public debate over 
the basic outlines of U.S. grand strategy. However, the question remained: How 
will overall U.S. national-security policy be reshaped in response to 9/11? The 
available options were basically the same as they had been since the end of the 
Cold War.977 The United States could completely disengage from its alliances and 
military deployments overseas; deepen its commitment to multilateralism; 
prioritise its vital interests, playing down democracy promotion; or adopt an 
aggressive form of U.S. primacy. As Bush’s Citadel and State of the Union 
speeches made clear, Bush saw the conflict with a personal moral clarity and he 
translated that purpose into strategy. America’s military posture would now be 
offensive. 
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Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union Address caused major controversy. In it, 
he named the three countries that he regarded as forming an “axis of evil” that 
was “threatening the peace of the world”: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.978 Some 
European commentators dismissed Bush’s moral stance as evidence of his 
“relative ignorance” of the outside world.979 Originally, Bush’s speechwriter, 
David Frum, wrote “axis of hatred”, not “axis of evil”, and it seems unlikely that 
Bush or his advisors anticipated that “axis of evil” would become the speech’s 
hallmark.980 After all, Bush regularly used the word evil. Nor was the meaning of 
‘axis’ clear. To Frum, the term drew an analogy between the former threat of the 
Second World War Axis powers (Japan, Nazi Germany, and fascist Italy) and the 
current threat of the anti-American nations of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea; it was 
not intended to suggest homogeneity of issues.981 However, Press Secretary Ari 
Fleischer asserted that Bush had intended “no comparison” to the Axis powers of 
the Second World War. According to Fleischer, the use of the term axis was more 
“rhetorical than historical.”982 Bush seldom repeated the phrase “axis of evil”, as 
the press focus on it had obscured the speech’s actual declaration of strategy: “I 
will not wait on events. . . . I will not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes 
to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”983 
The scale of Bush’s political act was substantial; in the second part of the address, 
he tried to recast the entire economic and domestic debate in terms of the new 
national-security environment. Bush linked the war on terrorism to what he 
termed “economic security”984 and ended the address with talk of values, extolling 
the volunteerism and self-sacrifice that people had demonstrated in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks as showing “what a new culture of responsibility could look 
like.”985 Bush added to his “new culture of responsibility” seven global and “non-
negotiable demands of human dignity,” including respect for women and religious 
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tolerance.986 With a rhetorical flourish worthy of his idol, Abraham Lincoln, Bush 
announced his political programme: “Steadfast in our purpose, we now press on. 
We have known freedom’s price, we have shown freedom’s power [and] we will 
see freedom’s victory.”987 
Step three of contextual analysis: the Bush Doctrine as an ideological move 
Step three of Skinnerian contextual analysis involves identifying ideologies and 
examining how they form, are criticised, and change. In this chapter, step three 
will consist of an analysis of the Bush Doctrine as an ideological move, 
discussing the degree to which Bush’s international strategy was conventional and 
the nature of its ideological innovation, if any. The analysis will identify the point 
at which ideological reinforcement or change was attempted and the political 
reasons for the attempt. 
The Bush Doctrine took some time to take definitive form and as a result 
Krauthammer was hasty in characterising the Bush Doctrine as “soft 
unilateralism.”988 After 9/11, the Bush administration determined that U.S. 
strategy should not distinguish between terrorists and the nations that harboured 
them. Still later, the administration saw U.S. strategy as focused on pre-emptive 
war or regime change. Ultimately, the Bush Doctrine was based on using U.S. 
power to promote a specific form of democracy in the Middle East in order to 
bring stability to the region.989 
This section will examine Krauthammer’s assertion that the “The Bush doctrine 
is, essentially a synonym for neoconservative foreign policy”990 and, in doing so, 
will extract the underlying elements of the Bush Doctrine and identify it as an 
ideological move. 
The Bush Doctrine’s first ostensible pillar was the belief that democratic regimes 
do not seek war. Therefore, promoting democracy could potentially bring about 
international stability. In 2002 Bush stated “Free societies do not intimidate 
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through cruelty and conquest, and open societies do not threaten the world with 
mass murder.”991 The next year he similarly stated “The world has a clear interest 
in the spread of democratic values because stable and free nations do not breed the 
ideologies of murder.”992 
John Mearsheimer described the neoconservative Bush Doctrine as 
“Wilsonianism with teeth” because “the theory has an idealist strand and a power 
strand: Wilsonianism provides the idealism, an emphasis on military power 
provides the teeth.”993 The belief that the spread of liberal values and democratic 
institutions abroad advanced America’s economic and security interests had a 
long pedigree and had last been prominent during the Clinton presidency.994 
However, as this chapter has already asserted, the link between Wilsonianism and 
neoconservatism is inaccurate and gives an incorrect sense of neoconservative 
foreign-policy aims. Whilst neoconservatives repeatedly and forcefully called for 
democracy promotion, their vision of democracy was polyarchic. At heart 
neoconservatism was a domestic critique of American democracy’s ‘betrayal’ by 
liberalism in the 1960s. The neoconservative response was in part to adopt a 
Schumpterian model of polyarchic democracy995 and repackage what was 
essentially an authoritarian European model of government “in order to make it 
palatable to an American audience.”996 Ronald Reagan, however, fused this notion 
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of the promotion of an authoritarian form of democracy abroad with the American 
exceptionalist tradition.997 
In its embrace with neoconservatism, the Bush Doctrine encompassed a particular 
and novel notion of polyarchic democracy and emphasised its promotion in U.S. 
exceptionalist discourse. This gave comments such as Krauthammer’s a particular 
meaning: “With the decline of communism, the advancement of democracy 
should become the touchstone of a new ideological American foreign policy.”998 
Although neoconservatives such as Francis Fukuyama had seemed to assume a 
steady and irreversible march toward democracy in the early 1990s, Bush was 
much more proactive about the spread of democracy. In suggesting that the mere 
existence of antipathetic regimes threatened the United States, the Bush Doctrine 
echoed NSC-68. 
The Iraq War illustrated Bush’s line of reasoning. If the Middle East became 
democratic, America’s security problem in the region, terrorism, and the 
proliferation of WMD would ultimately stop. Hence, it was essential to transform 
the Middle East. Regime change in Iraq would start a chain reaction. Bush stated: 
“A new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of 
freedom for other nations in the region.”999 
In his preface to the 2002 Strategy of the United States of America, Bush espoused 
the universal applicability of American values: 
The great struggles of the twentieth century between liberty and 
totalitarianism ended with a decisive victory for the forces of freedom 
– and a single sustainable model for national success: freedom, 
democracy, and free enterprise. . . . [The] values of freedom are right 
and true for every person, in every society.1000 
The belief in a universal desire for freedom was not new to U.S. grand strategy or 
to President Bush. In his inaugural address Bush had stated “Democratic faith is 
more than the creed of our country, it is the inborn hope of our humanity, an ideal 
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we carry, . . . a trust we bear and pass along.”1001 After 9/11, Bush became more 
certain of America’s proselytising role and it translated into his rhetoric: “Liberty 
and justice . . . are right and true and unchanging for all people everywhere.”1002 
Although Bush was at pains to avoid cultural imperialism, he vowed to “stand 
firm for the non-negotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law, limits on 
the power of the state; respect for women; private property; free speech; equal 
justice; and religious tolerance.”1003 The language makes clear that Bush regarded 
these values as universal. Therefore, in his view Americans were not imposing 
their values but helping other peoples realise their thymotic impulse. 
Neoconservativism was not concerned with spreading ‘universal values’ for their 
own sake but in order to guarantee U.S. security. 
The view that the spread of democracy must be a feature of U.S. grand strategy 
had not been so forcefully expressed since NSC-68. Bush lamented his belief that 
“sixty years of Western nations excusing and accommodating the lack of freedom 
in the Middle East”1004 had allowed authoritarian regimes to survive and 
ultimately given rise to terrorism: 
Some who call themselves realists question whether the spread of 
democracy in the Middle East should be any concern of ours. But the 
realists in this case have lost contact with a fundamental reality: 
America has always been less secure when freedom is in retreat; 
America is always more secure when freedom is on the march.1005 
The purpose of the spread of ‘democracy’ could not be any clearer; the Bush 
Doctrine was based on the notion that the United States was the sole superpower 
and should seek to preserve its hegemony indefinitely and this was in part based 
upon the spread of a particular version of democracy. In a West Point speech of 
June 2002 Bush stated “America has and intends to keep, military strength beyond 
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challenge – thereby making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, 
and limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.”1006 
The National Security Strategy built upon this conception of hegemonic stability. 
The strategy declared that Americans “must build and maintain our defenses 
beyond challenge,”1007 and also stated that “Our forces will be strong enough to 
dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of 
surpassing, or equalling, the power of the United States.”1008 
Third-age neoconservatives viewed U.S. omnipotence and leadership as a 
prerequisite for an orderly, peaceful world. William Kristol and Robert Kagan 
stated “American hegemony is the only reliable defense against a breakdown of 
peace and international order.”1009 In other words, a preponderance of American 
power was viewed by neoconservatives as beneficial to both the United States and 
the rest of the world and, according to Robert Jervis, a commitment to U.S. 
primacy was the unifying theme of all elements of the Bush Doctrine.1010 As this 
chapter has shown, this theme was present in neoconservative thought long before 
Bush became president; his innovation was to fuse American preponderance with 
a specific form of democracy promotion in a mutually reinforcing pattern and to 
do so within exceptionalist discourse. 
In advocating U.S. hegemony, neoconservatives expressed their antipathy to 
traditional balance-of-power politics. They viewed a U.S.-led hegemonic order as 
superior to a balance-of-power order. Whereas many realists view a balance of 
power as a prescription for peace, neoconservatives view it as an unnecessary 
hindrance to U.S. interests.1011 
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Mearsheimer argues that the underlying logic of neoconservatism is 
“bandwagoning.”1012 According to this logic, weaker nations join forces with a 
more powerful one rather than attempt to check its power. In this view, American 
power is a force for democratisation that will be universally supported by nations 
able to provide support. As expressed by Michael Williams, “Bandwagoning, in 
this sense, is seen as a moral–political process as well as a military–strategic 
calculation.”1013 
The Bush Doctrine was committed to using preemptive military force when 
necessary. This aspect of the doctrine was one of the most controversial. Most of 
the voluminous literature on the subject argues for or against pre-emption.1014 It 
does not examine why the Bush administration elevated pre-emption (which had 
always been an option for the United States) to doctrinal status after 9/11. As 
Jonathan Renshon comments, “The core of this issue is why this policy, and why 
now?”1015 A related question is “Why did the Bush administration define 
preemption as it did?” 
The Bush administration did not need a formal definition of pre-emption to drive 
home the point that the nexus between WMD, rogue nations, and terrorists posed 
the greatest threat to U.S. national security. As the Clinton administration had 
done, the Bush administration could have reserved pre-emption for rogue nations 
without highlighting that policy. The Bush administration also could have 
reserved pre-emption for rare situations in which inaction posed a credible risk of 
large, irreversible harm and other policy tools offered a poor prospect of success. 
In fact, pre-emption fitted with neoconservative ideology. Pre-emption in the 
Bush Doctrine can be viewed as an exercise in compelling rogue nations to 
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behave in accordance with U.S. policy objectives and thus in furthering American 
security interests. By highlighting pre-emption, the administration explicitly 
warned rogue nations of the consequences of pursuing WMD and ties to 
terrorism. Secretary of State Powell stated that the purpose of pre-emption was 
“putting the leaders of [some] countries on notice that the potential costs of their 
opportunism had just gone way up.”1016 
Launching the war in Iraq was central to this use of pre-emption. The war would 
give credibility to the threat of pre-emptive action against other nations believed 
to have WMD. For military and political reasons, the United States could not use 
force against Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. The invasion of Iraq signalled a new 
American will commensurate with the nation’s renewed military capacity. In the 
late 1990s many in Washington, including those within the Bush administration, 
believed that U.S. credibility had significantly weakened since the end of the Cold 
War despite the country’s political and military dominance.1017 After 9/11, issuing 
threats and making limited use of military power was perceived to merely 
continue the Clinton administration’s policies. The preservation of U.S. primacy 
required both actual and perceived military strength. Thus, the logic of primacy 
lay behind the Bush Doctrine’s formulation of pre-emption. In addition to 
promoting deterrence, pre-emption reflected the neoconservative worldview. 
The Bush Doctrine was clearly unilateralist. A commitment to pre-emption and to 
maintaining a unipolar international system is unilateralist to the core. It is 
extremely difficult to obtain a consensus on the pre-emptive use of force. Indeed, 
the UN Security Council would not authorise U.S. military action against Iraq. 
Neoconservatives had criticised not only President Clinton’s failure to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power but also his multilateral approach to foreign 
policy.1018 According to neoconservatives, a nation with primacy has the option of 
acting unilaterally. 
The Bush Doctrine did not treat international cooperation as inherently desirable. 
The Bush administration disregarded the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto 
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Protocol, and other treaties, and apparently shared neorealist scepticism that 
international institutions and treaties could reliably deliver security.1019 The Bush 
administration’s view of international cooperation was by no means ideologically 
innovative; it was consistent with much U.S. foreign-policy history. As expressed 
by John Lewis Gaddis, a ‘unilateralist turn’ after the Cold War and 9/11 “reflects 
a return to an old position not the emergence of a new one.”1020 
The neoconservative position was most distinctive with respect to the implications 
of U.S. primacy. To many neoconservatives, U.S. primacy signified a 
responsibility to intervene in humanitarian crises, especially genocide. Compared 
to liberal-institutionalists, neoconservatives tended to be quicker to endorse 
forceful intervention (if possible, multilateral intervention), especially when 
international institutions seemed ineffective.1021 
This section has identified the ideological components of the Bush Doctrine and 
demonstrated its roots in neoconservative thought. The doctrine included a strong 
ideological vein of nationalism. Indeed, neoconservatism appeals to what Walter 
Lippmann identified as the “persistent evangel in Americanism.”1022 This 
evangelism appears in Bush’s contention that the United States represents the 
“single sustainable model for national success: freedom, democracy, and free 
enterprise.”1023 In this view, promotion of democracy is inextricably linked to 
U.S. identity. Bush stated as much in his speech at the 2004 Republican National 
Convention: “Our nation’s founding commitment is still our deepest commitment: 
In our world, and here at home, we will extend the frontiers of freedom.”1024 Bush 
insisted that “the United States is the beacon for freedom in the world” and that he 
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had “a responsibility to promote freedom that is as solemn as the responsibility [to 
protect] the American people, because the two go hand in hand.”1025 
Step four: the Bush Doctrine and the alteration of political vocabulary 
Step four of Skinnerian contextual analysis addresses the question ‘What relation 
between political ideology and political action best explains the diffusion of 
certain ideologies, and what effect does this have on political behaviour?’ As 
discussed in previous chapters, political vocabulary includes normative terms that 
may be altered to advance a political agenda. 
In his preface to the 2002 National Security Strategy Bush specified three goals of 
his administration: “We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists 
and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the 
great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on 
every continent.”1026 In comparison, the three goals that the Clinton 
administration put forth in the 1999 National Security Strategy were “To enhance 
America’s security. To bolster America’s economic prosperity. To promote 
democracy and human rights abroad.”1027 Whereas the Bush objectives involved 
defending, preserving, and extending peace, the Clinton objectives were based on 
the premise of peace. Unlike the Bush administration, the Clinton administration 
did not explicitly call for cooperation amongst great powers. The Bush 
administration’s language of “encouraging” democratic societies “on every 
continent” was considerably more forceful than the Clinton administration’s 
language of “promoting” democracy and human rights “abroad.”1028 
In an innovative move that was surely a response to 9/11, the Bush document 
equated terrorists with tyrants as sources of danger. The document noted that U.S. 
strategy in the past had concentrated on defence against tyrants. The Cold War 
strategies of containment and deterrence had assumed a threat from identifiable 
regimes operating from identifiable territories. The threat of terrorism could not 
be similarly located. The events of 9/11 had shown that terrorists could inflict a 
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level of destruction that only nations wielding conventional military power had 
previously achieved. The document stated “Today, our enemies see weapons of 
mass destruction as weapons of choice.”1029 For the Bush administration, terrorists 
and tyrants were comparable in their ability to inflict mass destruction. The logic 
of the document suggests that this was why the option of pre-emption had to be 
added to those of containment and deterrence. However, the final section 
suggested that deterrence was also an implicit strategic consideration in the Bush 
Doctrine. 
In the 2002 National Security Strategy the White House was careful to specify a 
legal basis for pre-emption: international law recognised that “nations need not 
suffer an attack before they can lawfully take action to defend themselves against 
forces that present an imminent danger of attack.”1030 The administration argued 
that terrorism, rogue nations, and WMD required a new response, the use of 
preventive force. Deterrence and containment had sufficed during the Cold War, 
but they were unsuitable against enemies without territory or people to defend: 
Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no 
longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The 
inability to deter a potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s 
threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by 
our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We 
cannot let our enemies strike first. . . . Traditional concepts of 
deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed 
tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose 
so-called soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent 
protection is statelessness. The overlap between states that sponsor 
terror and those that pursue WMD compels us to action. . . . [T]he 
United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.1031 
Although the document repeatedly referred to “preemption” it actually made a 
case for preventive action, which is very different with regard to imminence.1032 If 
the United States took action against a hostile nation that had just pointed missiles 
at it and was clearly about to attack, the U.S. action would be pre-emptive. In 
contrast, if the United States took action against a nation that was considered 
hostile, was building its military, and might or might not direct force against the 
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United States at some future date, the U.S. action would be preventive. The 
threshold for preventive action is much higher than for pre-emptive action.1033 
The Bush National Security Strategy, however, conflated pre-emption and 
prevention: 
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the 
legitimacy of preemption on the existence of an imminent threat – 
most often a visible mobilization of armies, navies, and air forces 
preparing to attack. We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to 
the capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.1034 
The document indicated that pre-emptive action did not require imminent threat. 
Instead of being defined in terms of imminence (i.e., specificity and certainty), 
threat was defined mainly in terms of potential, the adversary’s capabilities, and 
its hostile attitude. The Bush National Security and Strategy stated: 
We must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and 
objectives of today’s adversaries. . . . The greater the threat, the 
greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for 
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack.1035 
The Bush Doctrine reset the theoretical baseline for pre-emptive military action 
but did not offer clear criteria for actually engaging in such action.1036 Although 
both ‘preemption’ and ‘prevention’ appeared throughout the document, they were 
not used interchangeably. In the course of the document, ‘preemption’ was 
gradually detached from the justificatory context of international law and 
normalised. This was an unusual step to take. In the past, the United States had 
sometimes strongly considered or even used pre-emptive action. For example, in 
1994 the Clinton administration had considered pre-emptive strikes against North 
Korea’s uranium-enrichment facilities,1037 and in 1998 it had struck what it 
believed to be a chemical weapons plant in Sudan. However, no administration 
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before the Bush presidency had publicly highlighted pre-emption. Through The 
National Security Strategy and presidential speeches, the administration presented 
pre-emption as a crucial strategic option in the ‘war on terror’. Despite this, 
Elainne Bunn suggested that “Pre-emption is not a new option. U.S. officials have 
contemplated preemptive military actions against WMD several times, usually 
without taking action. What is new is open discussion of pre-emption.”1038 In fact, 
from its earliest days the United States had been loathe to strike the first blow or 
be seen as an aggressor. Pre-emption had always been an option but previously 
only in the most circumscribed situations. 
Publication of The National Security Strategy coincided with the Bush 
administration’s campaign to secure public and congressional support for a war 
against Iraq. Iraq became the Bush Doctrine’s first test case. The administration 
explicitly portrayed Iraq as an imminent threat. Bush stated: 
We have experienced the horror of September 11. We have seen that 
those who hate America are willing to crash airplanes into buildings 
full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no less willing – in fact 
they would be eager – to use biological, or chemical, or a nuclear 
weapon. Knowing these realities, America must not ignore the threat 
gathering against us. Facing clear evidence of peril, we cannot wait 
for the final proof – the smoking gun – that could come in the form of 
a mushroom cloud.1039 
Such language was familiar to readers of national-security documents but was 
now used to support a novel strategic posture. With regard to the policy of pre-
emption, neoconservatives employed imprecise language which increased the 
range of the policy’s potential threat. Undersecretary of State Bolton said that he 
hoped “the outcome in Iraq” would “cause other states in the region and indeed 
around the world to look at the consequences of pursuing WMD and draw the 
appropriate lesson that such pursuits are not in the long term national interest.”1040 
Pre-emption required hegemony. In his preface to The National Security Strategy 
Bush referred to “a balance of power that favors human freedom,” which was an 
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oxymoron, and the forsaking of “unilateral advantage,”1041 but the document’s 
main thrust was clear: “Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential 
adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hope of surpassing, or equalling, 
the power of the United States.”1042 Bush’s West Point speech put it more bluntly: 
“America has, and intends to keep, military strength beyond challenge.”1043 
Bush’s foreign-policy approach was more proactive than Clinton’s. According to 
the Clinton administration, because movement toward democracy and market 
economics had become irreversible the United States need engage with the rest of 
the world only to expedite this movement. The Bush administration rejected that 
view and reshaped the discourse of national security so that pre-emption became 
simply another overt tool of preponderance. 
Step five of contextual analysis: a neoconservative future? 
The final concluding step is an explanation of how ideological change comes to 
be woven into ways of acting, how it comes to be convention or, indeed, how it 
fails to become conventional. This is a step with which the neoconservatives 
themselves would be acutely concerned because ideological struggle is the most 
important component of “the key question, who owns the future?”1044 Certainly, 
the two-term presidency of George W. Bush can be viewed as the victorious 
culmination of nearly forty years of neoconservative ideological and grand 
strategic struggle. 
The revised conception of pre-emption presented in the 2002 National Security 
Strategy recalled the transition advocated at the end of the Cold War from a 
‘threats based’ to a ‘capabilities based’ approach to national security.1045 Whereas 
a threats-based approach focuses on specific military threats posed by a clearly 
identifiable enemy, a capabilities-based approach focuses on developing the 
resources needed to “defeat any conceivable type of attack mounted by any 
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imaginary adversary at any point in time.”1046 This was an unprecedented strategic 
posture to adopt, based purely on a novel ideological conception of the world. The 
two strategy documents that codified and elaborated this approach – the 1992 
draft Defense Planning Guidance and the less strident Defense Strategy for the 
1990s – can be seen as statements of neoconservative ideological intent. 
The draft Defense Planning Guidance declared an unadulterated preventive 
posture, stating that the first “objective” of U.S. policy was to “prevent the re-
emergence of a new rival . . . that poses a threat on the order of that posed 
formerly by the Soviet Union.”1047 The strategy that emerged was centred on 
competitors’ capabilities and aspirations, on potential rather than imminent threats 
to the United States. 
This line of logic extended to the 2002 National Security Strategy, and the Bush 
Doctrine was predicated on a similar construal of the post-Cold War security 
environment and its implications for security policy. The key theme of the 2002 
National Security Strategy was a radically new security environment which 
presented both new danger and also an opportunity for “translating this moment 
of influence” so that America could continue “defending and preserving the 
peace.”1048 This themes suggested a particualr logic of world order: national-
security policy should preserve U.S. pre-eminence, which would enable a just 
peace. 
Conclusion 
As this chapter has demonstrated, a refashioned vision of American 
exceptionalism lay at the heart of the Bush Doctrine. Read proleptically (or 
perhaps, put more simply, with the ‘benefit’ of hindsight) it is very easy to 
misread exactly what the ideological and strategic revolution of the second Bush 
presidency meant. As this chapter has shown, a great many commentators confuse 
the true nature of neoconservatism and with it the Bush Doctrine because they 
misinterpret the nature of democracy within neoconservative thought. It is an easy 
mistake to make, as so much neoconservative writing emphasises the spread of 
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democracy; indeed, neoconservatism “thrives on this muddled [American] 
ideological terrain.”1049 However, the problem with such readings is that it 
overstates the line of continuity between neoconservative thought and more 
familiar Wilsonian democracy. When read contextually or ‘forward’ from its roots 
in the late 1960s, neoconservatism’s concern with American liberal thought and 
antipathy towards realism becomes much clearer and provides a very different 
understanding of the ideological importance of the Bush Doctrine. 
Writing in 1996, William Kristol and Robert Kagan observed “Without a broad, 
sustaining foreign-policy vision, the American people will be inclined to 
withdraw from the world.”1050 For neoconservatives the creation of such a vision 
or ‘purpose’ was at the heart of their ideological project; as Michael Williams puts 
it, “the inability to formulate a socially compelling vision of the national interest 
is a mark of degeneration.”1051 Neoconservatism had been formed in response to a 
perceived nihilism in America. The project of neoconservatism thus becomes an 
end in itself and its perpetuation a constant necessity to stave off domestic 
nihilism. At the core of neoconservatism’s ‘future-orientated conservatism’ was a 
form of American nationalism which completely transcended the barrier between 
the domestic and the international. It required not just backward-looking 
examinations of past glories but a commitment to ideals, to “the meaning of the 
nation in a heroic sense capable of mobilizing individuals to virtuous action.”1052 
This particular sense of purpose is strikingly apparent in the linguistic differences 
between the 1999 and 2002 iterations of the U.S. National Security Strategy. 
Whilst the language of the former is largely technocratic, the language of the latter 
is redolently valiant and sees national interest become indivisible from national 
greatness. Within this framework an ill-defined ‘war against terror’ potentially 
limitless in scope and the perpetual possibility of conflict unleashed by an explicit 
commitment to pre-emption make sense as animating principles for the 
reinvigoration of republican virtue. Indeed, “neoconservatism can only sustain 
itself by cultivating a level of limited but endemic conflict in the international 
system and nurturing its support base in the name of an expansive foreign 
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policy.”1053 The perhaps inevitable corollary of this “theatrical 
micromilitarism”1054 is that there is a 
lacuna at the heart of the neoconservative’s foreign policy agenda . . . 
it had very little to contribute once Iraq had been occupied . . . the 
intervention was not perceived . . . or sold to the American electorate 
as an extended exercise in either state building or military occupation. 
Instead it was to be a limited exercise in regime change and then state 
reform.1055 
Despite this hollow core, the success of neoconservatism was its ability to 
circumscribe its arguments within the familiar language of American 
exceptionalism. Whilst this thesis does not agree, some commentators suggest that 
the Bush Doctrine’s success will be its lack of innovation and, conversely, its 
ability to bring together perennial strands in American grand strategy.1056 To 
return to where this chapter started, the profusion of commentators who see 
neoconservatism as a form of ‘hard’ Wilsonianism goes a long way in 
demonstrating neoconservatism’s ideological success during the Bush years and 
the way in which it seemed to represent a recognisable strand of American 
ideology. This chapter has argued the contrary. Whilst neoconservatism has not 
disappeared from public debate it is no longer as powerful an ideological force as 
it was during the George W. Bush presidency. Nonetheless neoconservatism has 
survived and mutated during its periods in the wilderness and it remains to be 
seen whether it will reassert itself. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
The central argument made in this thesis is that American exceptionalism is a 
necessary yet insufficient way of reading American grand strategy. Insufficient, 
because it has always been a source of ideological contestation, employed in 
different ways, by different people, and in different contexts to support and enable 
different grand strategic projects. The thesis argues that grand strategy is 
inherently ideological and that its focus is the creation of an idealised utopian 
vision upon which the resources of the state can be deployed to that ideological 
end. The lexical choices asserted in the titles of grand strategies often reflect this – 
the ‘containment’ of Communism and the ‘enlargement’ of democracy are 
unusual linguistic devices, bestowing physical manifestations and geographical 
reach upon ultimately abstract political ideas. 
It is not always clear what constitutes a presidential doctrine and, apart from the 
Truman Doctrine, few have explicitly been given a title. The aim of this thesis has 
been the recreation of ideological debate, which this thesis has already suggested 
usually lacks analytic rigour and is often expressed in fragments. As Raymond 
Geuss conceives of it, such discourse is composed of “historically congealed 
kinds of rhetorical appeal, which make use of quasi-propositional fragments.”1057 
As a result the thesis has taken a deliberately expansive approach to the texts that 
express American grand strategy at any particular historical juncture. 
As the methodological commitments of contextualism indicate, the thesis has 
argued that it is not possible to compose a temporally stable grand narrative of 
American foreign policy, and nor is it possible to impose a “mythology of 
coherence”1058 upon American exceptionalism, for American exceptionalism does 
not have static meaning. The aim has not been to provide a new singular meaning 
of American exceptionalism – this thesis’s epistemological commitment would 
make such a goal fruitless – and nor has the thesis attempted to suggest whether 
America has ever been exceptional or not. 
The thesis has, however, necessarily been as concerned with elements of 
ideological continuity as it has with ideological innovation. The most pronounced 
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continuity in debate about American exceptionalism and how America should 
assert itself internationally has been the interplay of domestic and international 
concerns. Equally, the possibility that foreign policy might have a material and 
moral impact on the nature of the Union has been a longstanding element of 
exceptionalist debate. 
The thesis has posited a view of ideology as social practice and the resulting 
individual case studies have illustrated both ideological continuity and change. 
The key issue has been trying to recreate the authorial intention of the innovating 
ideologists, what they were trying to do. To overcome the “mythology of 
coherence” and, equally, to emphasise elements of ideological continuity, this 
thesis has recreated the ideological context at four critical junctures in American 
foreign policy in order to demonstrate the way in which four presidents and their 
key advisors – “ideological innovators,” in Quentin Skinner’s lexicon1059 – have 
attempted ideological innovation and dominance through the articulation of grand 
strategy which necessitated a refashioning of American exceptionalism. 
The research has shown that the process of ideological innovation involves the 
manipulation of existing politico-moral concepts to legitimate a particular course 
of action. In being forced to use existing conceptual and linguistic devices, 
however, limits are placed upon innovating ideologists in terms of what they can 
articulate intelligibly. This is what Skinner means when he suggests that “every 
revolutionary is to this extent obliged to march backwards into battle.”1060 The 
effect of this, however, is that even revolutionary texts can have an intrinsic 
appearance of familiarity, which can prove illusory. This thesis has recreated four 
of these ‘backward marches’. 
The first of these ‘re-creations’, in Chapter 4, centres around the ideological 
context which led to the strategy of containment. The chapter illustrated that 
Truman, Acheson, and Nitze were the central ideological innovators at that point, 
albeit buttressed for the first time in American history by a narrow, circumscribed 
national-security elite. The Truman Doctrine represented a rejection of differing 
realist and cosmopolitan versions of potential postwar American internationalism 
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which had been put forward by Walter Lippmann, Henry Luce, and George 
Kennan. All three of their visions moved away from pre-war American 
isolationism, whilst stressing American exceptionalism. Truman and Acheson’s 
main ideological innovation was to create a grand strategy which put at its very 
centre a Manichean binary between ‘freedom’ and ‘slavery’. It produced a new 
conception of American exceptionalism in which not only did America have a 
global responsibility to defend freedom everywhere but any challenge to that 
freedom was now perceived as a threat to the national security of the United 
States. It Not only universalised American values but left the legacy of a grand 
strategy which was motivated by the defence of an idea rather than concrete 
material goals. 
The way in which Truman and Acheson effected their ideological innovation is of 
considerable importance to this thesis. Their strategic revolution is a paradigmatic 
example of Skinner’s model of ideological innovation. As Michael Hogan noted 
about NSC-68, it managed to “wrap departures from tradition, in tradition 
itself.”1061 Chapter Four illustrated the way in which both the Truman Doctrine 
and NSC-68 leveraged a diverse range of existing language, lexical constructs, 
and texts in order to give legitimacy to texts that actually marked a significant 
departure from the existing conventions of American exceptionalism. Both the 
Truman Doctrine and NSC-68 employed the conventions of the Wilsonian 
rhetoric of freedom and Rooseveltian wartime rhetoric to invoke a global mission. 
Yet, at the same time, normal diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were 
presented as being completely untenable. 
The successes of the ideological innovation of Truman, Acheson and Nitze can be 
seen by the degree to which the ideas of the Truman Doctrine were encapsulated 
in, and actually extended even further by, NSC-68, one of the foundational texts 
of the early Cold War. The underlying aim of that document was “to assure the 
integrity and vitality of our free society,”1062 but it conflated the preservation of a 
domestic regime with ideological hegemony. The legacy was massive military 
buildup and the continued reference, even in contemporary foreign-policy debate, 
to the policy of containment. 
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Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon were less successful in their attempt at 
ideological innovation. Chapter 5 not only examined the nature of their project but 
also suggested why détente failed to become an enduring part of the foreign-
policy lexicon. Détente was conceived as a response to domestic attacks from 
both the Left and the Right of the political spectrum. These attacks had, in part, 
been caused by the idea that a pervasive sense of American domestic malaise was 
caused by the crusading Vietnam War. Writers such as Daniel Bell and Kenneth 
Galbraith suggested that the existing ideological debate in America, which had 
underpinned the undifferentiated globalism of containment, was simply no longer 
socially adequate for American social realities. In fact, Bell asserted that 
American ideology had become more concerned with restraining domestic 
pressure for international change. Kissinger’s response was to adopt European-
style realism as America’s grand strategy. Chapter 5 suggests that, even whilst he 
was promoting realism, Kissinger’s approach to détente was more ideological 
than realist. Whilst both Nixon and Kissinger pointed to America’s limited 
capabilities, the global reach of détente re-evoked America’s limitless strategic 
expectations. The emphasis which détente placed upon interdependence was 
undercut by Kissinger’s determination to defend American credibility. The point 
is that this form of détente was actually not realist at all but an attempt by Nixon 
and Kissinger to maintain bipolarity and the containment of Communism. Far 
from the retrenchment that might have been expected of a realist grand strategy, 
Kissinger pursued ongoing globalism and engagement. It was an ideological 
grand strategy which continued with the premise of American exceptionalism and 
bipolarity whilst, paradoxically, publicly trying to purge itself of ideological taint. 
In the pursuit of Soviet ‘self-restraint’ Kissinger was actually engaged in a 
profoundly ideological goal. To get the Soviet Union to abandon revolutionary 
projects and to accept the legitimacy of an American-dominated international 
system was perhaps even more ideologically ambitious than the logic of 
containment. Ironically, whilst détente was innovative, Kissinger’s own attempts 
to strip the strategy of its overt ideological components sowed the seeds of its 
destruction. Détente failed to become a conventional part of the strategic lexicon 
because, by consciously distancing détente from ideology, Kissinger pushed the 
supporting logic of his policy far beyond the governing conventions of American 
exceptionalism. The Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) ultimately killed off 
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détente by suggesting that it had fostered moral equivalence between America and 
the Soviet Union (it had not). Nonetheless, the CPD’s criticism, combined with 
neoconservative aversion to realism, led Ronald Reagan’s presidential platform to 
openly oppose détente. 
The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity to reshape American 
exceptionalism. Whilst the Clinton administration did not bring about major 
ideological reorientation, it did articulate a largely coherent grand strategy. 
Although America was in a position of unmatched military and economic strength 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall it was unclear what the ‘new world order’, as the 
first Bush president called it, would look like. Clinton came into power in the 
midst of intellectual argument surrounding the shape of the new world order. On 
the one hand, Paul Kennedy typified arguments that warned that America was at 
the zenith of an imperial moment and needed to bolster its economic base to ward 
off almost inevitable imperial decline. On the other, Francis Fukuyama was the 
acceptable face of neoconservative thought which both descriptively and 
prescriptively pointed towards American ideological and material hegemony. 
Fukuyama was vague enough about American purpose at ‘the end of history’ that 
even non-neoconservatives were able to accept at least part of his vision of 
America’s ideological pervasiveness. The identification of the misreading of 
Fukuyama in the 1990s and the conflation of his ideas with the apparent 
inevitability of the spread of democracy only serves to highlight the type of 
historical knowledge which contextualism facilitates. 
Clinton’s major ideological innovation was ‘democratic enlargement’ and, 
although he repeatedly invoked the “inexorable logic of globalization,”1063 his 
sense of the ‘inexorable logic’ was closer to Fukuyama than Samuel Huntington’s 
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dystopia. Despite this relative optimism regarding the meaning of American 
hegemony, the Clinton administration’s view of how American preponderant 
power should be deployed differed from that of the neoconservatives whose draft 
Defense Planning Guidance1064 blueprint had been leaked to the press in the early 
1990s. This thesis suggests that the strategy of enlargement was a sustained 
ideological articulation of American exceptionalism. It filled the void of post-
Cold War American purpose which Fukuyama had left to be answered by his 
ideological brethren who had been in place at the Department of Defense. Whilst 
the strategy of enlargement maintained a Wilsonian commitment to the support of 
democracy and the maintenance of liberal international institutions, its explicit 
commitment to democratic enlargement was via the economic elements of foreign 
policy. Clinton was less consistent in the exercise of military intervention and was 
well aware that it was American hegemony that allowed him to pursue an a la 
carte approach to multilateralism. 
In terms of the success of Clinton’s ideological refashioning of grand strategy, he 
bequeathed an unusual mix of legacies. Democratic enlargement fitted quite easily 
within the conventions of exceptionalist discourse, and it did not prove terribly 
difficult for the Clinton administration, wounded by the criticisms of inaction in 
Rwanda, to later attach a form of liberal hawkishness to their grand strategy. 
Although it would be unwise to overstate the place of intervention and, in 
particular, unilateral intervention in Clinton’s grand strategy, it is a point of 
significant continuity with the presidency of George W. Bush. 
Despite George W. Bush’s having attacked Clinton’s record on foreign policy 
during the campaign, and his ‘anything but Clinton’ mantra once in power, the 
ideological success of Clinton’s grand strategy was shown in Bush’s continuing 
with much of it until 9/11. Apart from a sustained critique of Clinton’s 
interventions for lacking a strategic rationale and a narrowing of what constituted 
the national interest, there was significant cross-over between the two 
administrations. As presidential candidate and early in his presidency, George W. 
Bush often displayed contradictory elements of both realism and neoconservatism 
which frustrated attempts to conveniently pigeonhole his early grand strategic 
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designs, even if his key advisors were at pains to stress Bush’s realist approach. 
Bush’s limited conception of the national interest was reaffirmed by the 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review,1065 which prioritised domestic security and 
deterrence, had no real policy of rolling back rogue states, and took no aggressive 
action against Iraq. Nonetheless, if Bush’s ‘balance of power that favors freedom’ 
seemed incomprehensible when first enunciated in his 2001 inaugural address, by 
the time it was repeated in the 2002 National Security Strategy1066 the meaning 
seemed much clearer. 9/11 facilitated two significant changes: first, as Gary 
Dorrien put it, “George W. Bush fully joined his own administration,”1067 which 
ended the balancing between neoconservatives and realists in the administration; 
second, it allowed a radical change in the normative parameters of American 
exceptionalism. The attacks of 9/11 became the focus of the Bush administration 
and made a neoconservative ideological revolution much easier. However, it is 
important not to overestimate the degree of ideological innovation that the Bush 
Doctrine represented. For instance, in the wake of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 
considerable focus was placed on the appearance of ‘pre-emption’ in the 2002 
National Security Strategy and the degree of novelty this represented. In 1904, 
President Theodore Roosevelt’s ‘corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine was a policy 
of preventive intervention in the Americas. This was echoed again prior to the 
United States’ entry into the Second World War by Roosevelt’s justification of 
anticipatory self-defence against German ships: “When you see a rattlesnake 
poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.”1068 
Pre-emption was certainly a good fit with neoconservatism in terms of compelling 
‘rogue states’ to behave in accordance with American policy objectives; however, 
it was by no means a novel concept. 
In examining neconservatism from its inception rather than proleptically, the 
thesis showed that a Skinnerian reading of the Bush Doctrine yields a different 
sense of the ideological innovation that it represented. First, neoconservatism had 
primarily been motivated by a sense of disgust with American nihilism and 
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cultural relativism in the 1960s and 1970s and thus the primary neoconservative 
goal was a domestic one, willing the recreation of republican virtue in America. 
From a neoconservative perspective, 9/11, and more specifically the identification 
of an enemy, was precisely the kind of event that would give normative substance 
to America and prevent cultural disintegration. From that perspective Bush’s call 
to arms “In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of 
action”1069 had both an international and domestic connotation. Second, the 
elements of democracy promotion had been a later addition to neoconservatism 
during the Reagan administration, when the defence of human rights had been 
fused with the promotion of narrow, polyarchic democracies. The type of 
democracy neoconservatives wished to export was elitist and its purpose was 
largely connected to facilitating an international environment dominated by the 
hegemony of the United States. As a result, proleptic readings of the Bush 
Doctrine have overemphasised the links between neoconservatism and 
Wilsonianism. Indeed, the success of neoconservatism in becoming ideologically 
‘conventional’ was in large part because it expressed its innovations within the 
acceptable discursive parameters of exceptionalist debate. As Robert Kaplan 
expressed rather crudely, America had to “Speak Victorian, think Pagan.”1070 
In his second inaugural address Bush made the bold ideological assertion that 
“The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty 
in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom 
in all the world.”1071 It was a remarkable recreation of the logic of NSC-68 and, 
perhaps most importantly of all, Bush demonstrated the ‘conventionality’ of such 
an ideological understanding of U.S. security interests by stating “We are led, by 
events and common sense, to one conclusion.”1072 
All of the individual studies in the thesis have illustrated the degree to which the 
normative architecture of American grand strategy has been continually re-formed 
and challenged. The point is that political actors need to gain control of the 
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dominant languages structuring political discourse within their society. It remains 
to be seen how correct President Bush was in asserting that his ideological vision 
had become “common sense.”1073 An op-ed in the New York Times declared 
triumphantly in the wake of Barack Obama’s inaugural address: “In about 20 
minutes, he swept away eight years of President George Bush’s false choices and 
failed policies and promised to recommit to America’s most cherished ideals.”1074 
Certainly, the expectations of those hoping for wholesale ideological change from 
President Obama have not yet been fulfilled.1075 While President Obama has 
stopped using many of the more controversial linguistic constructions of the Bush 
administration, such as “the war on terror,”1076 there are striking points of 
continuity between Obama and George W. Bush which are not just limited to 
inherited military campaigns. Obama has continued with the pre-emptive use of 
force, which is the strategic doctrine behind the use of preventive drone strikes in 
Pakistan and Yemen. He has also demonstrated a willingness to pursue selective 
unilateralism, notably in the operation against Osama Bin Laden. This has been 
unequivocally clarified in his justification for intervention in Libya, and, although 
that action had the backing of the UN Security Council,1077 Obama declared “I’ve 
made it clear that I will never hesitate to use our military swiftly, decisively, and 
unilaterally when necessary to defend our people, our homeland, our allies, and 
our core interests.”1078 Whilst it seems unlikely that Barack Obama shares with 
Bush the underlying ideological commitments of neoconservatism,1079 he will 
certainly be constrained to some extent by the ideological discourse that preceded 
him. He is yet to make a well-defined ideological contribution to American grand 
strategy of his own. 
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This thesis has used a theory of social life and social change to contribute to the 
process of revealing a far richer American political tradition within the arena of 
foreign-policy thought than either diplomatic history or positivist theories of 
International Relations allow. The history of grand strategy in America has not 
simply been limited to rational calculation of policy and political dealing but has 
been one of continual ideological contest. The thesis has attempted to strip itself 
of the ‘benefit’ of hindsight in order to understand how and why successive 
generations of political actors have sought to refashion America’s role anew in the 
world. America’s strategic posture has not been the only thing at stake: so too has 
been the reproduction of the animating principles of the Republic. 
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